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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann.$ 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Martineau requests the Appellate Court to consider four issues. (See Brief of 
Appellant ("Applnt Brief), p. 1-2.) In presenting the issues, however, Martineau 
inaccurately characterizes the trial court's rulings by seeking review of findings and 
conclusions that were never made. For example, the trial court never concluded that 
"Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball . . . owed no contractual obligation to honor 
Martineau's lease." (See Id.at f A.) Nor did the trial court find or conclude that it 
would allow the foreclosure sale to go forward "after [Miller and Kimball] had acquired 
both mortgaged property and the debt securing that mortgage under circumstances 
'designed' to discourage participation by the public at a foreclosure sale." (Id. at f B.) 
Rather, the trial court determined that Martineau's motion to set aside the default 
judgment was untimely and that Martineau was not entitled to injunctive relief. The net 
effect was to allow Miller and Kimball to go forward with the foreclosure sale Martineau 
had successfully postponed for almost 15 months. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure Rule 24(b)(1), Miller and Kimball hereby frame what they consider 
are the proper issues on appeal and the applicable standard of review. 
1 
Issue No. 1: Based upon all of the facts and circumstances, did the trial court 
abuse its discretion when it denied Martineau's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
which motion was filed approximately eighteen months after default judgment was 
entered against Martineau on March 5, 1993? 
Standard of Review: In considering Issue No. 1, the Appellate Court has 
several standards of review to follow. First, a trial court's findings of fact are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 
(Utah 1993). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination, if a factual finding is based on sufficient evidence, then the finding is not 
clearly erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Second, when a 
legal rule is applied to a given set of facts, i.e. whether to set aside a default judgment, 
the trial court's ruling is reversible only upon a showing of an "abuse of discretion." 
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434-36 (Utah 1993). 
Issue No. 2: Based upon all of the facts and circumstances, did the trial court 
abuse its discretion when it denied Martineau's motion for preliminary injunction on the 
grounds that Martineau lacked standing to seek injunctive relief? 
Standard of Review: In considering Issue No. 2, the Appellate Court has the 
same standards of review to follow as set forth above. See also, Birch Creek Irrigation 
v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 994 (Utah 1993) (appellate court "will not disturb a trial 
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court's judgment granting or refusing an injunction unless the court abused its discretion 
or the judgment rendered is clearly against the weight of the evidence"). 
Issue No, 3: Based upon the facts and circumstances, did the trial court abuse 
its discretion by awarding Miller and Kimball their attorneys fees, under Rule 65A of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the amount of $20,000 for having been wrongfully 
restrained from foreclosing Martineau's leasehold interest for over 15 months? 
Standard of Review: In awarding attorneys fees, the Appellate Court reviews 
the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Gillmor, 850 P.2d at 434-36. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
In moving to set aside the Default Judgment, Martineau relied upon Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, prior to moving to set aside the Default 
Judgment, Martineau obtained a temporary restraining order and moved to have the trial 
court enter a preliminary injunction precluding a foreclosure of Martineau's leasehold 
interest. In moving for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, 
Martineau relied upon Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Copies of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 65A are attached hereto as Addendum No. 14. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. The Nature of the Case: 
Martineau is seeking to preserve a leasehold interest which Martineau conceded 
was inferior, junior and subordinate to Miller and Kimball's lien when the trial court 
entered default judgment. This appeal is the last in a series of attempts by Martineau to 
use Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge Building in hopes of elevating its inferior 
unrecorded leasehold interest to a senior priority position. 
This action, commenced on January 8, 1992, is an action to judicially foreclose 
a 1986 Deed of Trust given to Miller and Kimball's predecessor, Republic Savings and 
Loan Association ("Republic"), to secure a loan for the purchase of the Judge Building. 
The purchaser, Judge Building Associates ("Associates"), defaulted on its obligations to 
Republic in 1991. Martineau, who held an unrecorded leasehold interest in the Judge 
Building, was named as a defendant on February 8, 1992. When Martineau failed to file 
an answer, the trial court entered default judgment on March 5, 1993. Pursuant to Rule 
58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Martineau received notice of the default judgment. 
The default judgment determined that Martineau's leasehold interest was inferior, junior 
and subordinate to the lien of Republic. Martineau never appealed the default judgment. 
In May of 1993, Republic, Associates and its general partners agreed to sell the 
Judge Building to Miller and Kimball. Martineau, who had expressed an interest in 
purchasing the Judge Building, had knowledge of Miller and Kimball's purchase. On 
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June 23, 1993, Republic, Associates and its general partners stipulated that Miller and 
Kimball could be substituted for Republic and could proceed with the foreclosure of the 
1986 Trust Deed, which foreclosure would terminate Martineau's junior and subordinate 
leasehold interest. The Court approved the stipulation and settlement. Subsequently, 
Miller and Kimball moved for and the Court entered a decree of foreclosure on 
November 1, 1993, ordering the Judge Building to be foreclosed. 
Without warning, less than a week before the foreclosure sale was to take place 
and after remaining silent for almost two years, Martineau injected itself into this action 
by moving to dismiss the action and moving to enjoin the foreclosure sale. Martineau's 
sole argument was that the 1986 Trust Deed had been canceled and was therefore no 
longer in effect. Martineau argued that, because Miller and Kimball now held both the 
fee title to the property and the beneficial interest in the 1986 Trust Deed, the two estates 
merged, and the 1986 Trust Deed was extinguished as a matter of law. 
The trial court found that Martineau's motions were untimely and without legal 
basis. The trial court ruled Martineau had no standing to set aside the default judgment 
since its motion was filed more than 18 months after the entry of default judgment and 
more than 16 months after Martineau had learned of Miller and Kimball's purchase of 
the Judge Building. Likewise, Martineau's claim for injunctive relief based upon certain 
equitable claims was factually and legally inadequate. Not only did the parties express 
an intent not to merge the two interests, but the trial Court found that Miller and Kimball 
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intended to foreclose Martineau's leasehold interest. In short, Martineau had no right 
to interfere with the foreclosure of the 1986 Trust Deed, and this Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it declined to set aside the default judgment, grant injunctive relief, or 
dismiss the action. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding Miller and 
Kimball damages based upon Martineau having wrongfully enjoined Miller and Kimball. 
II. The Course of Proceedings: 
A. The Foreclosure Action. 
1 • On January 8, 1992, Republic filed a complaint against Associates and its 
principals seeking to judicially foreclose the 1986 Trust Deed. (R. 1-54.) 
2, On February 14, 1992, adding two parties claiming an interest in the Judge 
Building, including Martineau. (R. 87-139.) 
3, Martineau never answered the Amended Complaint. (R. 1511-12.) 
4, On March 5, 1993, this Court entered default judgment against Martineau 
(the "Default Judgment'). (R. 472-75.) The Default Judgment states that the "lien or 
interest, if any, of the defendant Martineau ... is inferior, junior and subordinate to the 
lien of [Republic] upon the real property at issue herein [the Judge Building], . . . ." (Id. 
at f 1.) Martineau received notice of the Default Judgment. (R. 475.) 
5, In May and June of 1993, Miller and Kimball acquired the Judge Building 
from Republic and were substituted as plaintiffs in this action. (R. 798-837.) 
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6. Pursuant to the terms of the Default Judgment and the purchase agreement, 
on November 1, 1993, the Court entered a Decree of Foreclosure. A foreclosure sale 
was scheduled for November 30, 1993 at 12:00 p.m. (R. 849-74.) 
B. Martineau's Temporary Restraining Order. 
7. Less than a week before the scheduled foreclosure sale, on November 24, 
1993, Martineau entered an appearance for the first time in the case and moved the trial 
court for a temporary restraining order to forestall the pending foreclosure sale. 
Simultaneously Martineau moved to dismiss the Complaint on the sole basis that the 1986 
Trust Deed, under which the action was brought, had been canceled and was no longer 
in effect. (R. 875-889.) 
8. On November 30, 1993, the trial court granted Martineau's motion for a 
temporary restraining order, instructed Martineau's counsel to prepare a written order, 
and set the bond at $1,000. 
9. The sheriffs sale scheduled for November 30, 1993 was canceled. 
10. On the afternoon of November 30, 1993, Martineau forwarded to Miller 
and Kimball a proposed draft of a temporary restraining order "pursuant to the Court's 
ruling." (R. 1233-34.) 
11. At no time subsequent to November 30, 1993 did Martineau submit the 
proposed temporary restraining order to the Court for signature. (R. 1224.) 
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12. Martineau never presented an original temporary restraining order to the 
Court for signature or deposit the $1,000 bond with the Court clerk. (R. 1225.) 
13. On or about January 24, 1994, Martineau confirmed that a mutual 
agreement was reached between the parties that (a) "no formal order was necessary for 
signature by the Court," (b) "the temporary restraining order remains in effect until 
either (1) die parties agree otherwise or (2) subsequent order of the Court" and ® "he 
agreed to hold the $1,000 bond in [his] trust account." (R. 1236-37.) 
C. The September 29. 1993 Preliminary Injunction Hearing. 
14. A week before the September 29th preliminary injunction hearing 
Martineau forwarded a proposed Stipulation of Agreed Facts which outlined certain facts 
Martineau believed were not in dispute. The Stipulation of Agreed Facts acknowledged 
that "Martineau sought and obtained a Restraining Order from this Court which stopped 
the pending Sheriffs Sale" and that the preliminary injunction hearing "had been 
continued without date pursuant to agreement of the parties." (R. 1239-44.) 
15. At the hearing-, on September 29, 1994, due to Martineau's ever changing 
and evolving legal theories, the parties stipulated to a continuance of the hearing on the 
motion for preliminary injunction in order to afford Martineau an opportunity to file a 
memorandum outlining all of the legal theories, authorities and facts supporting its 
request for preliminary injunction. 
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16. On September 30, 1994, Martineau's counsel forwarded a proposed order 
to Miller and Kimball's counsel which documented the events at the September 29, 1994 
hearing, as well as reaffirm the temporary restraining order. (R. 1245.) The proposed 
Order specifically stated as follows: 
1. The Court acknowledges its issuance of a Temporary Restraining 
Order on November 30, 1993. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, such 
Order remains in effect pending a hearing on the Preliminary Injunction 
Motion, or pending other subsequent Order of this Court. (R. 1248.) 
17. Subsequent to September 30, 1994, Martineau never presented the proposed 
order to the Court for signature. 
D. Martineau's Equitahle Claims for Injunction Relief, 
18. On October 7, 1994, Martineau filed, for the first time, a motion to set 
aside the Default Judgment. (R. 972-994.) 
19. Concurrently, Martineau filed a Hearing Memorandum. (R. 975-994.) 
The memorandum only outlined Martineau's legal theories, authorities and facts 
supporting its request for preliminary injunction. (Id. at 975-76.) The memorandum 
was silent as to why the Default Judgment should be set aside. In particular, Martineau 
asserted that the 1996 Trust Deed Miller and Kimball were seeking to foreclose had been 
either (1) extinguished by operation of law, or (2) become subordinate to the Martineau 
Lease. (Id. at 981.) The new legal theories Martineau relied upon included: (a) merger 
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of title; (b) express contract; (c)unjust enrichment; (d) waiver and laches; (e) promissory 
estoppel; and (f) equitable estoppel. (Id. at 982-83.) 
E. The January 19. 1995 Preliminary Hearing. 
20. The preliminary injunction hearing was held on January 19, 1995. Four 
witnesses testified: Hill, Kimball, Miller and Leland Martineau. (R. 1374-1559.) 
21. At the close of Martineau's presentation of evidence, Miller and Kimball 
moved for dismissal of Martineau's claims pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 41(b) . (R. 1522.) Miller and Kimball's motion was granted when the trial court 
denied Martineau's motion to set aside the Default Judgment on the grounds there was 
an unreasonable delay in bringing the motion. (R. 1549-1550.) The trial court also 
denied Martineau's motion for preliminary injunction, in part, on the grounds that none 
of Martineau's rights had been violated by Miller and Kimball's subsequent purchase of 
the Judge Building. (R. 1551-52.) 
F. Post-Trial Motions. 
22. Martineau did not file any post trial motions, choosing simply to respond 
to Miller and Kimball's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Damages, 
filed on February 3, 1995 (R. 1170-1178 and 1202-1212) and objecting to Miller and 
Kimball's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed on March 2, 
1995. (R. 1215-20.) 
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23. On or about May 26, 1995, the parties entered into a Stipulation re: 
Completion of Pending Foreclosure and the trial court entered an Order re: Completion 
of Pending Foreclosure, whereby Martineau stipulated to the foreclosure of its leasehold 
interest. (R. 1279-1283.) Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order, neither party waived 
any claims, defenses, rights of appeal, etc. by virtue of the stipulation regarding 
completion of the foreclosure. (Id.) 
24. On June 29, 1995, the trial court issued a minute entry relating to 
objections raised by Martineau over the language of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order regarding the preliminary injunction hearing. (R. 1284-1287.) 
25. In August of 1995, Miller and Kimball submitted to the trial court for 
signature the revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in accordance 
with the minute entry of June 25, 1995. (See Applnt's Addendum No. 13.1) 
G. Award of Attorney's Fees to Miller and KimhalL 
26. On May 9, 1995, the trial court held a hearing to consider whether Miller 
and Kimball were entitled to recover damages from Martineau for having obtained a 
wrongfully issued temporary restraining order in November of 1993. 
1
 The executed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated 24, 
1995[sic] is attached to Appellant's Docketing Statement and as Addendum No. 13 to 
Appellant's Addendum. Miller and Kimball shall hereinafter refer to Addendum No. 13 
as the "Court Findings." 
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27. On June 29, 1995, the trial court issued a minute entry finding that Miller 
and Kimball were entitled to recover damages, which would be limited to the "costs and 
attorneys fees incurred by Miller and Kimball in defending against the temporary 
restraining order and the Motion for Preliminary Injunction." (R. 1284-88.) The trial 
court instructed the parties to consult and determine if the issue of damages could be 
submitted by affidavit. (Id.) 
28. On February 2, 1996, the trial court held a hearing to consider the amount 
of attorneys fees and costs to be awarded to Miller and Kimball based upon Martineau 
having obtained a wrongfully issued temporary restraining order. 
29. On May 24, 1996, after the presentation of evidence, the trial court entered 
a second set of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, wherein the trial court 
concluded that the temporary restraining order entered on November 30, 1993 was 
wrongfully issued and awarded Miller and Kimball attorneys fees in the amount of 
$20,000. (R. 1339-1333.) 
30. On June 21,-1996, Martineau filed a timely Notice of Appeal seeking 
appellate review of the following: (I) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
dated August 1995, concerning the January 19, 1995 preliminary injunction hearing 
(Court Findings); (ii) Minute Entry, dated June 29, 1995, concerning the trial court's 
determination that Martineau was liable for Miller and Kimball's attorneys fees and costs 
incurred by Miller and Kimball in defending against the temporary restraining order and 
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the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (R. 1284-88, Court Findings); and (iii) Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated May 24, 1996. (R. 1329-1333, 
Addendum No. 14.) 
III. Statement of Facts. 
Miller and Kimball's objection to Martineau's effort to use their purchase of the 
Judge Building to avoid foreclosure of its leasehold interest centers on the timing of its 
motions. After conceding it held an inferior interest, after allowing default to be taken, 
after learning that Miller and Kimball were purchasing the Judge Building in April 1993, 
Martineau waited until the week before the foreclosure sale to intercede. The trial court 
found Martineau's delays unreasonable. Because timing was critical to the trial court's 
ruling, Miller and Kimball set forth the following material facts in chronological order: 
a. On March 6, 1986, Associates became the owner of certain real property 
located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is commonly known as the 
Judge Building. (R. 2-3, Court Findings, p. 2 % 1.) 
b. On March ^6, 1986, Associates executed and delivered to Republic a 
Promissory Note, dated March 6, 1986 (the "1986 Note") in the principal amount of 
$2,300,000.00. (R. 3, 15-22, Court Findings, p. 2, 1 2.) 
c. On March 6, 1986, Associates executed a Deed of Trust with Assignment 
of Rents and Lease in favor of Republic to secure a $2,300,000 note (the "1986 Trust 
Deed"). (R. 4, 23-38.) 
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d. Concurrently, and as further security, Associates executed an Assignment 
of Rents, Profits and Leases. (R. 4, 47-53.) 
e. On November 13, 1990, Associates entered into a Lease Agreement with 
Martineau & Company, CPAs, whereby Martineau leased approximately 4,500 square 
feet located on the fifth floor of the Property. (R. 1080-1105, Court Findings, p. 3, f 
3.) Martineau's lease, which was negotiated between Associates' general partner, 
Harold J. Hill, and Martineau's principal, LeLand Martineau, was substantially different 
from other tenants in terms of the length of the lease, monthly rent, and pass-through 
costs.2 For example, at Martineau's option, the lease could be extended for a total of 18 
years. Similarly, the Martineau lease was only subject to a one percent (1 %) annual 
increase in rent, compared to five percent (5 %) for all other tenants. Nor was Martineau 
responsible for any pass-through operating costs. In other words, the terms were so 
favorable to Martineau that Associates (through Mr. Hill) asked Martineau not to discuss 
them with other tenants or anyone else. (R. 1412, 11. 12-17, Court Findings, p. 3, f 3.) 
f. The Martineau Lease was never recorded. (R. 1522, 1532, Court 
Findings, p. 3, 13.) 
g. Associates became delinquent in its obligation to Republic in October of 
1991 when it stopped making payments. (R. 1427, Court Findings, p. 3, If 4.) 
2
 Martineau argued that it signed the standard form lease used with all other 
Judge Building tenants. Various terms, however, were altered to render the agreement 
"substantially" different from others. (See R. at 1084, 1085-86, 1091-92 and 1093.) 
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h. Martineau learned that Associates was in default of the 1996 Note in 
December of 1991. (R. 1509; Court Findings, p. 3, 1 5.) 
i. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hill of Associates approached Martineau about the 
possibility of purchasing the Judge Building. (R. 1501.) 
j . On January 8, 1992, Republic filed a complaint against Associates and its 
principals, Mr. Hill and J. Michael Martin, seeking to judicially foreclose the 1986 Trust 
Deed. (R. 1- 54, Court Findings, p. 3, f 6.) The Complaint alleged, among other 
things, that Associates was in default of the 1986 Note and owed Republic approximately 
$2,200,000. (R. 1-54.) 
k. On February 11, 1992, Republic filed an Amended Complaint, adding 
Martineau as a defendant. (R. 87-139, Court Findings, p. 4, j 8.) 
1. After being served with the Amended Complaint, Martineau knew Republic 
was trying to foreclose its leasehold interest and after presenting the Amended Complaint 
to its counsel made a conscious decision not to answer or respond to the Amended 
Complaint. (R. 1510-12; Court Findings, p. 4, | 9.) 
m. At the preliminary hearing, LeLand testified that he knew with absolute 
certainty that the lease interest was inferior, junior and subordinate to the 1986 Trust 
Deed and that, in the event of foreclosure, any and all rights and/or interest Martineau 
had as a leasehold tenant would be extinguished and terminated. (R. 1512-14, 1516, 
1517, Court Findings, p. 4, f 9.) 
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n. Martineau never sought an extension of time nor filed an answer or 
counterclaim. (R. 1512, Court Findings, p. 4, 1 10.) 
o. In the beginning of 1993, Martineau began negotiations with Republic and 
its agent, Ray Unrath of Wallace & Associates, to purchase the Judge Building. (R. 
1501-02.) 
p. On March 5, 1993, this trial court entered Default Judgment against 
Martineau. (R. 472-475.) The Default Judgment states that the "lien or interest, if any, 
of the defendant Martineau & Company, Certified Public Accountants is inferior, junior 
and subordinate to the lien of plaintiff upon the real property at issue herein, . . .." (Id. 
at f 1.)(Emphasis added.) The Default Judgment goes on to provide that 
2. The defendant Martineau & Company is not a judgment debtor . . 
., is not a creditor having a lien by judgment or mortgage on the Property 
and is not a successor in interest to any such person or entity, and is not 
entitled to redeem the Property or any part thereof from any sale of the 
Property pursuant to Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Upon any execution sale of the Property pursuant to order of this Court 
in the above entitled action any interest or lien claimed by the defendant 
Martineau & Company shall be forthwith extinguished and 
terminated. 
(R. 472-475 at tf 2, 3 (emphasis added), Court Findings, p. 4, if 11.) A copy of the 
Default Judgment was given to Martineau. (Id.) 
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q. As of March 5, 1993, Martineau was aware that default had been entered 
against it and that the Default Judgment by its express terms would extinguish 
Martineau's leasehold interest in the Judge Building. (R. 1513.) 
r. Recognizing that its interest was inferior, junior and subordinate to 
Republic's, Martineau did not appeal the Default Judgment. (Court Findings, f 11.) 
s. Following the entry of the Default Judgment against Martineau, Leland 
Martineau had a couple of oral conversations with plaintiff, David M. Kimball, 
concerning the Judge Building. (R. 1503-04, 1516-17; see also Court Findings, p. 5, 
f 12.) These conversations were informal in nature and addressed issues, such as Mr. 
Martineau's impressions about the Judge Building, Mr. Kimball's intentions to purchase 
the Judge Building, and Mr. Martineau's desire to remain as a tenant. (R. 1503-17; 
Court Findings, f 12.) 
t. At one point in time, Mr. Kimball stated to Mr. Martineau that he was not 
in the business of "kicking tenants out." (R. 1504, Court Findings, f 12.) 
u. Mr. Martineau's and Kimball's oral communications in March and April 
1993 were informal and did not give rise to a promise by Kimball to retain Martineau as 
a tenant. (R. 1503-17, Court Findings, f 13.) 
v. On March 16, 1993, on Kimball's behalf, Hill submitted a purchase offer 
to Dennis Bush of Republic to purchase the Judge Building for $850,000, which purchase 
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would be free and clear of all encumbrances. (R. 1448; Court Findings, f 15.) Republic 
never accepted the offer. (R. 1397-98, Court Findings, f 15.) 
w. When Kimball made his offer to purchase the Judge Building, Miller and 
Kimball had not received or reviewed the Martineau lease, and were not aware of the 
terms thereof. (R. 1411, 1446, Court Findings, 1 16.) 
x. On March 18, 1993, Republic sent a letter of intent to Mr. Martineau, 
offering to sell the Judge Building to him for $850,000 cash, which was $100,000 less 
than what he had previously been negotiating with Republic. (R. 1506, Court Findings, 
f 17.) Martineau did not accept this offer. (Id.) 
y. On May 28, 1993, the culmination of negotiations between Associates, 
Republic and Miller and Kimball resulted in the execution of the Real Estate Sale and 
Purchase Agreement ("Purchase Agreement"), whereby Miller and Kimball acquired the 
Judge Building. (R. 1453, Court Findings, p. 7, f 20, Addendum No. 4.) Pursuant to 
paragraph 3.4 of the Purchase Agreement, Miller and Kimball purchased the property, 
subject to and conditioned upon "the entry of a final order by the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the foreclosure action 
commenced by [Republic] and entitled Republic Capital Bank, F.S.B. v. Judge 
Building Associates, et aL, Civil No. 920900094 PR." (Addendum No. 4 at 1 3.4 
(emphasis added).) The parties further expressly agreed to preserve and assign to Miller 
and Kimball the right to foreclose Martineau's leasehold interest: 
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11.21 In connection with the settlement of the Action and the sale of 
the Property to Purchaser, TCF agrees to preserve and assign to 
Purchaser the right to foreclose on the leasehold interest of Martineau 
& Company. (Id. at 1 11.21 (emphasis added).) 
z. As part of the Purchase Agreement, Associates (and its general partners), 
Republic and Miller and Kimball agreed to several significant terms and conditions, 
including the following: 
i. First, Associates transferred the Judge Building to Miller and 
Kimball by Special Warranty Deed, dated June 21, 1993, and assigned the leases in the 
Judge Building to Miller and Kimball, which deed was recorded in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office on July 1, 1993 as Entry No. 5543957, Book 6700 at Page 927. 
(Court Findings, f 21, Addendum No. 5.) 
ii. Second, Miller and Kimball obtained a new loan from Republic, 
which loan was secured by a Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents and Security 
Agreement in favor of TCF Bank Wisconsin, F.S.B. (fka Republic), dated June 21, 
1993, and recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on July 1, 1993 as Entry 
No. 5543958, Book 6700 at Page 929 (the "1993 Trust Deed"). (Court Findings, 1 21, 
Addendum No. 6.) The 1986 Trust Deed was subordinated to the 1993 Trust Deed, 
pursuant to a Subordination Agreement, which was recorded in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office on July 1, 1993 as Entry No. 5543953, Book 6700 at Page 912 (Court 
Findings, f 21, Addendum No. 8.) The Subordination Agreement expressly provides 
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that the "Foreclosure Action initiated by [Republic] and any foreclosure of the March 
6, 1986 Loan Documents shall not operate to diminish, defeat, foreclose or in any 
way impair the lien of the Purchaser's Loan Documents/' (Id. (emphasis added).) 
hi. Third, as part of the loan, Miller and Kimball executed an 
Assignment of Leases in favor of TCF Bank of Wisconsin, FSB, dated June 23, 1993, 
which was recorded in Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on July 1, 1993 as Entry No. 
5543959, Book 6700 at page 0953. (Court Findings, f 21, Addendum No. 7.) 
iv. Fourth, Miller and Kimball and Republic entered into a letter 
agreement, whereby Miller and Kimball agreed to either enter into a revised lease with 
Martineau in a form satisfactory to Republic or use their best efforts to complete the 
foreclosure action against Martineau. (Court Findings, f 21, Addendum No. 10.) 
Paragraph 2 of the letter expressly provided as follows: 
2. Lease with Martineau & Company. Within nine (9) months from 
the date hereof the Borrower [Miller and Kimball] shall have either entered 
into a revised lease with Martineau & Company in a form satisfactory to 
Lender and Borrower or shall have used its best efforts to complete the 
foreclosure of the Huiterest of Martineau & Company in the Judge 
Building property pursuant to the foreclosure action assigned by 
Lender to Borrower and entitled "Daniel A. Miller and David M, 
Kimball, Miller and Kimball v. Judge Building Associates, et al., Civil 
No. 920900094PR. (Id. (emphasis added).) 
v. Finally, Associates, Hill, Martin and Republic entered into a 
stipulation, whereby Associates, Hill and Martin were released from personal liability 
from any deficiency judgment on the 1986 note and that Miller and Kimball could be 
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substituted for Republic in this action and proceed to foreclose the 1986 Trust Deed. In 
particular, the stipulation provided that: 
[T]he parties stipulate that Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball may be 
substituted in the above entitled action as parties' plaintiff in place of and 
as successor to the Bank as plaintiff for the sole purpose of completing 
the foreclosure of any interest Martineau may have in the Property and 
on the condition that no deficiency judgment will be sought against Judge 
Building Associates, Hill or Martin. 
• • • 
3. Completion of Foreclosure: Dismissal of Sampinos Claims. The 
parties acknowledge that plaintiffs, or their designated assignees, may 
proceed with the above-entitled foreclosure action or proceed with the 
non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed, provided Hill and Martin are 
dismissed as party defendants, no deficiency judgment is sought against 
Judge Building Associates, Hill or Martin after any sheriffs or trustee's 
sale of the property and that purchaser indemnify and hold the Bank 
harmless of or from any claims which may hereafter be asserted against 
Bank by reason of any further actions taken in this matter. . . . Judge 
Building Associates stipulates that the Plaintiff may move Ex Parte and 
without notice to Judge Building Associates for the entry of a decree of 
foreclosure consistent with the terms of this Stipulation or dismiss the 
Complaint. 
(R. 798-837, Court Findings,! 21, (emphasis added).) 
aa. Prior to Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge Building on June 23, 
1993, Mr. Martineau knew that, as a condition of the purchase, the Martineau lease was 
rejected and that Republic and Miller and Kimball intended to proceed with the 
foreclosure. (R. 1516-17, Court Findings, f 18.) 
bb. Prior to Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge Building, Martineau 
knew with absolute certainty that its leasehold interest in the Judge Building would be 
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foreclosed. (R. 1517-18, Court Findings, 1 19.) Upon learning that its leasehold 
interest would be foreclosed, Martineau took no steps to prevent the foreclosure until 
November 24, 1993, a week before the scheduled foreclosure sale. (Id.) 
cc. On June 21, 1993, Republic, Associates and Miller and Kimball executed 
the Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, 
Substitution of Plaintiff and Dismissal of Certain Defendants, as part of the Purchase 
Agreement. (R. 798-837, Appellee's Addendum No. 1.) 
dd. On June 22, 1993, the trial court entered an Order Approving Stipulation 
and Motion Regarding Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action , Substitution 
of Plaintiff and Dismissal of Certain Defendants. (R. 843-45, Court's Finding, f 22, 
Appellee's Addendum No. 3.) The trial court's order provided, in part, as follows: 
2. Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball are substituted as parties 
plaintiff in place of Republic Capital Bank, F.S.B. (formerly known as 
Republic Savings and Loan Association of Wisconsin, a Wisconsin 
corporation). All pleadings filed hereafter shall reflect this substitution. 
3. Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball are substituted as parties 
plaintiff for the sole purpose of completing the foreclosure of any 
interest Martineau & Company, Certified Public Accountants, may 
have in the property which is the subject matter of the Complaint and 
on the condition that no deficiency judgment will be sought or granted 
against Judge Building Associates, a Utah limited partnership, Harold J. 
Hill or J. Michael Martin. (Id. at ft 2 and 3 (emphasis added).) 
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ee. Pursuant to the terms of the parties' agreement, on November 1, 1993, the 
Court entered a Decree of Foreclosure and a foreclosure sale was noticed and scheduled 
for November 30, 1993. (R. 872-874, Appellee's Addendum No. 5.).) 
ff. Martineau took no steps to prevent the foreclosure of his leasehold interest 
until November 24, 1993, less than a week before the foreclosure sale, when it entered 
an appearance for the first time in the case and moved the trial court for a temporary 
restraining order to forestall the pending foreclosure sale. (R. 875-889.) 
gg. On the morning of November 30, 1993, the trial court granted Martineau's 
motion for a temporary restraining order, instructed Martineau's counsel to prepare a 
written order, and set the bond at $1,000. 
hh. The sheriffs sale scheduled for November 30, 1993 was canceled. 
ii. On October 7, 1994, 18 months after the entry of the Default Judgment (and 
almost three years after Martineau was served with the Amended Complaint), Martineau 
moved to set aside the Default Judgment. (R. 972-974, Court's Findings, f 23.) 
jj. A preliminary injunction hearing was held on January 19, 1995. 
kk. At no time during the evidentiary hearing did Martineau present any 
evidence demonstrating that it would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief was not 
entered. (R. 1374-1559, Court Findings, f 29.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS OF MILLER AND KIMBALL 
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Martineau's effort to enjoin the foreclosure of its inferior and subordinate 
leasehold interest was untimely and without legal basis. Martineau's foray into this case 
came almost two (2) years after it was commenced, nine (9) months after default 
judgment was entered, and eight (8) months after learning Miller and Kimball were 
purchasing the Judge Building. Yet, it was not until October 7, 1994 that Martineau 
finally moved to set the Default Judgment aside. Needless to say, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it ruled that Martineau's delay in moving to set the default 
judgment aside was unreasonable. As such, Miller and Kimball were free to proceed 
with the foreclosure of Martineau's leasehold interest. 
Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martineau's motion 
for a preliminary injunction. Martineau failed to meet its burden necessary to impose 
the extraordinary relief requested. Miller and Kimball's subsequent purchase of the 
Judge Building in no way violated Martineau's rights. Miller and Kimball and the lender 
had a legal right to insure that Martineau's leasehold interest would be extinguished. The 
parties expressly contracted that Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge Building 
would not operate as a merger and that Miller and Kimball would be able to proceed with 
the foreclosure of Martineau's leasehold interest. This fact was known to Martineau over 
eight (8) months before it sought injunctive relief and eighteen (18) months before 
moving to set the Default Judgment aside. Since Martineau failed to demonstrate the 
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likelihood of success on the merits or that it would suffer irreparable harm, the trial court 
properly denied Martineau's motion for injunctive relief. 
Finally, the trial court properly awarded Miller and Kimball's reasonable attorneys 
fees. Having been wrongfully enjoined from proceeding with the foreclosure sale for 
more than fourteen months, Miller and Kimball are entitled to recover damages. Under 
Utah law, when an injunction is wrongfully issued, "the enjoined party has an action for 
costs and damages incurred as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction." Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel Co. v. Adkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 
1984). An injunction is "wrongful" if it is finally determined that the applicant was not 
entitled to the injunction. Id. In the instant case, the Court has concluded that the 
applicant, Martineau, was not entitled to any of the relief sought, including a temporary 
restraining order or a preliminary injunction. Therefore, Miller and Kimball were 
entitled to recover its costs and attorneys fees incurred as a result of the wrongfully 
issued injunction. Id.: see also Utah Code Ann. § 65A (c)(2). The trial court, therefore, 
did not abuse its discretion by awarding Miller and Kimball's damages in the amount of 
$20,000. 
ARGUMENT 
Stripped to its core, Martineau's appeal asks this Court to apply uncontested legal 
standards to findings of fact not made by the trial court. In particular, although not 
expressly described as such, Martineau asks this court to determine whether Miller and 
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Kimball are barred from foreclosing Martineau's unrecorded leasehold interest based 
upon the merger doctrine. By proceeding as it has, however, Martineau has placed the 
proverbial cart before the horse. Before this Court can consider Martineau's issues, it 
must first overcome the procedural hurdle that the trial court abused its discretion in (a) 
refusing to set aside the Default Judgment and (b) denying Martineau injunctive relief. 
Only if the appellate court determines the trial court abused its discretion in ruling as it 
did, should it even consider Martineau's issues on appeal. 
Martineau carries a heavy burden on appeal. In order to prevail, Martineau must 
demonstrate the trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and that it abused its 
discretion in denying Martineau's untimely motions. A trial court's findings are clearly 
erroneous if they are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). In order to successfully 
challenge the trial court's findings of fact, therefore, Martineau must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate the findings are so lacking as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P. 2d 9, 12 (Utah 
App. 1994). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is uno reasonable basis for the 
decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). Martineau has 
failed to carry its burden. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING MARTINEAU'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
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DEFAULT JUDGMENT OR ALLOWING THE FORECLOSURE 
SALE OF THE 1986 TRUST DEED TO GO FORWARD. 
Before considering whether the trial court erred in concluding that Miller and 
Kimball had no contractual obligation to honor Martineau's lease, or that the law of 
merger prohibits Miller and Kimball from foreclosing, Martineau must first demonstrate, 
by marshaling the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, that the trial court 
abused its discretion in declining to set the Default Judgment aside. Laub v. South 
Central Utah Tel. Assoc, Inc., 657 P.2d at 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982); Wade v. Stangl, 
869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994). Martineau has not and cannot meet its burden. 
In order for a defendant to be relieved from a default judgment, he must not only 
show one of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but 
he must also show that his motion was timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to 
the action. Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 
1994). In addition, the defendant has the burden on appeal of showing that the court's 
findings were clearly erroneous and that it abused its discretion in refusing to set the 
default judgment aside. Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306. A trial court's duty is to consider the 
motions "based on sound legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances." Id. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Found That Martineau's Eighteen 
Month Delay In Moving To Set Aside the Default Judgment Was 
Not Reasonable, 
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On November 24, 1993 Martineau moved to enjoin the foreclosure sale of its 
leasehold interest that nine months earlier it had acknowledged was inferior, junior and 
subordinate to the lien being foreclosed — the 1986 Trust Deed. Martineau asserted it 
was entitled to injunctive relief because the 1986 Trust Deed, under which the action was 
initially brought, had been canceled by operation of the law of merger. Martineau 
claimed that when fee title to the Judge Building and the beneficial ownership of the 1986 
Trust Deed had been transferred to Miller and Kimball, the two estates merged and the 
1986 Trust Deed was extinguished. 
However, when it moved for injunctive relief, Martineau ignored the existence 
of the Default Judgment which had been entered against it on March 5, 1993, and for 
good reason. The Default Judgment not only awarded judgment against Martineau, but 
decreed that Martineau's leasehold interest was "inferior, junior and subordinate" to the 
1986 Trust Deed. The Default Judgment further ordered that "upon execution sale of 
the property . . . any interest or lien claimed by . . . Martineau . . . shall be forthwith 
extinguished and terminated/' More importantly, a motion for relief from judgment 
"does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation." See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). In other words, unless Martineau set the Default 
Judgment aside, which it failed to do, it had no standing to object to or hold up the 
foreclosure sale. 
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It was not until October 7, 1994, that Martineau recognized the need to set the 
Default Judgment aside.3 In support of its motion, Martineau relied on Rule 60(b)(6) and 
(7) of the Utah RuleS of Civil Procedure, alleging that the judgment was no longer 
equitable and should not have prospective application and any other reason the trial court 
may think of justifying relief from operation of the judgment.4 In considering whether 
to grant or deny a motion under Rule 60(b), the trial court may consider a variety of 
factors including whether the motion was "made within a reasonable time." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 60(b); Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306. Rule 60(b), and in particular subparagraphs (6) and 
(7), also bring into conflict competing interests in the finality of judgments and relief 
from inequitable judgments. Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306. In reaching its decision to deny 
Martineau's motion, the trial court relied on these factors, stating as follows: 
3
 In an effort to downplay the significance of its unreasonable delay, 
Martineau argues that the motion to set aside was "filed eleven months after issuance of 
the Temporary Restraining Order as a precautionary measure only - a result of 
concern by [Miller and Kimball] counsel that without such a Motion on record all of the 
issues before the trial court would not be issue." (Applnt's Brief, p. 15 (emphasis 
added).) Martineau's motion was not filed as "precautionary measure." It was filed 
because Martineau recognized, as Miller and Kimball asserted, that it could not avoid 
foreclosure without first setting aside the Default Judgment. This statement reinforces 
Miller and Kimball5 position that Martineau was barred from objecting to the foreclosure 
unless it successfully set the Default Judgment aside. 
4
 Martineau moved for relief from the judgment under subparagraphs (6) and 
(7) because a motion for relief under just about any other provision of Rule 60(b) would 
clearly be time barred. A motion under subdivisions (1) through (4) must be brought 
within three months after the judgment was entered, Utah R Civ, P. 60(b), and the 
judgment in this case was entered March 5, 1993, over eighteen (18) months before 
moving to set aside. 
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The Court is not going to set aside the default judgment. The Court 
is of the opinion that there was an unreasonable delay in bring the motion 
to set aside default judgment. These judgments have to have some finality, 
and under certain circumstances they can be set aside, but there must be a 
reasonable response to a motion for a default judgment. . ., and the Court 
finds that there was not in this case; that there was an unreasonable delay. 
(R. 1550-51.) In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied upon a variety of 
uncontroverted facts. 
Republic commenced this foreclosure action on January 8, 1992 and first named 
Martineau as a defendant in February 1992. Knowing that its leasehold interest was 
subordinate to Republic's, Martineau did not file an answer. The Default Judgment was 
entered against Martineau on March 5, 1993. Martineau knew that its lease was inferior, 
junior and subordinate to the interests of Republic and made a conscious decision not to 
answer the Amended Complaint. Martineau reviewed and understood the effect of the 
Default Judgment and chose not appeal. 
In the spring of 1993, shortly after default was entered, Martineau had several 
conversations with David Kimball concerning their interest in purchasing the Judge 
Building. At the same time, Republic offered to sell the Judge Building to Martineau for 
$850,000. Martineau chose not to accept Republic's offer. Martineau also knew that 
neither Miller and Kimball nor Republic were going to allow Martineau to remain as a 
tenant under the current lease terms and that its leasehold interest in the Judge Building 
would be foreclosed. Yet, Martineau allowed the purchase of the Judge Building to go 
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forward without objection. Martineau's motion was not filed until October 7, 1994, 
nearly 16 months after Miller and Kimball purchased the Judge Building, and almost a 
year after Martineau enjoined the scheduled foreclosure sale. In short, Martineau knew 
about all the grounds it relied on before filing its motion. 
Based on this array of facts, the trial court had a reasonable basis for denying the 
motion to set aside the Default Judgment because Martineau's delay was not reasonable. 
Cf Timothy A. Garverick & Assocs. v. Heidtman Steel Prods., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 430 
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (one year delay was unreasonable); Federal Land Bank of St. Louis 
v. Cupples Bros., 889 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1989) (court held Rule 60(b) motion was 
untimely after defendants waited ten weeks after foreclosure judgment and motion filed 
twelve days before sale). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
enforcing the Default Judgment and allowing the foreclosure sale to go forward. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying 
Martineau Injunctive Relief. 
Having denied Martineau's motion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that injunctive relief would be inappropriate under the circumstances. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b), moving for injunctive relief did 
not result in the suspension of the Default Judgment. As such, the Court could not 
ignore the effect the Default Judgment had on Martineau's motion for injunctive relief. 
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A restraining order or preliminary injunction will issue only upon a showing that: 
(1) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues; (2) 
the threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or 
injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; (3) the order or injunction, if 
issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a substantial 
likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65A(e). IXiring the preliminary injunction hearing, Martineau failed to make 
the necessary showing to entitle it to injunctive relief. 
First, Martineau presented no evidence that it would suffer irreparable harm. (See 
R. 1496-1520; Court Findings.) Second, Martineau could not and did not show that the 
foreclosure sale of its leasehold interest outweighed Miller and Kimball's and the lender's 
right to foreclose so that free and clear title would pass to Miller and Kimball. Finally, 
Martineau failed to show that there was a substantial likelihood it would prevail on the 
merits. To the contrary, the trial court asked and was told by Martineau's counsel that 
the June 1993 transaction, which resulted in Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge 
Building, was legal. (R. 1531; Addendum No. 13.) The trial court went on to conclude 
as follows: 
Now, you've relied quite heavily, Mr. Jones, on this subsequent 
transaction that occurred in June of 1993 to say that this default judgment 
should be set aside, and that that somehow violated Mr. Martineau's rights. 
And I disagree with you. I am not convinced and I haven't been shown 
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that there's any right of [Martineau's] that has been violated by that 
subsequent transaction. 
I think you can see that the plaintiffs had a legal right to do what 
they did. They could have gone out and borrowed money on the property. 
I believe they have acted legally in everything that they've done and that 
they had a right to fashion this transaction in the way that they did, and I 
don't know of any vested right that [Martineau] would have in his position 
to prevent them in any way from doing that, or even to argue that they 
shouldn't. So I just am not convinced. 
And in addition that, there's been absolutely no evidence, and as 
heavily as you have relied on that subsequent transaction, there's been 
no evidence as to the significance of that subsequent transaction, 
actually, to your client, as to what his intent was, what he relied upon, 
whether he intended to bid on this property or whether in any way he 
actually has been harmed. I think that you've asked me to rule on that 
academically, that there may be some harm. But there has been no 
evidence from your client with regards to those subsequent transactions. 
(R. 1551-52; Appellee's Addendum No. 13 (emphasis added).) The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to enjoin the foreclosure sale. 
II. MARTINEAU HAD NO MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO JUSTIFY 
SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT OR GRANTING 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
The focus of Martineau's appeal apparently centers around the trial court not 
giving adequate consideration to its legal arguments that Miller and Kimball had 
promised to honor Martineau's lease and that the merger doctrine prohibited Miller and 
Kimball from continuing to pursue foreclosure. In advancing these arguments, however, 
Martineau does not disagree with the applicable law; rather, just how the trial court 
applied the law to the facts. 
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For example, in attacking the Court's refusal to adopt the merger doctrine, 
Martineau focuses on a single clause in a 24-page, 39-paragraph trust deed executed by 
Miller and Kimball as part of the refinancing of the Judge Building. (See Applnt's Brief, 
p. 10; Addendum No. 6, f 16 (Borrower shall "comply with and observe Borrower's 
obligations as landlord under all leases of the Property or any part thereof').) 
Martineau also relies upon the Assignment of Leases to imply that Miller and Kimball 
contracted to keep Martineau's lease in place after June 1993. (Applnt's Brief, p. 11; 
see Addendum No. 7, Applnt's Brief, pp. 10-11.) Martineau then turns to the favorable 
lease it obtained from Associates in 1990 to suggest that Miller and Kimball were 
contractually barred from foreclosing. (Id. at 11-12.) Finally, Martineau asserts that 
Miller and Kimball "persuaded the trial court they could proceed with foreclosure 
because they did not intend a merger of legal title and the existing lien on the property." 
(Id. at 13.) What Martineau is really arguing is that the trial court allegedly erred in 
concluding that the merger doctrine did not apply. The Purchase Agreement and its 
related documents, however, did not result in the merger of interests, especially since the 
documents expressed a specific intent to foreclose the 1986 Trust Deed and, in effect, 
Martineau's junior leasehold interest. 
The merger doctrine is a rule of common law. It states that, "[w]hen a person 
holds two estates in property in the same right and without an intervening estate, the two 
estates will coalesce to one estate unless a beneficial reason exists for keeping them 
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distinct. "5 Ann M. Burkhart, supra note 5, at 284 (citing 4 American Law of Property 
§ 16.142 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property \ 459 (P. Rohan 
rev. ed. 1984); 5 H. Tiffany, Real Property § 1479 (B. Jones 2d ed. 1939)).6 The 
merger doctrine does not apply in this case for several reasons. 
A. The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply Because Miller and Kimball THH 
Not Intend It to Apply. 
The merger doctrine is not favored. F.D.L C. v. Lee, 988 F.2d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 
1993). Whether or not merger applies in a given case depends on the intent of the person 
acquiring the two interests. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770, 
773 (1934); Federal Land Bank v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 786 P.2d 514, 515 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1989); First Fed. Sav. & LoanAss'n v. Nath, 839 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Okla. 1992); 
Altabet v. Monroe Methodist Church, 111 P.2d 544, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). In this 
case, it was Miller and Kimball's intent that was dispositive, and the intent of any other 
party to the foreclosure is irrelevant, except to the extent another party's intent may 
5
 There is some question as to whether a trust deed creates an "estate in 
property" such that the merger doctrine would even apply. See Ann M. Burkhart, 
Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 283, 329 (1987). 
6
 The term "merger doctrine" is also used to refer to other legal doctrines, 
perhaps the most common of which is the rule diat, upon delivery and acceptance of a 
deed, the provisions of the underlying contract for the sale of the property are merged 
into the deed and thereby become unenforceable. See, e.g., Dobrusky v. Isbell, 740 P.2d 
1325, 1326 (Utah 1987). It is the doctrine of real property and not the contract doctrine 
that Martineau relies on in this case. 
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illuminate Miller and Kimball's intent. If the court can divine an intention that the 
estates not merge, then it will give effect to that intention. Nath, 839 P.2d at 1340. 
In this case, all the evidence of the parties' intent shows that Miller and Kimball 
did not intend a merger of their legal title and their lien on die property. Paragraph 3.4 
of the Purchase Agreement provides that the sale to Miller and Kimball was contingent 
on the completion of the foreclosure proceedings. (Addendum No. 4, \ 3.4.) Paragraph 
11.21 of the Purchase Agreement further provides that Republic "agrees to preserve and 
assign to [Miller and Kimball] the right to foreclose on the leasehold interest of 
Martineau & Company." {Id. 1 11.21 (emphasis added).) On June 21, 1993, Miller 
and Kimball entered into a letter agreement by which Republic required them either to 
enter into a revised lease with Martineau satisfactory to Republic or to use its best efforts 
to complete the action against Martineau to foreclose its interest in the property. 
(Addendum No. 10.) Concurrently, Republic and Associates entered into a stipulation, 
approved by the court, acknowledging that Miller and Kimball could either proceed with 
judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed "for the sole purpose of 
completing the foreclosure of any interest Martineau may have in the Property." 
(Applee's Addendum No. 1, p. 4 (emphasis added).) Associates further stipulated that 
Miller and Kimball could move, ex parte, for the entry of a decree of foreclosure. {Id. 
at 5.) These documents demonstrate that Miller and Kimball, Republic and Associates 
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intended that there be no merger and that the foreclosure proceed so Martineau's 
leasehold interest could be extinguished. 
Miller and Kimball also testified at the preliminary injunction hearing that their 
intent was that their interests in the property not merge. Perhaps the best evidence of 
Miller and Kimball's intent was that they proceeded with the foreclosure action, only to 
be rebuffed at the last minute by Martineau's actions. Cf. O'Reilly, 37 P.2d at 773. 
In O'Reilly, the defendant (McLean) had given the plaintiff (O'Reilly) a 
mortgage on certain property in 1925, to secure a debt. The following year, Utah 
Lumber Company brought an action against the plaintiff and McLean to foreclose a 
subsequent materialman's lien on the property. The lien was foreclosed, and Utah 
Lumber Company received a sheriffs deed to the property. In June 1929, O'Reilly 
brought an action against McLean to foreclose the 1925 mortgage. A few months later, 
in September 1929, Utah Lumber Company conveyed the property to O'Reilly by quit 
claim deed. O'Reilly then deeded the property to John Gardner, who in turn contracted 
to sell the property to Utah Mortgage Company. Utah Mortgage Company claimed that 
O'Reilly could not proceed with her foreclosure action because her equitable title under 
her mortgage had merged with the legal title acquired from Utah Lumber Company. The 
Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument: 
We are of the opinion there was no intention to effect a merger at 
the time Mrs. O'Reilly acquired legal title by obtaining the quitclaim deed 
from the Utah Lumber Company on September 20, 1929. The evidence 
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shows that she was one of the defendants in the action brought by the Utah 
Lumber Company to foreclose its materialman's lien and under which 
action it obtained the sheriffs deed. Before the sheriffs deed issued to the 
lumber company, plaintiff commenced the present action, still claiming her 
mortgage lien on the property, notwithstanding judgment in the lien 
foreclosure suit . . . . After obtaining the deed from the lumber 
company, she continued her present action to judgment, thereby 
evidencing an intention inconsistent with a merger. 
Id. at 773 (emphasis added). The court further noted that, when Gardner negotiated to 
sell the property to Utah Mortgage Company, more than five months after O'Reilly had 
accepted the quit claim deed from Utah Lumber Company, both O'Reilly and Gardner 
acknowledged that O'Reilly wanted her mortgage paid off. Id. The court concluded: 
It is clear . . . that neither plaintiff nor Gardner considered that a merger 
of the equitable title of plaintiff had been effected by the acquisition of the 
legal title by plaintiff under the deed from the Utah Lumber Company. 
Their intention to keep the mortgage alive and effective is clearly and 
expressly manifested. Consequently no merger took place. 
Id. at 773-74. 
Similarly, Miller and Kimball's intention to keep the Trust Deed "alive and 
effective" is "clearly and expressly manifested." Thus, "no merger took place." 
B. The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply Because Miller and Kimball 
Would Be Benefited by Keeping Their Interests Separate, 
The merger doctrine operates as "a technical, nonsubstantive rule" of property 
titles: "If the holder of the interests is not benefited in any way by keeping the estates 
distinct, they will merge to simplify the state of title." Ann M. Burkhart, supra note 2, 
at 284. Conversely, if the holder of the interests is benefited by keeping the estates 
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distinct, they will not merge. See, e.g., O'Reilly, 37 P.2d at 773 (where it is in the 
mortgagee's interest to keep the mortgage alive, merger does not occur) (citations 
omitted). See also Whiteley v. DeVries, 116 Utah 165, 209 P.2d 206, 208 (1949) 
(Wolfe, J., concurring) ("when it is required that a mortgage be not considered as 
merged in the title of the mortgagee, equity will . . . treat the mortgage as still in 
existence"). Even if there were some doubt about their intent, the trial court correctly 
found that Miller and Kimball did not intend a merger of their estates where, as here, the 
circumstances indicate that Miller and Kimball would benefit if their interests did not 
merge. See Federal Land Bank, 786 P.2d at 516; Nath, 839 P.2d at 1340. 
Where a mortgagee reacquires the beneficial interest in the mortgaged property, 
there is a presumption that he intended to keep the security alive, and that presumption 
can only be overcome by "strong evidence." Lee, 988 F.2d at 843. That presumption 
applies, for example, where the mortgagee fails to join an interest holder as a defendant 
in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding and then purchases the mortgaged property at the 
sheriffs sale. Nath, 839 P.2d at 1340. The presumption should apply even more where, 
as here, the mortgagee does join the interest holder as a defendant in the mortgage 
foreclosure proceeding and stipulates that the proceeding can continue against the interest 
holder-the only remaining defendant-even after a sale of the property. 
Miller and Kimball are clearly benefited if the estates do not merge. Absent 
merger, Miller and Kimball can proceed with the foreclosure action and clear the 
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property of the unfavorable junior interest - Martineau Lease. That is why all parties 
to the transaction-TCF (aka Republic), Associates and Miller and Kimball as the new 
owners-agreed that the foreclosure action should continue. 
C. The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply Because of Martineau fs 
Intervening Interest. 
Finally, the merger doctrine does not apply where there is an intervening estate 
between the two estates sought to be merged. See, e.g., Altabet v. Monroe Methodist 
Church, 111 P.2d 544, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) ("if there is an outstanding 
intervening tide, the foundation of the merger does not exist as a matter of law") (quoting 
Anderson v. Starr, 294 P. 581 (Wash. 1930)). In this case, the interests in the property 
were created as follows: 
• In 1986, Associates gave Republic a lien on the property, in the form of 
the Trust Deed, which was later assigned to Miller and Kimball. 
• In 1990 Associates gave Martineau a lease to the property. 
• In 1993 Associates gave Miller and Kimball a special warranty deed to the 
property. 
Clearly, Martineau1 s leasehold interest is an intervening interest between Miller 
and Kimball's interest under the 1986 Trust Deed and their interest under the 1993 
special warranty deed. Thus, the merger doctrine does not apply. See, e.g., Altabet, 
111 P.2d at 545-46. Based upon the clear weight of authority and the uncontroverted 
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facts of this case, it becomes obvious that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it declined to enjoin the foreclosure of Martineau's unrecorded leasehold interest. 
III. THE DEBT UNDERLYING THE TRUST DEED HAS NOT BEEN 
EXTINGUISHED: THEREFORE. IT WOULD NOT BE 
INEQUITABLE TO ALLOW MILLER AND KIMBALL TO 
PROCEED WITH FORECLOSURE. 
Martineau further argues that the trial court erred in not finding that the 1986 
Trust Deed had been extinguished and therefore could not be foreclosed. (Applnt's 
Brief, p. 15.) In fact, the trial court found that at no time did Miller and Kimball 
intentionally relinquish their rights to foreclose Martineau's leasehold interest. (Court 
Findings, 1 31.) The trial court determined that the 1986 Trust Deed was not 
extinguished. The undisputed facts were that Republic and Miller and Kimball simply 
agreed not to seek a deficiency judgment against Associates or Hill and Martin, its 
general partners. A debt and the liability of the mortgagor for that debt "are two distinct 
things." Federal Land Bank, 786 P.2d at 516 (citing Korb v. Minneapolis Threshing 
Mach. Co., 3 P.2d 502 (Kan. 1931)). "A mortgage lien is not discharged if it is the 
intention of the parties merely to release the mortgagor's personal liability for it and not 
to extinguish the debt." Id. 
The intention of the parties in this case, as set forth in the stipulation that the court 
approved, was merely that "no deficiency judgment" be sought against Associates and 
its principals, Hill and Martin. The effect of the Purchase Agreement, therefore, was 
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only to release Associates, Hill and Martin from personal liability and not to extinguish 
the debt. Cf. id. (where the mortgagee agreed to cancel the debtor's promissory note and 
release him from all personal liability but also expressed an intent that there be no 
merger, the documents only released the debtor from personal liability and did not 
extinguish the mortgage lien). Therefore, the 1986 Trust Deed remained alive and the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it to be foreclosed. 
Finally, without citation to any legal authority, Martineau claims that the trial 
court should not have allowed the foreclosure because it uis no longer equitable that the 
[Default JJudgment should have prospective application." (Applnt. Brief, pp. 15-16.) 
Stated differently, Martineau asserts that the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 24, that 
"Martineau's 18 month delay in moving to set aside the default was not reasonable" 
ignores the circumstances which developed during those 18 months, which made it unfair 
to enforce the Default Judgment. (See Applnt's Brief, pp. 16-17.) 
In advancing this argument, Martineau once again ignores that this was a statutory 
action to foreclose a trust deed as a mortgage, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-7-23 & 78-
37-1 through -9. These statutes do not require the court to balance the fairness of the 
parties' respective positions. The only questions are the relative priorities of the parties' 
interests and whether Miller and Kimball have complied with the statutory procedures. 
The fact that the defendant may be prejudiced as a result of the foreclosure is irrelevant. 
Cf. Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179, 407 P.2d 141, 142 
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(1965) (defendant could not complain where the plaintiff foreclosed a trust deed as a 
mortgage, even though in selecting that remedy the plaintiff was able to obtain additional 
costs and attorney fees). If the statutory procedure could be thwarted simply by alleging 
unfairness, the statutory scheme would be nullified. 
The only case Martineau relied on for its equitable argument, Nath, 839 P.2d 
1336 (Okla. 1992), is clearly distinguishable. The mortgagee in that case brought an 
action to foreclose its mortgage and purchased at the foreclosure sale. The mortgagee 
had failed to name a junior interest holder in the foreclosure action and later brought an 
action to have its foreclosed mortgage declared superior to the county's junior tax liens. 
The court concluded that, where the mortgagee's failure to join the county in the earlier 
foreclosure action was not attended by some inequitable conduct, the mortgagee's first 
mortgage was not merged into the legal title the mortgagee acquired at the foreclosure 
sale. Nath, 839 P.2d at 1341. The court held, however, that the mortgagee had to 
bring a second foreclosure proceeding to clear the property of the county's tax liens. 
The court noted that the county could insist that the sale be conducted fairly and for a fair 
value, and that the sale could be set aside if it was not. Id. at 1343 n.37. Nath stands 
for the proposition that any foreclosure sale must be conducted fairly. It does not 
support Martineau's argument that the court should stop a sale before it occurs if it would 
somehow be unfair to junior interest holders. Foreclosure sales always hurt junior 
interests by cutting them off, but that does not make them unfair. A junior interest 
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holder can protect its interest by bidding at the foreclosure sale. But until there has been 
a foreclosure sale, the court cannot say that the sale was unfair. Nath implicitly 
recognized the fact that the county's valid tax liens could be lost as a result of the 
foreclosure was not the sort of unfairness that would justify interfering with the sale. 
Similarly, in this case, Miller and Kimball have not acted inequitably. They have 
done everything they could to keep the 1986 Trust Deed alive and to foreclose that deed. 
They are therefore entitled to proceed with the foreclosure sale. Nor have Miller and 
Kimball been unjustly enriched by the foreclosure of Martineau's inferior leasehold 
interest. If anyone would be unjustly enriched, it is Martineau. 
Martineau leased its space in the building knowing that the building was subject 
to a $2,300,000 trust deed. If it wanted to ensure that its leasehold would survive 
foreclosure, it could have asked for a nondisturbance agreement, as other tenants in the 
building did, but it chose not to. Martineau admits, it could not escape the effects had 
Republic proceeded with foreclosure prior to the sale to Miller and Kimball. The fact 
that Associates and Republic were able to find a buyer for the property before the 
foreclosure sale was completed does not destroy the mortgagee's right to rid its security 
of an unfavorable lease. If Miller and Kimball were precluded from foreclosing, 
Martineau's junior interest would be 
elevated to a priority for which its owner paid nothing and hence is, as 
to him, a pure windfall. And it is a windfall at the expense of the prior 
mortgagee. Where [as here] the first mortgagee knew of the second 
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man and intended to prevent him getting this benefit it would be 
unconscionable to permit him to have it. 
George E. Osborne, Handbook on the Law of Mortgages, § 6.15 at 420 (2d.Ed. 1970) 
(emphasis added). 
By allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed, the trial court did not put 
Martineau at a disadvantage. To the contrary, it put Martineau in no worse a position 
than it would have been before the sale to Miller and Kimball. On the other hand, if the 
fortuity of the sale to Miller and Kimball had the effect of elevating Martineau to a senior 
position, it would be Martineau who would be unjustly enriched. See Federal Land 
Bank, 786 P.2d at, 516 (by keeping a first mortgage lien alive, the court places a junior 
lienor in the same position it expected to occupy at the time its interest arose, namely, 
a junior position; any contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the junior lien holder). The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to set the Default Judgment aside and 
allowing the foreclosure sale to go forward as ordered. 
IV. MILLER AND KIMBALL ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
FOR MARTINEAU1 S WRONGFULLY OBTAINED TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER. 
Having concluded that Martineau was not entitled to set aside the default judgment 
entered into on March 5, 1993, and having concluded that Martineau was not entitled to 
a preliminary injunction, the trial court properly concluded that Miller and Kimball were 
entided to recover damages. Under Utah law, when an injunction is wrongfully issued, 
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"the enjoined party has an action for costs and damages incurred as a result of the 
wrongfully issued injunction." Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Adkin, Wright & 
Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). An injunction is "wrongful" if it 
is finally determined that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. Id. In the 
instant case, the Court has concluded that the applicant, Martineau, was not entitled to 
any of the relief sought, including a temporary restraining order or a preliminary 
injunction. Therefore, Miller and Kimball have an action for costs and damages incurred 
as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction. Id.; see Utah Code Ann. § 65A (c)(2). 
Martineau raises the same argument it did in the lower court by asserting that 
Miller and Kimball are not entitled to recover damages because Martineau failed to 
properly secure a formal temporary restraining order. Considering Martineau already 
raised this argument before the lower court, it has a heavy burden of demonstrating that 
there was no reasonable basis for the trial court's decision. Crookston, 860 P.2d at 938. 
The Code of Judicial Administration provides in relevant part as follows: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties 
obtaining the ruling shall within 15 days, or within a shorter time as the 
court may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or 
decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments and orders shall 
be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for 
signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objection shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after service. 
46 
Rule 4-502 (emphasis added). Based upon Rule 4-504, it is the party who "obtains the 
ruling" who shall prepare and submit an order for the court's signature. 
It is undisputed that on November 30, 1993, this Court granted Martineau a 
temporary restraining order. It is also undisputed that the temporary restraining order 
stayed the pending sheriffs sale of the Judge Building. The sheriffs sale would have 
resulted in the eviction of Martineau who was occupying one of the premium spaces in 
the building. The parties, and Martineau in particular, knew the temporary restraining 
order remained in effect even after the passage of ten days and until the preliminary 
injunction hearing. This fact was reaffirmed on numerous occasions by Martineau's 
counsel. (See Appellee's Addendum Nos. 6-11.) To suggest that the temporary 
restraining order was not entered and/or expired is in direct conflict with Martineau's 
conduct and statements. 
Moreover, and more importantly, Martineau cannot use its own failure to secure 
a formal temporary restraining order as a sword to avoid liability for its conduct. It was 
Martineau's responsibility to have the temporary restraining order entered by the Court. 
Martineau recognized this responsibility when he forwarded temporary restraining orders 
to Miller and Kimball's counsel. When Miller and Kimball did not voice an objection 
within five days after receipt of the proposed orders, it was incumbent upon Martineau 
to submit the proposed orders for signature by the Court. However, on January 24, 
1994, Martineau stipulated that no formal temporary restraining order was necessary for 
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signature by the Court agreeing that "the temporary restraining order remains in effect 
until either (1) the parties agree otherwise or (2) subsequent order of the Court." These 
facts were all before the trial court when it concluded that Miller and Kimball were 
entitled to recover attorneys fees. Martineau's failure to secure a formal temporary 
restraining order did not obviate its liability to pay for damages caused as a result of the 
wrongfully issued injunction. 
As evidenced by die various correspondence and hearings held before the trial 
court, Martineau clearly understood that a temporary restraining order had been issued 
and remained in effect until the preliminary injunction hearing was held on January 19, 
1995. This knowledge is best evidenced by the September 30, 1994 letter in which 
Martineau reconfirms that the temporary restraining order remains in effect. (Appllee's 
Addendum No. 11.) Martineau cannot shield itself from liability simply because it failed 
to secure the Court's signature on an order the Court granted and the parties honored. 
To do so would give Martineau a substantial windfall, which clearly was not the intent 
of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65A(c)(2).1 Based upon the circumstances before it, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys fees. 
7
 Martineau cites Birch Creek Irrigation Co. v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah 
1993) to support its assertion that the temporary restraining order expired by definition ten 
days after it was issued. The Prothero case is distinguishable because there was no 
evidence the parties had stipulated that the temporary restraining order would remain in 
effect after the passage often days. In this action, the parties clearly intended to have the 
temporary restraining order "remain in effect" until the completion of the preliminary 
injunction hearing. 
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Martineau's final attack on the award of attorneys fees centers on the trial court's 
alleged failure "to limit fees to what is allowed under the rule." (Applnt's Brief, pp. 19-
20.) Martineau argues that the January 19, 1995 hearing considered all of its various 
motions and, therefore, attorneys fees not directly related to the restraining order should 
not have been awarded. 
The fallacy of Martineau's argument is that it runs in direct conflict with the trial 
court's finding that "[a] substantial portion of the amount of time spent by plaintiffs' 
counsel after the issuance of the temporary restraining order on November 24, 1993, 
was spent in defense of the temporary restraining order and motion for preliminary 
injunction." (R. 1331, Addendum No. 14.) What Martineau also ignores is that the 
issues it raised subsequent to issuance of the temporary restraining order applied 
irrespective of the motion before the court. In other words, none of the fees Miller and 
Kimball incurred would have been incurred but for the application for and issuance of 
the temporary restraining order. See Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592, 597 (Utah 
App. 1993). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded 
Miller and Kimball attorneys fees in the amount of $20,000. 
V. MILLER AND KIMBALL ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS 
FEES FOR RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL. 
In the proceeding below, the trial court properly awarded attorneys fees to Miller 
and Kimball based upon having to respond to and defend against a wrongfully issued 
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temporary restraining order. As the prevailing party below, Miller and Kimball are 
entitled to recover attorneys fees reasonably incurred on appeal. Utah Dept. of Social 
Serv. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1993, 1997 (Utah App. 1991). Additionally, the arguments 
raised by Martineau on appeal are not new. As a consequence, pursuant to Rule 33(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court should award Miller and Kimball 
their attorneys fees for having to respond to this frivolous appeal. See Utah R.App.P. 
33(a); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309-310 (Utah App. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should hold that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in declining to set aside the Default Judgment. Further, the Court 
should conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant 
injunctive relief and allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed. Finally, the Court should 
uphold the award of attorneys fees and further award attorneys fees to Miller and 
Kimball for having to respond to this appeal. 
DATED this 6th day of October, 1998. 
SUITTER AXLAND 
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M J C E t . Jt>NES,/Esq( 
MARK R. GAYLORD, Esq. 
Attorneys for Miller and Kimball, Appellees 
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 1 
JUH2=> 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert D. Merrill, #2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B. 
(Formerly known as REPUBLIC 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN 
corporation) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as 
personal representative of the 
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, 
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, 
Certified Public Accountants, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION AND MOTION RE 
PARTIAL SETTLEMENT, 
ASSIGNMENT OF CAUSE OF 
ACTION, SUBSTITUTION OF 
PLAINTIFF AND DISMISSAL OF 
CERTAIN DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 920900094PR 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
This Stipulation is entered into as of the ZUJ~day of 
June, 1993 by, between and among Republic Capital Bank, F. S. B. , 
(now known as TCF Bank Wisconsin, fsb, a federal savings bank 
(the "Bank"), Judge Building Associates, a Utah limited 
[partnership ("Judge Building Associates"), Harold J. Hill 
("Hill"), J. Michael Martin ("Martin") and Sam Sampinos 
("Sampinos") as follows: 
0 * 0 0 7 9 S 
RECITALS 
A. On January 8, 1992 Bank filed a Verified 
Foreclosure Complaint (the "Complaint") against Judge Building 
Associates, Hill and Martin. The Complaint was amended on 
February 2, 1992 in order to join Wilma W. Gardner as a personal 
representative of the estate of Kenneth N. Gardner, deceased 
("Gardner") and Martineau & Company, certified public accounts 
(" Martineau"). 
B. The Complaint was filed to foreclose a trust deed 
(the "Trust Deed") in favor of Bank covering real property and 
improvements located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 known as the Judge Building and more particularly 
described in the Complaint (the "Property"). 
C. Judge Building Associates, Hill, Martin, Gardner 
and Martineau were all duly served. Judge Building Associates, 
Hill and Martin have filed answers and Martin has filed a third 
party complaint against Sampinos. Sampinos has filed a 
counterclaim against Martin and Martin has filed a response 
thereto. 
D. Bank, Judge Building Associates, Hill and Martin 
have agreed with Gardner to pay Gardner the total sum of $15,000 
in exchange for Gardner' s release and reconveyance of the 
Gardner encumbrance against the Property. 
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E. Martineau has not filed any responsive pleading 
and on March 3, 1993, upon the Bank's Motion the Court entered 
its default judgment against Martineau. 
F. Judge Building Associates, as "Seller", has 
entered into a Real Estate Sale and Purchase Agreement and 
Escrow Instructions (the "Purchase Agreement") with Daniel A. 
Miller and David M. Kimball, as "Purchaser" with respect to the 
Property, a copy of which Purchase Agreement is attached hereto 
marked Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part hereof. 
G. In order to implement the terms of the Purchase 
(Agreement, the parties hereto have agreed to the settlement of 
certain claims as among them with respect to the matters covered 
by the Complaint in accordance with the terms of this 
Stipulation. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties stipulate as follows and 
move the Court to enter an order approving this Stipulation. 
1. Escrow. The Purchaser, Bank, Judge Building 
Associates, Hill and Martin acknowledge that the documents and 
funds called for in the letter of escrow instructions (the 
"Escrow Instructions") addressed to Associated Title Company 
(the "Escrow Agent") have been delivered or will be placed with 
the escrow agent within two (2) days of Court approval of this 
Stipulation. 
2. Substitution of Plaintiff: No Deficiency. As of 
the date hereof Bank has assigned to Purchaser the cause of 
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action set forth in the Complaint and the underlying note and 
Trust Deed and the Purchaser has agreed that Purchaser' s rights 
thereunder is junior and subordinate to the Trust Deed and other 
loan documents entered into by the Bank and Purchasers pursuant 
to the Purchase Agreement. Accordingly, the parties stipulate 
that Daniel A, Miller and David M. Kimball may be substituted in 
the above entitled action as parties plaintiff in place of and 
as successor to the Bank as plaintiff for the sole purpose of 
completing the foreclosure of any interest Martineau may have in 
the Property and on the condition that no deficiency judgment 
will be sought against Judge Building Associates, Hill or 
Martin. This substitution is made pursuant to the provisions of 
[Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures. 
I 3. Completion of Foreclosure: Dismissal of Sampinos 
Claims. The parties acknowledge that Miller and Kimball, or 
their designated assignees, may proceed with the above entitled 
foreclosure action or proceed with the non-judicial foreclosure 
of the Trust deed, provided Hill and Martin are dismissed as 
party defendants, no deficiency judgment is sought against Judge 
Building Associates, Hill or Martin after any sheriff s or 
trustee's sale of the Property and that Purchaser indemnify and 
hold the Bank harmless of or from any claims which may hereafter 
be asserted against Bank by reason of any further actions taken 
in this matter. Martin and Sampinos agree that the Court may 
enter an order dismissing the third party complaint and 
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counterclaim as between them without prejudice. Judge Building 
Associates stipulates that the Plaintiff may move Ex Parte and 
without any notice to Judge Building Associates for the entry of 
a decree of foreclosure consistent with the terms of this 
Stipulation or dismiss the Complaint. 
4. Termination of Receivership. The parties agree 
that there is no further need for a Receiver in this Action and 
I the receivership may be terminated and the Receiver released 
upon the filing of a final report and accounting with the Court. 
5. Settlement of Disputed Claims. The parties 
acknowledge that this Stipulation is intended as a settlement of 
disputed claims and that nothing contained herein constitutes an 
admission of liability by any of the parties. 
6. Costs. Each party shall bear his or its 
attorneys' fees and costs of court incurred in connection with 
this matter, the negotiation of this Stipulation and the 
performance of this Stipulation. Any party who sues 
[successfully to enforce the terms of this Stipulation may 
recover his, its or their costs of court and reasonable 
attorneys fees incurred in the prosecution of that suit. 
7. Successors and Assigns. All covenants and 
agreements contained in this Stipulation shall bind and inure to 
the benefit of the respective successors or assigns of the 
parties hereto. 
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8. Entire Agreement. This Stipulation contains the 
entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject 
matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements and 
understandings oral or written pertaining to the same. This 
Stipulation may be amended or modified only by an agreement in 
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement of any 
waiver, amendment, extension or discharge is sought or the 
assignee of such party. No waiver of any provision of this 
Stipulation and no consent to any departure by any party 
therefrom shall in any event be effective unless the same shall 
be in writing and signed by the other parties and then such 
waiver or consent shall be effective only in the specific 
instance or the specific purpose for which given. This 
Stipulation may be executed in counterparts each of which shall 
be deemed an original but all of which taken together shall 
constitute one and the same instrument. 
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DATED this 2^ day of June, 1993. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
APPROVED: 
"PURCHASER" 
y io^^ 
Robert D. Merrill 
Attorneys for TCF Bank 
Wisconsin, fsb 
Azda^ 
William C. Halls 
Attorney for J. Michael Martin 
William Russell 
Attorney for Judge Building Associates, 
Harold J. Hill and Sam Sampinos 
Daniel A. Miller 
David M. Kimball 
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DAI80 t h i s day of Juua, 1993, 
VAN COT?, BAOLfiY, CORNWALL U MCCARTHY 
APPROVED: 
' ttfRCHASBR" 
David M. Ki 
811M4II? I 
Hoba'rt D. Merrill 
Attornsya for tCF Bank 
Wisconsin, fab 
William C, Halls 
Attorney'for J. Michael Martin 
William Jiuea&li 
Attorney for Judge Building Associates, 
Harold <J, Hill and Sam Sampinoa 
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REAL ESTATE? SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
AND ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS 
This Real Estate Sale and Purchase Agreement and Escrow 
Instructions (the "Agreement") is made and entered into by and 
between JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a Utah general partnership, 
(the "Seller"), and DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M. KIMBALL (the 
"Purchaser"), and is effective as of this *~2J& day ofM£s_, 1993 
(the "Effective Date"). This Agreement is also consented to and 
joined in by TCF BANK WISCONSIN, F. S. B. , formerly Republic ' 
Capital Bank, F. S. B. ), a federal savings bank ("TCF") as its 
interests may appear. 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE MUTUAL COVENANTS 
contained herein, and other good and valuable consideration the 
receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the 
Seller hereby agrees to sell and Purchaser hereby agrees to 
purchase and pay for that certain property hereinafter described 
in accordance with the following terms and conditions. 
1. PROPERTY 
1.1 The conveyance by Seller to Purchaser shall 
consist of all of the real property described in Exhibit "A" 
attached to this Agreement (the "Real Property"), together with 
all right, title, and interest, if any, of Seller in and to any 
and all rights to use parking facilities, all roads, easements, 
streets, and ways bounding the Real Property, and rights of 
ingress and egress thereto and public or private utility 
connection thereto. 
1.2 The conveyance"by Seller to Purchaser also 
shall include all improvements (the "Improvements") of any kind 
whatsoever situated upon the Real Property, including, but not 
limited to, the building now known as the Judge Building located 
at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and fixtures 
located on the Real Property (the "Building").. 
1. 3 The conveyance by Seller to Purchaser also 
shall include all tangible personal property, if any, located on 
or in the Improvements owned by Seller (the "Personal Property"). 
The Real Property, Improvements, and Personal Property 
are hereinafter sometimes collectively called the "Property." 
At Closing the following shall be transferred and 
assigned by Seller to Purchaser: 
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1.4 The Tenant Leases, as more fully described in 
Paragraph 3.1(g) below, and any refundable security deposits made 
by the tenants thereunder; 
1. 5 The Contracts, as more fully described in 
Paragraph 3.1(f) below; 
1.6 Any assignable warranties and guarantees in 
conjunction with the Property; 
1.7 All trade names, trademarks, and names owned 
and assignable by Seller including the use of the name "Judge 
Building", and telephone numbers used in connection with the 
Property, and all intangible property rights related to the same; 
and 
1. 8 The plans and drawings and the engineering 
reports more fully described in Paragraph 3. 2 below. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE 
2.1 The purchase price for the Property shall be 
Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000.00), which is 
payable to TCF in the following manner: 
(a) Twenty Five Thousand Dollars 
($25,000.00) transferred by Purchaser to Associated 
Title Company (the "Escrow Agent") as an Earnest Money 
deposit at the same time as this fully executed 
Agreement is delivered to the Escrow Agent. Prior to 
Closing (the term is defined in paragraph 9. 1 below) 
Purchaser shall deposit the additional sum of One 
Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00) for 
a total of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) 
in the form of immediately available funds with the 
Escrow Agent. The Earnest Money shall be placed in an 
interest bearing account at a federally-insured bank 
selected by Escrow Agent. If the $25,000.00 Earnest 
Money is forfeited to Seller as provided in this 
Agreement, Seller shall be paid the interest earned 
thereon. If the Earnest Money becomes credited to 
Purchaser or otherwise payable to Purchaser due to 
Seller' s failure to timely perform, then the interest 
earned thereon shall be paid to Purchaser at Closing. 
(b) The balance of the purchase price shall 
be paid by Purchaser in the form of: 
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(i) Purchaser's execution at Closing of 
a Promissory Note in favor of TCF in the original 
principal amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($550,000.00 (the "Note"), providing for 
interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of 
Eight and One-Half percent per annum (8 1/2%) and 
payable in equal monthly installment payments 
amortized over a 25 year term with a final payment 
due seven years after the date of the Note, 
secured by a deed of trust, assignment of rents, 
and security agreement (the "Deed of Trust") 
encumbering the Property, and such additional 
documents (the "Loan Documents") as may be usual, 
customary and proper in the opinion of TCF and its 
counsel to evidence and secure Purchaser' s 
obligations to TCF. 
3. PRE-CLOSING OBLIGATIONS AND CONDITIONS 
3.1 As of the Effective Date of this Agreement, 
Seller or TCF has delivered to Purchaser, at TCF' s sole cost and 
expense, each of the following: 
(a) A current commitment (the "Title 
Commitment") for the issuance of an ALTA standard 
owner' s policy of title insurance from Associated Title 
Company (the "Title Company") together with good and 
legible copies of all documents referenced therein as 
exceptions to Seller' s title. If Purchaser elects to 
obtain extended coverage Purchaser shall satisfy all 
obligations of the Title Company in connection 
therewith, including without limitation the updating or 
recertification of any survey; 
(b) ALTA surveys of the Real Property and 
Improvements meeting the accuracy standards of a Class 
A survey as defined by ALTA/ACSM and prepared by a 
surveyor or engineer licensed in the state of Utah (the 
"Survey" ); 
(c) Drafts of the Note,-Deed of Trust and 
Loan Documents in the usual form used by TCF for review 
and approval by Purchaser within Five (5) working days 
after the effective date of this Agreement; 
(d) An inventory of the Personal Property, 
which is located at the Property; 
• 3 -
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(e) Copies of all existing warranties and/or 
guaranties affecting the Building or any features 
thereon and any Personal Property located therein or 
thereon which shall be assigned to Purchaser at 
Closing; 
(f) Copies of all management, employment, 
services, operations, maintenance and supply contracts 
affecting or pertaining to the Property or the business 
conducted thereon, together with a description of any 
or all undertakings and/or modifications which are not 
in writing (the "Contracts"). Purchaser shall assume 
Contracts except for those which Purchaser shall notify 
Seller in writing within ten (10) days after the 
Effective Date that Purchaser will not assume at 
Closing; 
(g) Copies of rental agreements with those 
tenants at the Property listed on Exhibit "BM attached 
to this Agreement (the "Tenant Leases"); 
(h) Copies of 1992 real property tax 
statements for the Property; and 
(i) Copies of all periodic reports prepared 
by Wallace Associates, the Court appointed receiver of 
the Property (the "Receiver"). 
Purchaser acknowledges that the documents referred to 
in Paragraph 3. 1(d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) have not been 
prepared by Seller or TCF or at their direction and no warranty 
is made as to the accuracy or completeness of these documents. 
3.2 As of the Effective Date of this Agreement, 
TCF has delivered to Purchaser, at TCF' s sole cost and expense, 
each of the following to the extent that any such items which 
pertain to the Property exist and are in the control or 
possession of TCF: copies of any and all studies, engineering 
data, site analysis, architectural drawings, tenant office floor 
plans, floor plate drawings, reports, results of tests and 
statements or records reflecting the expenses incurred in 
connection with the operation of the Properties during the years 
1989 to date, if available. 
3.3 Within fifteen (15) days after the Effective 
Date of this Agreement, Purchaser shall deliver to TCF such 
information concerning Purchaser as TCF shall reasonably request 
including, without limitation, Purchaser' s tax returns for the 
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two tax years immediately preceding the Effective Date of this 
Agreement, Purchaser' s current financial statements, which shall 
be true, accurate, and complete in all material respects, 
together with a complete listing of each of Purchaser' s assets, 
an authorization to TCF to obtain a credit report of Purchaser, 
and Purchaser' s organizational documents. 
3. 4 (a) Seller' s and TCF' s obligations under 
this Agreement are subject to and conditioned, First, upon the 
entry of a final order by the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah in the foreclosure action 
commenced by TCF and entitled "Republic Capital Bank, F. S. B. v. 
Judge Building Associates, et. a.," Civil No. 92090094PR (the 
"Action") approving this Agreement, releasing the Receiver and 
approving either the dismissal or other disposition of the 
Action, and, second, the approval of this Agreement by the TCF' s 
board of directors within ten (10) days after the Effective Date. 
TCF shall notify Escrow Agent and Purchaser in writing within 
five (5) days following the expiration of the foregoing 10-day 
period that corporate approval has been obtained, then this 
condition shall be deemed fulfilled or be waived. If TCF gives 
timely notice of disapproval of this condition, then neither 
party shall have any further obligation to the other hereunder, 
Escrow Agent promptly shall return the Earnest Money to Purchaser 
and Escrow Agent shall return to Seller or TCF any documents 
delivered to escrow by them. 
(b) TCF' s obligations under this Agreement 
are further subject to and conditioned upon approval by TCF's 
loan committee and board of directors within ten (10) days after 
Purchaser' s submittal of the information as set forth in 
paragraph 3. 3 above, of Purchaser' s Obligations and entering into 
the Loan Documents. TCF shall notify Escrow Agent, Seller and 
Purchaser in writing within five (5) days following the 
expiration of the foregoing 10-day period that corporate approval 
obtained, then this condition shall be deemed fulfilled or 
waived. If TCF gives timely notice of disapproval of this 
condition, then no party shall have any further obligation to the 
other hereunder; Escrow Agent promptly shall return the Earnest 
Money to Purchaser and Escrow Agent promptly shall return the 
Earnest Money to Purchaser and Escrow Agent s.hall return to 
Seller or TCF any documents delivered to escrow by Seller. 
3. 5 Seller or TCF shall deliver tenant estoppel 
statements to Purchaser for all tenants occupying more than 1000 
square feet of leased space within five (5) days after the 
effective date of this Agreement. 
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4, TITLE REVIEW 
4. 1 Purchaser shall have a period of five (5) 
days after the Effective Date (the "Title Review Period") to 
provide written disapproval to Escrow Agent and TCF of the 
condition of title to the Property as disclosed by the Title 
Commitment and thereby to terminate this Agreement. All 
exceptions to Seller' s title which are shown on Schedule B of the 
Title Commitment and to which no written objection is timely made 
shall be considered "Permitted Exceptions." If the Title Company 
amends the Title Commitment after the expiration of the Title 
Review Period to provide for exceptions in addition to the 
Permitted Exceptions, then the Purchaser shall either accept by 
written notice provided to Seller and Escrow Agent within five 
(5) days after receipt thereof the additional exceptions as 
Permitted Exceptions or elect in the same period by written 
notice to Seller and Escrow Agent to terminate this Agreement. 
If Purchaser shall timely disapprove the Title Commitment in 
writing or thereafter shall timely disapprove in writing any 
additional exceptions in accordance herewith, this Agreement 
shall be deemed terminated and the Earnest Money and all interest 
earned thereon shall be promptly returned to the Purchaser, any 
documents delivered to escrow by Seller or TCF shall be returned 
to them and thereafter no party shall have any further rights or 
obligations under this Agreement. 
5. FEASIBILITY STUDY AND INSPECTIONS 
5. 1 Purchaser represents and acknowledges that 
Purchaser has conducted a feasibility study of the Property, and 
reviewed and inspected the items delivered by Seller or TCF 
pursuant to this Agreement. 
5. 2 During this Feasibility Period, Purchaser and 
its duly authorized agents and representatives have been entitled 
to enter upon the Real Property and Improvements at all 
reasonable times to inspect the operation of the Property and to 
conduct whatever other inspections Purchaser has deemed necessary 
or advisable with respect to the structural integrity of the 
Building or otherwise, including the conduct of environmental 
assessments. Seller or TCF shall not be required to take any 
action or effect any remediation of defects alleged to have been 
discovered by Purchaser during the Feasibility Period. 
6. DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION PRIOR TO CLOSING 
6. 1 In the event tha t the Improvements, or any of 
them, are damaged by any casualty p r io r to Closing, the cost of 
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repairing such damage shall be estimated by an architect retained 
by TCF. 
6.2 If the cost of repairing such damage as 
estimated in accordance with Paragraph 6.1 above is less than 
FIFTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($50,000.00), then the Seller 
or TCF shall repair such damage as promptly as is reasonably 
possible, restoring the damaged property at least to its 
condition, immediately prior to such damage; and, in the event 
such repairs have not been completed prior to Closing, then the 
Closing shall nevertheless proceed as scheduled, and Purchaser 
may have the Escrow Agent withhold from TCF the funds necessary 
to make such repairs until Seller or TCF has repaired such damage 
pursuant to the provisions hereof, at which, time such funds shall 
be distributed to TCF. 
6. 3 If the cost of repairing such damage as 
estimated in accordance with Paragraph 6.1 above is greater than 
FIFTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($50,000,000), then Purchaser 
may elect to terminate this Agreement and receive a refund of the 
Earnest Money and the interest earned thereon. alternatively, 
with the approval of Purchaser and TCF, TCF shall, at TCF' s sole 
expense, repair the damage as promptly as is reasonably possible, 
restoring the damaged property at least to its condition 
immediately prior to the casualty, and Closing hereunder shall be 
deferred until such repair is made; or at TCF's and Purchaser' s 
Agreement, Seller shall pay to Purchaser, at Closing, all 
insurance proceeds payable for such damage, and the sale shall be 
closed without Seller' s repairing such damage. 
7. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES: RELEASE 
7. 1 Representations and Warranties of Seller. 
Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that: 
(a) Upon satisfaction or waiver of the 
conditions set forth in Paragraph 3. 4 above and the 
conditions set forth in Paragraph 9.3 below, Seller has 
the full power and authority to enter into and perform 
this Agreement to the terms hereof; 
(b) Except for the Action, Seller has not 
received written notice of any litigation pending or 
threatened (including without limitation proposed or 
threatened condemnation) affecting the Property or 
Seller' s ability to consummate this transaction, or of 
any violations of any laws, regulations, ordinances or 
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statutes in connection with the use and ownership of 
the Property; 
(c) Seller has not received notice of any 
violation of any applicable laws, regulations, or 
ordinances with respect to the Property; and 
(d) Seller and TCF make no representation or 
warranty as to the transfer to Purchaser of title to 
any item of personal property, it being understood by 
Purchaser that the personal property being acquired by 
Purchaser "as is, where is." 
7.2 Release. Except with respect to the 
representations and warranties set forth in Paragraph 7. 1 above: 
Except for those matters which Seller is or may be 
liable for due to its ownership of the Property, during 
its ownership of the Property, Seller, the Receiver and 
TCF are hereby released from all responsibility and 
liability regarding the condition of materials or 
substances that have been or may in the future by 
determined to be toxic, hazardous, undesirable or 
subject to regulation and that may need to be specially 
treated, handled and/or removed from the Property under 
current or future federal, state and local laws and 
regulations; 
Seller, Receiver and TCF are hereby released from 
all liability with respect to all matters with regard 
to the valuation or utility of the Property or its 
suitability for any purpose whatsoever; 
Purchaser expressly acknowledges that Purchaser 
has not relied on any warranties, promises, 
understandings or representations, express or implied, 
of Seller, Receiver or TCF or RCB or of any agent of 
Seller or TCF, relating to the Property which are not 
contained in this Agreement, and that Purchaser is 
acquiring the Property in its present condition and 
state of repair, "AS IS," with all defects, latent or 
apparent, and subject to all matters which an accurate 
inventory, survey or physical inspection of the 
Property would disclose; 
Purchaser acknowledges that any information of any 
type which Purchaser has received or may receive from 
Seller, Receiver or TCF or their agents is furnished on 
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the express condition that Purchaser shall make an 
independent verification of the accuracy of such 
information, all such information being furnished 
without any warranty whatsoever and Purchaser agrees 
that Purchaser will not attempt to assert any liability 
against Seller, Receiver or TCF for furnishing such 
information. 
Purchaser acknowledges having inspected the 
Property, having observed its physical characteristics 
and existing conditions and having had the opportunity 
to conduct such inventory, investigation and study on 
and of said Property and adjacent areas as it deems 
necessary and hereby waives any and all objections to, 
complaints about or claims (including, without 
limitation, federal, state or common law based actions 
and any private right of action under state or federal 
law including but not limited to, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 
and any state environmental statute, to which the 
Property is, or may be, subject) regarding physical 
characteristics and existing conditions, including, 
without limitation, subsurface soil and water 
conditions and solid and hazardous waste and hazardous 
substances on, under or adjacent to the Property; and 
Purchaser further hereby assumes the risk of 
changes in applicable laws and regulations relating to 
environmental conditions, so long as such changes do 
not occur before the Closing, on the Property and the 
risk that adverse physical characteristics and 
conditions, including, without imitation, the presence 
of hazardous substances or other contaminants, may not 
have been revealed by its investigation. 
7.3 Representations and Warranties of Purchaser. 
Purchaser hereby represents and warrants to Seller and TCF that 
as of the date hereof, the individuals executing this Agreement 
on behalf of Purchaser are authorized to do so, and as of the 
Closing the persons executing all documents to effect the 
transfer and transactions contemplated hereby shall be fully 
authorized to do so. 
7. 4 Re-Certification; Survival. All 
representations set forth in this Paragraph 7 are deemed to have 
been re-certified as of Closing by the party making such 
representation. The representations and warranties shall not be 
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deemed to have merged in the delivery of any deed, assignment or 
bill of sale but shall survive the Closing. 
8. ESCROW PERIOD 
8.1 From and after the Effective Date of this 
Agreement until the earlier of the termination of this Agreement 
or the Closing, Seller and/or TCF shall: 
(a) Maintain and manage the Property through 
the Receiver in its present condition, ordinary wear, 
tear and casualty excepted, and will punctually perform 
every obligation and undertaking of lessor or landlord 
under any Tenant Leases; 
(b) Continue to actively promote the 
Property for lease, and Not enter into any new Tenant 
Leases or modifications of existing Tenant Leases 
without the written consent of Purchaser; and 
(c) Be responsible for obtaining the final 
billing for utilities as of Closing, and Purchaser 
shall be required to have all utilities transferred to 
Purchaser' s name as of the Closing; provided, however, 
Purchaser shall be entitled to have all utilities 
transferred to Purchaser' s name as of the Closing in 
order that there shall be no interruption of utility 
services. Utilities, including, without imitation, 
telephone, gas, water and electricity, shall be 
apportioned on the basis of the final meter reading the 
final invoice to be obtained by Receiver. Purchaser 
shall be responsible for all utility charges from and 
after the Closing. All utility deposits shall be paid 
over to TCF at Closing and Purchaser shall make new 
utility deposits at Closing. 
9. CLOSING 
9.1 The Closing or Close of Escrow shall take 
place at the office of the Escrow Agent no later than June, 1993, 
subject to such reasonable extension as may be necessary for TCF 
to complete the process described in paragraph 3.4 above. If 
Closing fails to timely occur by June, 1993, or as may be 
extended by TCF as a result of the failure of the conditions set 
forth in this Agreement then this Agreement shall terminate and 
the Earnest Money and all interest earned shall be promptly 
returned to Purchaser any documents delivered to escrow by Seller 
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shall be promptly returned to Seller and therefore neither party 
shall have further rights or objections hereunder. 
9.2 At Closing, Seller shall deliver or cause to 
be delivered to Purchaser, at Seller' s sole cost and expense, 
each of the following items: 
(a) A Special Warranty Deed executed and 
acknowledged on behalf of Seller, in recordable form, 
conveying good and indefeasible fee simple title to the 
Properties to Purchaser in the form attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C," subject to all current taxes, reservations 
in patents, all easements, rights-of-way, covenants, 
conditions, and restrictions as may appear of record, 
all leases and all matters which an accurate survey or 
a physical inspection of the Property would disclose; 
(b) A certificate of non-foreign status in 
the form attached hereto as Exhibit "D": 
(c) An ALTA standard Owner's Policy of Title 
Insurance or, if timely requested by Purchaser, an ALTA 
extended Owner's Policy of Title Insurance (the "Title 
Policy") issued by the Title Company in the full amount 
of the purchaser price insuring good and indefeasible 
title to the Real Property in the Purchaser subject 
only to the Permitted Exceptions; the cost of a 
Standard Owner' s Title Policy shall be paid by TCF; 
(d) All original warranties and guaranties, 
if any, and the keys pertaining to or affecting the 
Property or any portion thereof and an assignment, duly 
executed and acknowledged by Seller, assigning to 
Purchaser all of Seller' s right, title and interest, if 
any, in all warranties and guaranties applicable to the 
Properties, or any part thereof in the form of Exhibit 
"E" hereto; 
(e). A bill of sale duly executed and 
acknowledged by Seller, transferring and assigning the 
Personal Property free and clear of all liens in the 
form of Exhibit "F" hereto; 
(f) The originals of the Tenant Leases and 
all amendments thereto, together with an assignment 
duly executed and acknowledged by Seller, assigning all 
of Seller' s interest in and to said Tenant Leases to 
Purchaser in the form of Exhibit " G" hereto; 
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(g) Duly executed Estoppel Certificates with 
respect to each Tenant Lease or the certification by 
Seller or the Receiver as to the status of each Tenant 
Lease; 
(h) An assignment, duly executed and 
acknowledged by Seller, assigning to Purchaser (who 
shall assume Seller' s obligations thereunder) all of 
Seller' s rights under the Contracts in the form of 
Exhibit "H": 
(i) All additional documents and 
instruments, including those documents described in 
paragraphs 1 and 3. 2 above, this Agreement requires to 
be provided by Seller at Closing, and all additional 
documents and instruments as in the reasonable opinion 
of the Title Company or Escrow Agent are reasonably 
necessary for the proper consummation of this 
transaction. 
9. 3 At Closing, Purchaser shall deliver or cause 
to be delivered to TCF. the following items 
fe* 
(a) The duly executed Loan Documents 
referred to in Paragraph 2. 1(b) above; 
(b) The premium differential to obtain ALTA 
extended title insurance coverage if such has been 
timely requested by Purchaser and the cost to obtain 
the extended title insurance and the premium for any 
special or other endorsements as may have been 
requested by Purchaser; and 
(c) All additional documents and instruments 
this Agreement requires to be provided by Purchaser at 
Closing and all additional documents and instruments as 
in the reasonable opinion of the Title Company or 
Escrow Agent are reasonably necessary for the proper 
consummation of this transaction.
 ; 
9. 4 At Closing, the following items shall be ZjvDbKS^s fMa&u. 
paid, adjusted or prorated between Seller and Purchaser: StUi^.U>-<-
(a) Ad valorem taxes and any general or -3- \ ^ ^
 nQ_ 
special assessments for the Property for the current * 
calendar year shall be prorated as of the date of J-»^cv^^Yte 
Closing on the basis of the latest available tax bill £«**** ^ 
and shall not be subject to subsequent adjustment; ~^^ ^c"*-vOU< 
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(b) Charges for the Title Policy shall be 
made as provided in paragraph 9.2(c) above and 9.3(d) 
above; 
(c) All rent will be apportioned as of 11:59 
p. m. on the day preceding the Closing. No prorations 
shall be made for delinquent rents existing as of the 
Closing. With respect to such delinquent rents, 
Purchaser shall make a reasonable attempt to collect 
the same for Seller' s benefit after Closing in the 
usual course of operation of the Property, and any such 
collection shall be remitted to Seller promptly upon 
receipt by Purchaser; provided, however, that nothing 
contained herein shall opt or to require Purchaser to 
institute any lawsuit or other collection procedure to 
collect such delinquent rents. In this regard, the 
first money is collected from tenants owing delinquent 
rents shall be applied to the current month' s rent and 
retained by Purchaser and any overage shall be 
forthwith paid by Purchaser to TCF for the delinquent 
rents; 
(d) All prepaid rents and refundable 
security deposits actually collected and received by 
Seller shall be credited to Purchaser. Non-refundable 
deposits shall remain the property of Seller; and 
(e) All other Closing costs (except as 
otherwise set forth in this Agreement and professional 
fees which shall be the responsibility of the party 
employing the professional except as otherwise set 
forth in this Agreement and in the event of litigation 
concerning this Agreement), including, but not limited 
to, recording and escrow fees, shall be shared by the 
parties according to local custom. 
9. 5 Without limitation, it shall be the 
obligation of the Escrow Agent at Closing or promptly thereafter 
as the case may be: 
(a) To record the Special Warranty Deed 
delivered hereunder and upon recordation the Special 
Warranty Deed shall be delivered to Purchaser; 
(b) To deliver to Purchaser those items 
specified in Paragraph 9. 2(d)-(j) above; 
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(c) To perform the prorations specified in 
Paragraph 9. 4 hereof; and 
(d) To deliver to TCF the funds referred to 
in Paragraph 9.3(a) above, and the Loan Documents which 
are not recorded and to record TCF Loan Documents as 
directed by TCF and upon recordation they shall be 
delivered to TCF. 
9. 6 Possession of the Property and keys thereto 
shall be delivered to Purchaser by Seller or the Receiver at 
Closing. 
9.7 Purchaser agrees to indemnify and hold TCF, 
the Receiver and Seller harmless of and from any and all 
liabilities, claims, demands, and expenses, of any kind or nature 
(except those items which by the terms of this Agreement 
specifically remain the obligation of Seller, TCF or the 
Receiver) arising or occurring subsequent to the date of Closing 
and which are in any way related to the ownership, maintenance, 
or operation of the Property, including, but not limited to, 
court costs and attorneys' fees. TCF agrees to indemnify and 
hold Purchaser harmless of and from any and all liabilities, 
claims, demands, and expenses of any kind or nature (except those 
which by the terms of this Agreement specifically become the 
obligation of Purchaser) arising or occurring prior to the date 
of Closing that are in any way related to the ownership, 
maintenance, or operation of the Property, including but not 
limited to court costs and attorneys' fees. 
9.8 In the event any party hereto receives notice 
of a claim or demand which results or may result in 
indemnification pursuant to Paragraph 9. 7 above, such party shall 
immediately give notice thereof to the other. The party 
receiving such notice shall immediately take such measures as may 
be reasonably required to properly and effectively defend such 
claim, and may defend same with counsel of its own choosing. In 
the event the party receiving such notice fails to properly and 
effectively defend such claim, and in the event such party is 
liable therefor, the party so giving such notice may defend such 
claim at the expense of the party receiving such notice. 
10. REMEDIES UPON DEFAULT 
10.1 In the event that Seller or TCF fails to 
timely comply with all conditions, covenants, and obligations 
Seller or TCF has hereunder, such failure shall be an event of 
default and Purchaser shall have the option (a) to terminate this 
- 1 4 -
0 1 i \ 2 4 4 4 3 . 3 - A 
0 ft *1 K \ i\ 
Agreement and receive immediately without further instruction or 
consent of Seller or TCF the Earnest Money and all interest 
earned thereon, or (b) grant Seller and TCF additional time 
within which to comply. 
10. 2 In the event all conditions of this 
Agreement are satisfied and all covenants and agreements to be 
performed prior to Closing are fully performed, but the sale is 
not consummated through a default on the part of Purchaser, then 
Seller shall have the option (a) to terminate this Agreement and 
to receive from Escrow Agent upon demand liquidated damages in 
the amount of the Earnest Money and all interest earned thereon, 
such amount being agreed upon by the between the Seller or TCF 
and the Purchaser as liquidated damages due to the difficulty and 
inconvenience of ascertaining and measuring actual damages, and 
the uncertainty thereof; or (b) to sue to enforce this Agreement 
by specific performance. 
11. MISCELLANEOUS 
11.1 Any notice to be given or served upon any 
party hereto in connection with this Agreement must be in writing 
and shall be deemed to have been given (including by courier and 
electronic facsimile transmission) and received and served 
personally on the party to whom notice was given or on the second 
day after mailing if mailed to the party to whom notice is to be 
given by first class mail, certified or registered, postage 
prepaid, return receipt requested and property addressed to 
Purchaser, Seller and Escrow Agent as follows: 
To Seller: Judge Building Associates 
c/o Harold J. Hill 
366 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
With Copies to: William C. Halls, Esq. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William R. Russell, Esq. 
#8 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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To TCF: TCF Bank Wisconsin, F. S. B. 
500 West Brown Deer Road 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53223 
Attn: Richard C. Thiermann, 
Senior Vice President 
Fax No. : (414) 351-8680 
With copy to: Robert D. Merrill, Esq. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Fax No. : (801) 534-0058 
To Purchaser: Daniel A. Miller 
c/o D.M. Properties Incorporated 
13601 Ventura Blvd, Suite 93 
Sherman Oaks, California 91423 
David M. Kimball 
Kimball Investments 
999 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
With copy to: David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson 
175 South West Temple, Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
To Escrow Agent: Associated Title Company 
349 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
11.2 Any representations and warranties contained 
in Paragraph 7.1 above shall be true and correct on the date of 
Closing, and Purchaser shall have no obligation to close if such 
representations and warranties are not true and correct as of 
such date. Any representations and warranties contained in 
Paragraph 7. 3 above shall be true and correct on the date of 
Closing, and Seller shall have no obligation to close if such 
representations and warranties are not true and correct as of 
such date. It is further understood and agreed that any and all 
representations, warranties, covenants, and agreements contained 
herein, whether to be performed before or after the time of 
Closing, shall not be deemed to be merged into or waived by the 
instruments of Closing, but shall expressly survive Closing and 
shall be binding upon the party obligated thereby. 
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11.3 This Agreement shall be construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
Venue for any action shall be Salt Lake County, Utah only and the 
parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of any federal or state 
court in such county. 
11.4 Where required for proper interpretation, 
words in the singular shall include the plural; the masculine 
gender shall include the neuter and the feminine, and vice versa. 
The terms "heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns" shall 
include "successors, legal representatives, and assigns." 
11.5 This Agreement may not be modified or 
amended, except by an agreement in writing signed by each of the 
parties signing below. The parties may waive any of the 
conditions contained herein or any of the obligations of the 
other party hereunder, but any such wavier shall be effective 
only if in writing and signed by the party waiving such 
conditions or obligations. 
11.6 Purchaser may not assign its right, title 
and interest under this Agreement without the prior written 
consent of Seller and TCF which may be granted or denied in 
Seller' s and TCF' s sole and absolute discretion. 
11.7 In the event any party files a suit in 
connection with this Agreement or any provisions contained 
herein, then the substantially prevailing party in such action 
shall be entitled to recover, in addition to all other remedies 
or damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of court 
incurred in such suit. 
11.8 The descriptive headings of the several 
articles, sections, and paragraphs contained in this Agreement 
are inserted for convenience only and shall not control or affect 
the meaning or construction of any of the provisions hereof. 
11.9 This Agreement (and the items to be 
furnished in accordance herewith) constitutes the entire 
agreement between the parties pertaining to the subject matter 
hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements 
and understandings of the parties in connection therewith. No 
representations, warranties, covenants, agreements, or conditions 
not expressed in this Agreement shall be binding upon the parties 
hereto or shall affect or be effective to interpret, change, or 
restrict the provisions of this Agreement; provided, however, 
that all certifications, representations, and warranties of 
Seller contained in the statements and schedules to be furnished 
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herewith, shall become a part of this Agreement as though st 
forth herein. 
11.10 Numerous copies of this Agreement may be 
executed by the parties hereto. Each such executed copy shall 
have the full force and effect of any original executed 
instrument. 
11.11 This Agreement shall be of no force and 
effect unless Purchaser shall execute and deliver the Agreement 
to Seller by 5:00 p.m. local time, May 28, 1993 and unless Seller 
shall have executed this Agreement and delivered it to Escrow 
Agent on or before 5:00 p.m. local time, May 28, 1993. The 
deliveries required herein may be made by facsimile provided ink 
originals are delivered within forty-eight hours after the 
facsimile transmission. 
11. 12 Time is of the essence in the performance 
of each of the provisions of this Agreement, however, in the 
event the provisions of this Agreement require any act to be done 
or action to be taken hereunder on the date which is a Saturday, 
Sunday or legal holiday observed by Escrow Agent, such act or 
action shall be deemed to have been validly done or taken if done 
or taken on the next succeeding day which is not a Saturday, 
Sunday or legal holiday observed by Escrow Agent. 
11.13 In the event any provision or part of this 
Agreement is deemed invalid, illegal or unenforceable, prior to 
Closing, such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability will not 
affect the remaining provisions of this Agreement provided that 
if the change materially affects the terms of this Agreement, 
then either party may elect to terminate this Agreement, in which 
event the Earnest Money and all interest earned thereon, will be 
returned to Purchaser with all interest earned thereon and 
thereupon this Agreement shall be null and void and of no further 
force and effect. 
11.14 All exhibits to this Agreement are fully 
incorporated herein as though set forth at length. 
11.15 In the event that eminent domain or 
condemnation proceedings are commenced or notice is given of any 
such proceedings or if any easements or dedications are sought on 
or against any portion of the Real Property prior to Closing, 
Purchaser shall have the right (a) to cancel this Agreement or 
(b) to close the transaction contemplated hereunder, in which 
event Purchaser shall be entitled to receive any and all 
condemnation or eminent domain proceeds. 
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11.16 Seller and TCF shall pay Wallace Associates 
a commission which is equal to six percent (6%) of the purchase 
price as computed in Paragraph 2. 1 above for services rendered on 
behalf of Seller, TCF and Purchaser in this transaction. The 
foregoing commissions shall be deemed to have been earned and is 
due and payable only upon the Closing of this transaction and 
recordation of the Special Warranty Deed. Except for the payment 
of the foregoing commission, each party warrants to the other 
that it has not entered into any agreement that would subject the 
other to the payment of any real estate commissions or fees due 
or allegedly due any broker by reason of such agreement. Wallace 
Associates shall pay Kimball Investments fifty percent (50%) of 
said commission through escrow. 
11. 17 Nothing in this Agreement shall confer 
upon any person, firm or corporation not party to this Agreement, 
or the legal representatives of such person, firm or corporation, 
any rights or remedies of any nature or kind whatsoever under or 
by reason of this Agreement, except as expressly set forth 
herein. 
11. 18 The terms and provisions of this 
Agreement represent the results of negotiations between Seller 
and Purchaser, each of which has been represented by counsel of 
its own choosing, and neither or which have acted under any 
duress or compulsion, whether legal, economic or otherwise. 
Consequently, the terms and provisions of this Agreement shall be 
interpreted and construed in accordance with their usual and 
customary meanings, and Seller and Purchaser hereby waive the 
application of any rule of law which would otherwise be 
applicable in connection with the interpretation and construction 
of this Agreement including (without limitation) any rule of law 
to the effect that ambiguous or conflicting terms or provisions 
contained in the executed draft of this Agreement shall be 
interpreted or construed against the party whose attorney 
prepared the executed draft or any earlier draft of this ;/% 
Agreement. /C<1.— 
11. 19 TCF agrees to be responsible for the 
proper and timely construction and installation of all required 
improvements and equipment in connection with the new Judge Cafe 
lease, and pay for all improvement and leasing costs,^in » \ . , 
connection therewith. Purchaser shall have no responsibility or VV*-'-1* 
liability in connection therewith. f2»r^ 
11. 20 It is a condition of purchase and 
Purchaser' s obligations hereunder, that prior to the close of 
escrow, there be executed a new parking agreement with the owner 
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of the Exchange Parking Terrace, utilizing proper and current 
legal descriptions, that reaffirms the right of the Judge 
Building and its tenants to certain minimum parking privileges in 
the Exchange Parking Terrace, It is understood that Seller and 
TCF make no warranty or representation to Purchaser in connection 
with such parking privileges or rights, but shall assist 
Purchaser in obtaining such rights. 
11.21 In connection with the settlement of the 
Action and the sale of the Property to Purchaser, TCF agrees to 
preserve and assign to Purchaser the right to foreclose on the 
leasehold interest of Martineau & Company. 
DATED this 1** day of May, 1993. 
CONSENT AND JOINDER 
TCF consents to and joins in the foregoing Agreement 
and agrees to be bound by and perform those provisions pertaining 
to TCF. 
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of the Exchange Parking Terrace, utilizing proper and current 
legal descriptions, that reaffirms the right of the Judge 
Building and its tenants to certain minimum parking privileges in 
the Exchange Parking Terrace. It is understood that Seller and 
TCF make no warranty or representation to Purchaser in connection 
with such parking privileges or rights, but shall assist 
Purchaser in obtaining such rights. 
11.21 In connection with the settlement of the 
Action and the sale of the Property to Purchaser, TCF agrees to 
preserve and assign to Purchaser the right to foreclose on the 
leasehold interest of Martineau & Company. 
DATED this day of May, 1993. 
SELLER: 
Judge Building Associates, 
a Utah general partnership 
By 
Harold J. Hill, Partner 
PURCHASER: 
CONSENT AND JOINDER 
TCF consents to and joins in the foregoing Agreement 
and agrees to be bound by and perform those provisions pertaining 
to TCF. 
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DATED this ^ ^ day of May, 1993 
TCF 
TCF Bank, 
Republ ic 
I t s \//cc -
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EXHIBIT "A1 
The following tract of real property lying in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL 1; 
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52, 
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence 
East 148. 50 feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West 
148. 50 feet; thence North 100 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a non-exclusive right of 
way over and across the following: 
BEGINNING 138. 5 feet East of the 
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52, 
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and 
running thence South 100. 0 feet; thence 
South 7° 16' East 168.3 feet; thence East 
10.0 feet; thence North 7° 16' West 168.3 
feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence 
West 10.0 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 2: (Foot-Walls) 
A perpetual right to maintain and erect a Foot-Wall 
upon a strip of land described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the bottom of the building 
at a point 100 feet South of the 
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52, 
Plat, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, 
at depth of not less than 14 feet 
beneath the level of Main Street; and 
running thence East 138 1/2 feet; thence 
South 2 feet; thence West 138 1/2 feet; 
thence North 2 feet to the place of 
BEGINNING. 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
List of tenant leases to be provided at Closing. 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
pPSCIAL WARRANTY DEED 
WHEN RECORDED. MAIL TO: 
Daniel A- Miller 
David M. Kimball 
c/o Kimball Investment Company 
999 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, Utah general partnership, 
Grantor, of 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, hereby 
CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against those claiming by, through, or under 
said Grantor, but not otherwise, to DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M. 
KIMBALL, as tenants in commons, c/o Kimball Investment Company, 
999 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Grantee, for 
the sum of Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00), and other good and 
valuable consideration, the following described real property in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
The following tract of real property lying in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL 1; 
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52, 
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence 
East 148. 50 feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West 
148. 50 feet; thence North 100 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a non-exclusive right of 
way over and across the following: 
BEGINNING 138. 5 feet East of the 
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52, 
Plat WAM, Salt Lake City Survey; and 
running thence South 100.0 feet; thence 
South 7° 16' East 168.3 feet; thence East 
10.0 feet; thence North 7° 16' West 168.3 
feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence 
West 10. 0 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
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PARCEL 2: (Foot-Walls) 
A perpetual right to maintain and erect a Foot-Wall 
upon a strip of land described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the bottom of the building 
at a point 100 feet South of the 
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52, 
Plat, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, 
at depth of not less than 14 feet 
beneath the level of Main Street; and 
running thence East 138 1/2 feet; thence 
South 2 feet; thence West 138 1/2 feet; 
thence North 2 feet to the place of 
BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO: 
WITNESS the hand of said Grantor as of the day of 
, 1993. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah general partner 
By 
Harold J. Hill 
General Partner 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me 
this day of , 1993, by Harold J. Hill, the 
General Partner of Judge Building Associates, a Utah general 
partnership. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing a t : 
My Commission Exp i re s : 
- 2 5 -
0 1 1 X 2 4 4 4 3 . 3 - A 
EXHIBIT "D" 
NON-FOREIGN AGREEMENT 
Section 144 5 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that 
a transferee of a U.S. real property interest must withhold tax 
if the transferor is a foreign person. To inform Daniel A. 
Miller and David M. Kimball ("Transferee") that withholding of 
tax is not required upon the disposition of a U. S. real property 
interest by Judge Building Associates, a Utah general 
partnership, ("Transferor"), Transferor hereby certifies as 
follows: 
1. Transferor is not a foreign corporation, foreign 
partnership, foreign trust, or foreign estate (as those terms are 
defined in the Internal Revenue Code and Income Tax Regulations); 
2. Transferor' s U. S. employer identification number 
and address are: 
(a) Judge Building Associates 
c/o Harold J. Hill, General Fed. ID Number 
Transferor agrees to inform Transferee if it becomes a 
foreign person at any time during the three year period 
immediately following the date of this notice. 
Transferor understands that this affidavit may be 
disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service by Transferee and that 
any false statement contained herein could be punished by fine, 
imprisonment, or both. 
Under penalties of perjury the undersigned declares 
that he has examined this affidavit and to the best of his 
knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete, and the 
undersigned further declares that he has authority to sign this 
affidavit on behalf of Transferor. 
DATED as of the day of June, 1993. 
"TRANSFEROR" 
By 
I t s 
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The undersigned hereby acknowledges and affirms to the 
below named notary public that (1) [s]he appeared before such 
notary public, holds the position or title set forth above, and, 
on behalf of the above named corporation by proper authority, 
either executed the foregoing document before such notary public 
or acknowledged to such notary public that the undersigned 
executed the foregoing document, and that (2) the foregoing 
document was the act of such corporation for the purpose stated 
in it. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me 
this day of , 19 , by 
of , a corporation. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
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EXHIBIT " E" 
Assignments of warranties to be provided at Closing. 
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EXHIBIT " F 
BILL QT SALE 
(Without Warranties) 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, Utah general partnership, 
SELLER, of 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, for and 
in consideration of the sum of Ten and no/100 hundred dollars 
($10.00), and other good and value of consideration, hereby 
sells, transfers and assigns, without warranty and "AS IS" all of 
Seller' s right, title and interest in and to that certain 
personable property located at 8 East Broadway/ Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 as more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
The Seller makes no representation as to title to said 
property, the right to sell same or whether said property is 
subject to any liens or encumbrances, the same being sold to 
Seller without warranty and "AS IS." 
DATED this day of June, 1993. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah general partnership 
By 
Harold J. Hill 
General Partner 
-29-
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EXHIBIT M G" 
Original tenant leases to be delivered at Closing. 
-30-
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EXHIBIT "H" 
Assignments of contracts to be delivered at Closing. 
-31-
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 2 
Robert D. Merrill, #2244 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
HLED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN23 1993 
DepjWsteTiT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B. 
(Formerly known as REPUBLIC 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as 
personal representative of the 
ESTATE OF KENNETH H. GARDNER, 
Deceased, MARTINgAU & COMPANY, 
Certified Public Accounts, 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR SETTLEMENT 
OF FINAL ACCOUNT OF 
RECEIVER; AND FOR DECREE 
OF DISCHARGE OF RECEIVER 
Civil No. 920900094PR 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
David L. Jewkes, of Wallace Associates Management, 
Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Receiver") states as follows: 
1. The Receiver is the duly appointed, qualified and 
acting receiver of that certain real property located at and 
commonly known as The Judge Building, 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, which real property is more particularly 
described at Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference 
made a part hereof (the "Subject Premises"). 
2. The Receiver was appointed by Order of this Court 
entered on the 10th day of January, 1992, and the Receiver has 
preserved the Subject Premises, has collected the rents arising 
therefrom during the pendency of this action, has paid all 
reasonable and proper costs and expenses and has taken all other 
necessary and proper actions in connection with this 
receivership. At the present time the Subject Premises are 
being transferred to purchasers pursuant to the terms of a 
stipulation file concurrently with this petition (the 
"Stipulation"), and there is no further need for the Receiver's 
services. 
3. The Receiver is now preparing for filing with 
this Court a Final Account showing all of the rents, issues and 
profits which have been collected and received during the 
accounting period and all disbursements which have been made by 
Receiver. The Receiver anticipates that there will be cash on 
hand as of the date of the Final Account which should be paid 
over to the Plaintiff and further accounted for as provided in 
the Purchase Agreement, a copy of which is attached to the 
Stipulation. Said Final Account, together with prior quarterly 
reports filed herein, shall constitute a true and correct 
statement of all funds received and disbursed by Receiver with 
regard to the Subject Premises. 
011X34862.1 
4. The Receiver is entitled to reasonable 
compensation for the services rendered by it in connection 
therewith as set forth in the Quarterly Reports and the Final 
Account. 
5. After payment of all costs of the receivership 
and of all expenses of the administration thereof, the balance 
of the sums collected by Receiver as rents, issues and profits 
from the Subject Premises should be paid over to Plaintiff. 
6. Upon payment of all of the costs of the 
receivership and the expenses of administration, the payment of 
the remaining sums as hereinabove stated the Receiver will be 
entitled to be released and discharged as Receiver. 
WHEREFORE, the Receiver requests as follows: 
1. That the Receiver' s Final Account be approved and 
allowed upon filing with the Court and approved by Plaintiff; 
2. That all acts of the Receiver in respect of the 
receivership of the Subject Premises be approved and ratified; 
3. That the Receiver be discharged as Receiver of 
the Subject Premises; 
4. That upon the discharge of Receiver, the Court 
enter an Order releasing Receiver from any further duty or 
obligation herein; and 
5. That such further orders be entered herein as may 
be necessary. 
011X34862.1 
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DATED this _^5fday of June, 1993. 
DavicT L. Jewkes, of and for 
Wallace Associates Management, Inc. 
APPROVED: 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
<Y^A>-0 
Robert D. M e r r i l l 
At to rneys for Republic Cap i t a l Bank, F. S. B. 
A yAJ<? 
William C. ' Halls 
Attorney for J. Michael Martin 
/ ^ 
William R. Russe l l 
A t to rney fo r Judge Bui ld ing Assoc ia t e s 
Harold J. H i l l 
011X34862. 1 
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EXHIBIT "A1 
The following tract of real property lying in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL 1: 
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52, 
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence 
East 148.50 feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West 
148. 50 feet; thence North 100 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a non-exclusive right of 
way over and across the following: 
BEGINNING 138. 5 feet East of the 
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52, 
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and 
running thence South 100.0 feet; thence 
South 7° 16' East 168.3 feet; thence 
• East 10.0 feet; thence North 7° 16' West 
168.3 feet; thence North 100.0 feet; 
thence West 10. 0 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 2: (Foot-Walls) 
A perpetual right to maintain and erect a Foot-Wall 
upon a strip of land described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the bottom of the building 
at a point 100 feet South of the 
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52, 
Plat, Plat "A"., Salt Lake City Survey, 
at depth of not less than 14 feet 
beneath the level of Main Street; and 
running thence East 138 1/2 feet; 
thence South 2 feet; thence West 138 
1/2 feet; thence North 2 feet to the 
place of BEGINNING. 
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 3 
FILEO DISTRICT CSUaT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 2 1993 
SALT LAKE COUNT 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY V O^uty Clerk 
Robert D. Merrill, #2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B. 
(Formerly known as REPUBLIC 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN 
corporation) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as 
personal representative of the 
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, 
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, 
Certified Public Accountants, 
Defendants. 
ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION 
AND MOTION RE PARTIAL 
SETTLEMENT, ASSIGNMENT OF 
CAUSE OF ACTION, 
SUBSTITUTION OF PLAINTIFF 
AND DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 
DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 920900094PR 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
The Stipulation and Motion re Partial Settlement, 
[Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff and 
Dismissal of Certain Defendants dated June J<j , 1993 having been 
considered by the Court and good cause appearing 
IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
1. The Stipulation is approved. 
011\26932.2 
2. Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball are 
substituted as parties plaintiff in the place of Republic 
Capital Bank, F.S.B., (formerly known as Republic Savings & Loan 
Association of Wisconsin, a Wisconsin corporation). All 
pleadings filed hereafter shall reflect this substitution. 
3. Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball are 
substituted as parties plaintiff for the sole purpose of 
completing the foreclosure of any interest Martineau & Company, 
Certified Public Accountants, may have in the property which is 
the subject matter of the Complaint and on the condition that no 
deficiency judgment will be sought or granted against Judge 
Building Associates, a Utah limited partnership, Harold J. Hill 
or J. Michael Martin. 
4. Harold J. Hill and J. Michael Martin are hereby 
dismissed as parties defendant. 
5. The third party Complaint and counterclaim as 
between J. Michael Martin and Sam Sampinos are dismissed without 
prejudice. 
6. The parties to the Stipulation are direct to take 
such other and further steps as may be necessary or appropriate 
to implement the terms and provisions thereof. 
DATED t h i s ^ y d a y of June, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
FranJiCG. No£3r jf 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge; J 
011X26932.2 * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing ORDER by mailing copies thereof, 
postage prepaid to the following this ^3*day of June, 1993: 
Robert D. Merrill 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
William C. Halls, Esq. 
9 Exchange, Place, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William R. Russell, Esq. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Daniel A. Mi l l e r 
DM Properties, Inc. 
13601 Ventura Blvd., Suite 93 
Sherman Oaks, California 91423 
David M. Kimball 
Kimball Investment Co. 
999 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 4 
DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458) 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, ESQ. (5037) 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M. 
KIMBALL (substituted as parties plaintiff 
in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL 
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as 
REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND LOAN ] 
ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN, ] 
a Wisconsin Corporation), ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a ] 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL ) 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as ] 
personal representative of the } 
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, ] 
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, ] 
Certified Public Accountants, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) EX PARTE MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 
) DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
I Civil No. 920900094PR 
i Honorable Frank G. Noel 
1 
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Plaintiffs Daniel A, Miller and David M. Kimball, through their attorneys David R. 
Olsen and Claudia F. Berry of Suitter Axland & Hanson, make this ex parte motion for entry 
of a Decree of Foreclosure. 
STATEMENT OF ttKTFVANT FACTS 
1. On the 21st day of June, 1993, plaintiffs' predecessor, Republic Capital Bank, 
F.S.B., and the defendants Judge Building Associates, Harold J. Hill, J. Michael Martin, and 
Sam Sampinos entered into a written Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment 
of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff, and Dismissal of Certain Defendants. A copy of 
this Stipulation is appended as Exhibit A. 
2. In accordance with the Stipulation, on June 22, 1993, the court entered an Order 
Approving the Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, 
Substitution of Plaintiff, and Dismissal of Certain Defendants. A copy of the Order is appended 
as Exhibit B. 
3. Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order, defendants Harold J. Hill and J. Michael 
Martin were dismissed as parties defendant. Defendant Wilma W. Gardner, as personal 
representative of the Estate of Kenneth N. Gardner, has executed a release and reconveyance 
of her encumbrance against the property. See Recital D of the Stipulation. 
4. Default judgment has been entered against defendant Martineau & Company. A 
copy of the Default Judgment is appended as Exhibit C. 
5. Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the Stipulation, Judge Building Associates stipulated 
that the plaintiffs "may move Ex Parte and without notice to Judge Building Associates for the 
entry of a decree of foreclosure consistent with the terms of this Stipulation. . . ." Paragraph 
2 
A •'• O v. •' f. 
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3 further states that the plaintiffs "may proceed with the above-entitled foreclosure action . . . 
provided Hill and Martin are dismissed as party defendants, no deficiency judgment is sought 
against Judge Building Associates. Hill, or Martin after any sheriffs or trustee's sale of the 
property and that Purchaser indemnify and hold Bank harmless of or from any claims which may 
hereafter be asserted against Bank by reason of further actions taken in this matter." 
Pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation, and in accordance with the default judgment 
entered against Martineau & Company, plaintiffs are entitled to a Decree of Foreclosure against 
Judge Building Associates and Martineau & Company, the remaining defendants in this case. 
As required by the Stipulation and Order, no deficiency judgment may be sought or granted 
against Judge Building Associates, Harold J. Hill, or J. Michael Martin. Further, inasmuch as 
Martineau & Company was not a party to the contract with Republic Capital Bank, no deficiency 
judgment may be granted against it, and it has no right of redemption. 
DATED this ^ day of September, 1993. 
SUTTTER AXLAND & HANSON 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Claudia F. Berry, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
hmd34.22 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert D. Merrill, #2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 2 - 3 3 3 3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B. 
( F o r m e r l y known as REPUBLIC 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN 
c o r p o r a t i o n ) 
Plaintiff , 
vs. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as 
personal representative of the 
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, ||De ceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, 
jjCertified Public Accountants, 
Defendants. 
This Stipulation is entered into as of the ZUf"day of 
June, 1993 by, between and among Republic Capital Bank, F. S. B. , 
(now known as TCF Bank Wisconsin, fsb, a federal savings bank 
(the "Bank"), Judge Building Associates, a Utah limited 
partnership ("Judge Building Associates"), Harold J. Hill 
("Hill"), J. Michael Martin ("Martin") and Sam Sampinos 
("Sampinos") as follows: 
s^ssr 
J«?3 
STIPULATION AND MOTION RE 
PARTIAL SETTLEMENT, 
ASSIGNMENT OF CAUSE OF 
ACTION, SUBSTITUTION OF 
PLAINTIFF AND DISMISSAL OF 
CERTAIN DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 920900094PR 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
'v V O 0 1 
RECITALS 
A. On January 8, 1992 Bank filed a Verified 
Foreclosure Complaint (the "Complaint") against Judge Building 
Associates, Hill and Martin. The Complaint was amended on 
February 2, 1992 in order to join Wilma W. Gardner as a personal 
representative of the estate of Kenneth N. Gardner, deceased 
("Gardner") and Martineau & Company, certified public accounts 
("Martineau"). 
B. The Complaint was filed to foreclose a trust deed 
(the "Trust Deed11) in favor of Bank covering real property and 
improvements located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 known as the Judge Building and more particularly 
described in the Complaint (the "Property"). 
C. Judge Building Associates, Hill, Martin, Gardner 
and Martineau were all duly served. Judge Building Associates, 
Hill and Martin have filed answers and Martin has filed a third 
party complaint against Sampinos. Sampinos has filed a 
counterclaim against Martin and Martin has filed a response 
thereto. 
D. Bank, Judge Building Associates, Hill and Martin 
have agreed with Gardner to pay Gardner the total sum of $15,000 
in exchange for Gardner' s release and reconveyance of the 
Gardner encumbrance against the Property. 
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E. Martineau has not filed any responsive pleading 
and on March 3, 1993, upon the Bank's Motion the Court entered 
its default judgment against Martineau. 
F. Judge Building Associates, as "Seller", has 
entered into a Real Estate Sale and Purchase Agreement and 
lEscrow Instructions (the "Purchase Agreement") with Daniel A. 
Miller and David M. Kimball, as "Purchaser" with respect to the 
Property, a copy of which Purchase Agreement is attached hereto 
marked Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part hereof. 
G. In order to implement the terms of the Purchase 
Agreement, the parties hereto have agreed to the settlement of 
certain claims as among them with respect to the matters covered 
by the Complaint in accordance with the terms of this 
Stipulation. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties stipulate as follows and 
move the Court to enter an order approving this Stipulation. 
1. Escrow. The Purchaser, Bank, Judge Building 
Associates, Hill and Martin acknowledge that the documents and 
funds called for in the letter of escrow instructions (the 
"Escrow Instructions") addressed to Associated Title Company 
(the "Escrow Agent") have been delivered or will be placed with 
the escrow agent within two (2) days of Court approval of this 
Stipulation. 
2. Substitution of Plaintiff: No Deficiency. As of 
the date hereof Bank has assigned to Purchaser the cause of 
01i\26932.2 3 
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action set forth in the Complaint and the underlying note and 
Trust Deed and the Purchaser has agreed that Purchaser' s rights 
thereunder is junior and subordinate to the Trust Deed and other 
loan documents entered into by the Bank and Purchasers pursuant 
to the Purchase Agreement. Accordingly, the parties stipulate 
I that Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball may be substituted in 
the above entitled action as parties plaintiff in place of and 
as successor to the Bank as plaintiff for the sole purpose of 
completing the foreclosure of any interest Martineau may have in 
the Property and on the condition that no deficiency judgment 
will be sought against Judge Building Associates, Hill or 
Martin. This substitution is made pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures. 
3. Completion of Foreclosure: Dismissal of Sanvpinos 
Claims. The parties acknowledge that Miller and Kimball, or 
their designated assignees, may proceed with the above entitled 
foreclosure action or proceed with the non-judicial foreclosure 
of the Trust deed, provided Hill and Martin are dismissed as 
party defendants, no deficiency judgment is sought against Judge 
Building Associates, Hill or Martin after any sheriff's or 
trustee's sale of the Property and that Purchaser indemnify and 
hold the Bank harmless of or from any claims which may hereafter 
be asserted against Bank by reason of any further actions taken 
in this matter. Martin and Sampinos agree that the Court may 
enter an order dismissing the third party complaint and 
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IIcounterclaim as between them without prejudice. Judge Building 
Associates stipulates that the Plaintiff may move Ex Parte and 
without any notice to Judge Building Associates for the entry of 
a decree of foreclosure consistent with the terms of this 
Stipulation or dismiss the Complaint. 
4. Termination of Receivership, The parties agree 
| that there is no further need for a Receiver in this Action and 
the receivership may be terminated and the Receiver released 
upon the filing of a final report and accounting with the Court. 
5. Settlement of Disputed Claims. The parties 
acknowledge that this Stipulation is intended as a settlement of 
disputed claims and that nothing contained herein constitutes an 
admission of liability by any of the parties. 
6. Costs. Each party shall bear his or its 
attorneys' fees and costs of court incurred in connection with 
this matter, the negoriation of this Stipulation and the 
performance of this Stipulation. Any party wh$ sues 
successfully to enforce the terms of this Stipulation may 
recover his, its or their costs of court and reasonable 
attorneys fees incurred in the prosecution of that suit. 
7. Successors and Assigns. All covenants and 
agreements contained in this Stipulation shall bind and inure to 
the benefit of the respective successors or assigns of the 
parties hereto. 
011N26932.2 5 
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8. Entire Agreement. This Stipulation contains the 
entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject 
matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements and 
understandings oral or written pertaining to the same. This 
Stipulation may be amended or modified only by an agreement in 
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement of any 
waiver, amendment, extension or discharge is sought or the 
assignee of such party. No waiver of any provision of this 
Stipulation and no consent to any departure by any party 
therefrom shall in any event be effective unless the same shall 
be in writing and signed by the other parties and then such 
waiver or consent shall be effective only in the specific 
instance or the specific purpose for which given. This 
Stipulation may be executed in counterparts each of which shall 
be deemed an original but all of which taken together shall 
constitute one and the same instrument. 
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DATED this 2^ day of June, 1993. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
APPROVED: 
PURCHASER" 
Daniel A. Miller 
David M. Kimball 
011X26932.2 
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Robert D. Merrill 
Attorneys for TCF Bank 
Wisconsin, fsb 
William C. Halls 
Attorney for J. Michael Martin 
William Russell 
Attorney for Judge Building Associates, 
Harold J. Hill and Sam Sampinos 
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SENT BY: 
Ju.n 1 4 , 9 3 1 ) No 301 P ri7 
6-14-83 S 2--S3m ! YANCOTT.BAOLEY-
 W . M , & ; * A . ? - ° 7 
DAtlD t h i t day of Juna, 1993. 
VAN COTT, &AGL«Y, CORNWALL * McCAWHY 
APPROVED: 
David M. Kl 
OUMittM 
ROb#rt D. I t e r r i l i 
Attorney! for tcF Bank 
Wisconsin, fsb 
WilliWB C. H*ll8 
Attorney '£oz J. Michael Martin 
Kill!am Rutaall 
Attorney for Judge Building Aftsooiatas, 
Harold J, Ki l l and San Sampinoa 
njfrH nhv; FILES DISTRICT CdCST Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 2 1993 
i SALT LAKE COUNT 
/ / Deputy Clark VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert D. Merrill, #2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B. 
( F o r m e r l y known a s REPUBLIC 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN 
c o r p o r a t i o n ) 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as 
jpersonal representative of the 
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, 
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, 
Certified Public Accountants, 
Defendants. 
ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION 
AND MOTION RE PARTIAL 
SETTLEMENT, ASSIGNMENT OF 
CAUSE OF ACTION, 
SUBSTITUTION OF PLAINTIFF 
AND DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 
DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 920900094PR 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
The Stipulation and Motion re Partial Settlement, 
[Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff and 
Dismissal of Certain Defendants dated June JZJ , 1993 having been 
considered by the Court and good cause appearing 
IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
1. The Stipulation is approved. 
011X26932.2 
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2. Danie l A. M i l l e r and David M. Kimball are 
s u b s t i t u t e d as p a r t i e s p l a i n t i f f i n t h e p l a c e of Republ ic 
C a p i t a l Bank, F. S. B. , ( formerly known as Republ ic Savings & Loan 
A s s o c i a t i o n of Wisconsin, a Wisconsin c o r p o r a t i o n ) . A l l 
p l e a d i n g s f i l e d h e r e a f t e r s h a l l r e f l e c t t h i s s u b s t i t u t i o n . 
3. Danie l A. M i l l e r and David M. Kimball are 
s u b s t i t u t e d as p a r t i e s p l a i n t i f f f o r t h e s o l e purpose of 
c o m p l e t i n g t h e f o r e c l o s u r e of any i n t e r e s t Martineau & Company, 
C e r t i f i e d P u b l i c Accountants , may have i n t h e property which i s 
t h e s u b j e c t matter of the Complaint and on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t no 
d e f i c i e n c y judgment w i l l be sought o r g r a n t e d a g a i n s t Judge 
B u i l d i n g A s s o c i a t e s , a Utah l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p , Harold J. H i l l 
or J. Michael Martin. 
4. Harold J. H i l l and J. Michael Martin are hereby 
d i s m i s s e d as p a r t i e s defendant . 
5. The t h i r d party Complaint and c o u n t e r c l a i m as 
between J. Michael Martin and Sam Sampinos are d i s m i s s e d wi thout 
p r e j u d i c e . 
6. The p a r t i e s t o the S t i p u l a t i o n are d i r e c t t o take 
such o t h e r and f u r t h e r s t e p s as may be n e c e s s a r y or appropr ia te 
t o implement the terms and p r o v i s i o n s t h e r e o f . 
DATED t M s ^ f f i d a y of June, 1993. 
BY 51^ E COURT: 
tfO&3r- J! FraxiRQS. No 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge^ J 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing ORDER by mailing copies thereof, 
postage prepaid to the following this ~23day of June, 1993: 
Robert D. Merrill 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
William C. Halls, Esq. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William R. Russell, Esq. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Daniel A. Miller 
DM Properties, Inc. 
13601 Ventura Blvd., Suite 93 
Sherman Oaks, California 91423 
David M. Kimball 
Kimball Investment Co. 
999 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
k>ll\26932.2 
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SI- I I ~ 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert D. Merrill, #2244 
Attorneys for Republic Capital Bank 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
(801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B. 
(Formerly known as REPUBLIC 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN 
corporation) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as 
personal representative of the 
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, 
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, 
Certified Public Accountants, 
Defendants. 
Upon motion of plaintiff and the affidavit of Robert 
D. Merrill, and the Court having previously duly entered the 
default certificate of defendant Martineau & Company, Certified 
Public Accountants, upon the Amended Complaint of the plaintiff 
on file herein, 
-1-
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DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS MARTINEAU & 
COMPANY, CERTIFIED PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTANTS 
Civil No. 920900094PR 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1- Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant 
Martineau & Company, Certified Public Accountants, in accordance 
with its Amended Complaint to the effect that the lien or 
interest, if any, of the defendant Martineau & Company, 
Certified Public Accountants is inferior, junior and subordinate 
to the lien of plaintiff upon the real property at issue herein, 
which property is located at #8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly described as 
follows (the "Property"). 
PARCEL A: 
Beginning 13 8. 50 feet East of the Northwest 
corner of Lot 5, Block 52 Plat "A", Salt 
Lake City Survey; and running thence South 
100.0 feet; thence South 7 degrees 16 
minutes East 168.3 feet; thence East 10.0 
feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes West 
168.3 feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence 
West 10. 0 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL B: 
Beginning at a point 55. 0 feet East and 
160.0 feet South of the Northwest corner of 
Lot 6, Block 52 Plat "A", Salt Lake City 
Survey; and running thence East 12. 0 feet; 
thence South 127.0 feet; thence West 72.4 
feet; thence North 20. 0 feet; thence East 
60. 4 feet; thence North 87. 0 feet; thence 
North 45 degrees West 14. 10 feet; thence 
West 40.40 feet; thence South 45 degrees 
West 15.50 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 
minutes West 47. 70 feet; thence South 30 
degrees 00 minutes East 30.40. feet; thence 
East 52. 0 feet to the point of beginning. 
-2 
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The use of Parcel B is limited to providing 
turnaround space for vehicles using the 
right of way described as Parcel A above. 
ALSO: Together with any rights enjoyed in 
and to a foot-wall upon a strip of land 
described as follows: Commencing at the 
bottom of the building at a point 100 feet 
South of the Northwest corner of Lot 5, 
Block 52, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, 
at depth of not less than 14 feet beneath 
the level of Main Street; and running thence 
East 138-1/2 feet; thence South 2 feet; 
thence West 138-1/2 feet; thence North 2 
feet to the place of beginning, as set forth 
in Agreement dated March 11, 1907, recorded 
March 13, 1907, as Entry No. 219820, in Book 
2-K of Liens and Leases, at Pages 325 - 327. 
The above described property also known by 
the street address of #8 East Broadway, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
2. The defendant Martineau & Company is not a 
judgment debtor in the above-entitled action, is not a creditor 
having a lien by judgment or mortgage on the Property and is not 
a successor in interest to any such person or entity, and is not 
entitled to redeem the Property or any part thereof from any 
sale of the Property pursuant to Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
3. Upon any execution sale of the Property pursuant 
to order of this Court in the above entitled action any interest 
or lien claimed by the defendant Martineau & Company shall be 
forthwith extinguished and terminated. 
-3-
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DATED this ^ day of F*ferory, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
te 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, this ^ day of Fy binary, 1993 to the 
following: 
William R. Russell, Esq. 
Attorney for Harold Hill and Judge Building Associates 
8 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William C. Halls, Esq. 
Attorney for J. Michael Martin 
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Martineau & Company 
8 East Broadway, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
9 ^ ^ ^ v ^ ^ 
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DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458) 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, ESQ. (5037) 
SUTTTER AXLAND & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M. 
KIMBALL (substituted as parties plaintiff 
in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL 
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as 
REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN, 
a Wisconsin Corporation), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as 
personal representative of the 
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, 
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, 
Certified Public Accountants, 
Defendants. 
Having reviewed: Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Decree of Foreclosure; the 
Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of 
1 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. 920900094PR 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Plaintiff, and Dismissal of Certain Defendants; and the Order Approving Stipulation and Motion 
Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff, and Dismissal 
of Certain Defendants; and good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that the property described below be sold at public auction by the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales, and 
that the Sheriff, when the subject property is sold by him, shall retain first his costs, 
disbursements, and commissions from the proceeds of such sale, and then pay the remainder of 
the proceeds to plaintiffs to be applied to the amount owing by defendant Judge Building 
Associates, together with interest, costs, attorney's fees, and expenses. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no deficiency judgment may be sought or granted 
against the defendants. 
The court finds that the interest of Judge Building Associates, Harold J. Hill, J. Michael 
Martin, Wilma W. Gardner, and Martineau & Company are subordinate to the interest of 
plaintiffs, and these defendants are foreclosed of all right, title, and interest in the subject 
property. As stated in the Default Judgment against Martineau & Company, Martineau & 
Company does not have any rights of redemption. 
The real property is described as: 
PARCEL A: 
Beginning 138.50 feet East of the Northwest corner of Lot 5, 
Block 52 Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence 
South 100.0 feet; thence South 7 degrees 16 minutes East 168.3 
feet; thence East 10.0 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes 
West 168.3 feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence West 10.0 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
2 
PARCEL B: 
DATED: 
Beginning at a point 55.0 feet East and 160.0 feet South of the 
Northwest comer of Lot 6, Block 52 Plat "A", Salt Lake City 
Survey; and running thence East 12.0 feet; thence South 127.0 
feet; thence West 72.4 feet; thence North 20.0 feet; thence East 
60.4 feet; thence North 87.0 feet; thence North 45 degrees West 
14.10 feet; thence West 40.40 feet; thence South 45 degrees West 
15.50 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes West 47.70 feet; 
thence South 30 degrees 00 minutes East 30.40. feet; thence East 
52.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
az%t w 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL ) 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
hmd34.23 
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DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458) 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, ESQ. (5037) 
SUTTTER AXLAND & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M. 
KIMBALL (substituted as parties plaintiff 
in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL 
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as 
REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND LOAN ; 
ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN, ; 
a Wisconsin Corporation), ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a ; 
Utah Limited Partnership; ] 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL ; 
MARTIN; WTLMA W. GARDNER, as ] 
personal representative of the ] 
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, ] 
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, ] 
Certified Public Accountants, } 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER OF SALE 
) Civil No. 920900094PR 
i Honorable Frank G. Noel 
TO THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, GREETING: 
WHEREAS on the 16th day of September, 1993, issued a Decree of Foreclosure against 
defendants Judge Building Associates and Martineau & Company, Certified Public Accountants, 
1 
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which Decree of Foreclosure was entered by the Clerk of Salt Lake County, and a certified copy 
of the Decree of Foreclosure is attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof; 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the real property described in the 
Decree of Foreclosure be sold at public auction. 
NOW, THEREFORE, you, the said Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah, are hereby 
commanded and required to proceed to notice for sale, and to sell the property described in the 
Decree of Foreclosure and apply the proceeds of said sale as directed in the Decree of 
Foreclosure and you shall make and file your report of such sale with the Clerk of this Court 
within sixty (60) days from date of your receipt thereof, and you shall do all things according 
to the terms and requirements of said Decree of Foreclosure, and the applicable provisions and 
requirements of law. 
EXECUTED this day of , 1993. 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
, Clerk 
By: .Deputy Clerk 
hmd3424 
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 5 
DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458) 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, ESQ. (5037) 
SUHTER AXLAND & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
HB% o i m 
^nvtvcien, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M. 
KIMBALL (substituted as parties plaintiff 
in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL 
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as 
REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN, 
a Wisconsin Corporation), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL 
MARTIN; WJJLMA W. GARDNER, as 
personal representative of the 
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, 
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, 
Certified Public Accountants, 
Defendants. 
^ - o - > ^ 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. 920900094PR 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Having reviewed: Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Decree of Foreclosure; the 
Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of 
1 
Plaintiff, and Dismissal of Certain Defendants; and the Order Approving Stipulation and Motion 
Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff, and Dismissal 
of Certain Defendants; and good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that the property described below be sold at public auction by the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales, and 
that the Sheriff, when the subject property is sold by him, shall retain first his costs, 
disbursements, and commissions from the proceeds of such sale, and then pay the remainder of 
the proceeds to plaintiffs to be applied to the amount owing by defendant Judge Building 
Associates, together with interest, costs, attorney's fees, and expenses. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no deficiency judgment may be sought or granted 
against the defendants. 
The court finds that the interest of Judge Building Associates, Harold J. Hill, J. Michael 
Martin, Wilma W. Gardner, and Martineau & Company are subordinate to the interest of 
plaintiffs, and these defendants are foreclosed of all right, title, and interest in the subject 
property. As stated in the Default Judgment against Martineau & Company, Martineau & 
Company does not have any rights of redemption. 
The real property is described as: 
PARCEL A: 
Beginning 138.50 feet East of the Northwest corner of Lot 5, 
Block 52 Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence 
South 100.0 feet; thence South 7 degrees 16 minutes East 168.3 
feet; thence East 10.0 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes 
West 168.3 feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence West 10.0 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
2 
PARCEL B: 
Beginning at a point 55.0 feet East and 160.0 feet South of the 
Northwest corner of Lot 6, Block 52 Plat "AH, Salt Lake City 
Survey; and running thence East 12.0 feet; thence South 127.0 
feet; thence West 72.4 feet; thence North 20.0 feet; thence East 
60.4 feet; thence North 87.0 feet; thence North 45 degrees West 
14.10 feet; thence West 40.40 feet; thence South 45 degrees West 
15.50 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes West 47.70 feet; 
thence South 30 degrees 00 minutes East 30.40. feet; thence East 
52.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
DATCD: iLLM} „ 
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November 30, 1993 
VIA FAX: (801) 532-7355 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
Suitter Axland & Hanson 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
S a l t LaJce C i t y , Utah 84101 
Re: Judge Building Matter 
Dear Bruce: 
I forward herewith a proposed draft of a Temporary 
Restraining Order pursuant to the Court7s ruling this morning. 
Please let me know whether you need to request any changes. 
It is my understanding that you have cancelled the 
pending sale (I just received your faxed letter to the Deputy 
Sheriff) and that it is not necessary to have the actual Temporary 
Restraining Order signed by the court prior to noon today. Please 
let me know if I am incorrect in that understanding. 
After we have agreed to the form of the Temporary 
Restraining Order, I confirm that we need to make a joint telephone 
conference to Judge Noel's clerk to schedule a hearing on the 
injunction. 
Your clients have indicated to Mr. Martineau that a 
proposal for a new lease would be forthcoming. To date we have 
seen no proposal. I suggest in the best interest of both of our 
clients, now is the time to consider a voluntary lease amendment 
before the legal action goes much further- If your client wants to 
discuss any proposal, I encourage a proposal to be made as soon as 
001233 
NOU 30 f 9 3 1 3 : I t FROM >C I U J O C O 
ACCCN NCLSON RASMUSSCN & CHPISTCNSCN 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
November 30, 1993 
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possible. While you may choose to forward the proposal through my 
office, I have no problem if the clients vant to discuss the matter 
directly themselves. 
Sincerely, 
ATtfrffi NELSON RASMUSSEN 
yCHKISTENSEN 
kruca J. Nelson 
BJN/s l f 
Enclosure 
c c ; Leiand A. Martineau 
(v ia fax) (801) 364-0961 
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BRUCE J. NELSON 
LAW OFFICES OF 
A L L E N N E L S O N R A S M U S S E N & CHRISTENSEN 
A PttOrcSStONAL CORPORATION 
SUITE 9 0 0 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8*111 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 53l-6«400 
FACSIMILE 
(SOI) 3 6 3 - 3 6 M 
January 5, 1994 
VIA "HAND DELIVERY" 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
Suitter Axland & Hanson 
175 South West Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: JUDGE BUILDING MATTERS 
Dear Bruce: 
I enclose the original Temporary Restraining Order which I have held pending 
the setting of a Court date. Please approve it as to form and return it to me for 
presentation to Judge Noel. Once signed, I will deposit the $1,000 bond with the court 
clerk. 
As we also previously discussed, I briefly reviewed the documents in the 
possession of Harold Hill. Frankly, he did not have a very good set of documents. I took 
the liberty of copying anything that looked relevant. I had indicated to you that I would 
provide a copy of any documents which I obtained through inspection of Mr. HilPs files. 
As a result, I enclose herein miscellaneous documents which were copied from his files. I 
also indicated to Mr. Hill that the subpoena was "open" and that you reserved the right to 
review his files at a later date, if necessary. 
Sincerely, 
BJN:slf 
Enclosures 
cc: Leland A. Martineau 
NELSON RASMUSSEN 
RISTENSEN 
J. 
ruce J. Nelson 
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AFFELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 8 
LAW orncES or 
A L L E N N E L S O N R A S M U S S E N & C H R I S T E N S E N 
A l»«tOrtSSlONAU CORPORATION 
SUITE 9 0 0 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
BRUCE J . NELSON SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8*IH 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 53 I -8400 
January 24, 1994 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
Suitter Axland & Hanson 
175 South West Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: MILLER & KIMBALL VS. MARTINEAU & COMPANY 
Dear Bruce: 
The purpose of this letter is to summarize our various verbal agreements in 
the above-referenced matter and to let you know my understanding of where this matter is 
going. 
As you know, on November 30, 1993, Judge Noel granted my motion for a 
temporary restraining order, which order stopped a pending sheriffs sale relating to my 
client's tenancy at the Judge Building. The Judge ordered that my client post a $1,000 bond 
as a condition of the temporary restraining order. My client immediately gave me $1,000 
which has been sitting in my trust account since such time. 
It is my understanding that we have agreed to the verbiage of a temporary 
restraining order but have waited to submit the order to the court until we agreed upon a 
date for a one-day hearing on the preliminary injunction. We have delayed the date from 
time to time pending settlement negotiations between our clients. 
A few weeks ago, we obtained the date of February 1, 1994 for the one-day 
hearing on the preliminary injunction. Last week, you requested that the hearing date be 
continued to allow the parties more time to resolve the matter. I agreed to a continuance 
on the condition that the status quo would be maintained and that the hearing date would 
not be reset until after May 1, 1994. As you know, my client is an accountant and his 
schedule between now and April 15, 1994 would not permit him to have a hearing prior to 
the month of May, 1994. 
FACSIMILE 
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ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN <& CHRISTENSEN 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
January 24, 1994 
Page 2 
It is my understanding that you have cancelled the February 1, 1994 hearing 
date with the court, and explained to the clerk that we would attempt to resolve the matter 
through stipulation. If we are unable to achieve a stipulation for settlement, either party 
could schedule a hearing anytime after May 1, 1994. 
We agreed on the phone that no formal order was necessary for signature by 
the court. It is my understanding that we have agreed that the temporary restraining order 
remains in effect until either (1) the parties agree otherwise, or (2) subsequent order of the 
court. I have also agreed to hold the $1,000 bond in my trust account inasmuch as the clerk 
will not accept the funds without a formal court order. 
I have not yet had an opportunity to speak with my client regarding this 
matter. It may be that Mr. Martineau will want a formal stipulation and court order 
submitted for the court files. If so, I will prepare such documentation along the lines set 
forth herein for your review and consideration. 
In the meantime, my client has recently stated his position to Mr. Miller and 
to Mr. Kimball. If they care to respond, the ball is in their court. 
Please let me know if I have incorrectly stated any of our agreements in this 
matter. 
Sincerely, 
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN 
(KCHRISTENSEN 
\Bruce J. Nelson 
BJN:slf 
cc: Lee Martineau 
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WILLIAM L. P*ATC» 
DAVID R. OLSCN 175 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE C A S L E ADDPESS: SAXLAW 
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D A N W. E G A N 
MiCMACu L. AU.CN 
CxANi.cs P. S A M P S O N 
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P A U L M. S I M M O N S 
C L A U D I A F. B C N N Y 
G A N T R. H C N N I C 
H. MtCMAtL DNAHC 
M A N * R. G A T L O N O 
L O N I N E. P A T T C N S O N 
J I L L L. D U N V O N - H A N S E N 
DAMNCLLCB.oorLt J u l y 2 2 , 1 9 9 4 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Miller & Kimball v. Judge Building Associates 
Dear Bruce: 
Judge Noel says that the first he can fit us in would be 
September 29 at 10:00 a.m. I think we better grab this date 
because Judge Noel has a very busy calendar. Please confirm your 
availability. 
Sincerely, 
^SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
/ 
Bruce T. Jones 
BTJ/sr 
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LAW orncES or 
A L L E N N E L S O N R A S M U S S E N & C H R I S T E N S E N 
A MVOTCSSlOMAi. CO»»OftATiON 
SUITE ©OO 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
BRUCE J . NELSON SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 6*NI 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 531-6*00 
September 23, 1994 
HAND DELIVERED 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
175 South West Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Miller Kimball/Martineau Matter 
Dear Bruce: 
As a follow-up to our telephone conversation this morning, I wanted to confirm my 
understanding of the following: 
1. I have asked to see your client's acquisition file of the Judge Building. You 
have asked to see my client's lease file. We tentatively agreed to allow each 
other to review such files prior to the hearing. As I indicated on the phone, 
I will be unavailable most of the day on Monday, September 26, 1994. I 
suggest we try to exchange files or documents on Tuesday or Wednesday. 
2. I expressed a desire to have David Kimball available at the hearing. Please 
let me know if he is not planning on being there. 
3. You do not wish to stipulate that this hearing can be considered to be a final 
hearing on the matter, reserving the right to undertake additional discovery in connection 
with any final hearing you may request. Obviously, I reserve the same right if we cannot 
stipulate that this will be a final hearing. 
On the phone this morning, we discussed possible witnesses. In reviewing the 
potential witnesses, I fear we might have trouble completing the hearing within the time 
allowed by the Court. I wonder if it might not save time to stipulate to some of the 
undisputed facts. To accomplish that result, I have prepared a proposed stipulation of those 
FACSIMILE 
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ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
September 23, 1994 
Page 2 
facts which I think we both have no dispute. I enclose a copy of the proposed stipulation 
herein. If you want to stipulate to some or all of the facts, please advise. 
Sincerely, 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
USTENSEN 
/ \ , 
BJNrple 
Enclosure 
bjn\maninca\judgc\0009 
001240 
BRUCE J. NELSON, ESQ. (#2380) 
ROBERT L. PAYNE, ESQ. (#5129) 
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 
Attorneys for Defendant Martineau & Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M. ) 
KIMBALL (substituted as parties ) 
plaintiff in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL ) STIPULATION OF 
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as REPUBLIC ) AGREED FACTS 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF ) 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin Corporation), ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CIVIL NO. 920900094 
vs. ) 
) JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a Utah Limited ) 
Partnership; HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL ) 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as personal ) 
representative of the ESTATE OF KENNETH ) 
N. GARDNER, Deceased; MARTINEAU & ) 
COMPANY, Certified Public Accountants, ) 
Defendants. ) 
A hearing for Preliminary Injunction is currently scheduled before the above-entitled 
court for Thursday, September 29, 1994. The current parties to the above-entitled action, 
in an effort to shorten the required time for hearing, seek to stipulate to certain undisputed 
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facts. As a result, the parties stipulate and agree to the accuracy of the following facts 
without the necessity of introducing evidence regarding the same: 
1. On March 6,1986, Judge Building Associates ("Associates") was the record owner 
of real property ("Property") located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah. Such 
Property is commonly known as the Judge Building. 
2. On March 6, 1986, Associates executed a Trust Deed and Assignment of Leases 
(Trust Deed") on the Property in favor of Republic Savings and Loan Association 
("Lender") to secure a $2,300,000 note. 
3. On November 13, 1990, Associates entered into a lease agreement ("Lease") with 
Manineau & Company, CPA's ("Manineau") with respect to certain space located on the 
5th floor of the Property. 
4. Manineau continues to occupy such 5th floor space. 
5. On January 8, 1992, lender filed a Complaint with this Coun to initiate a judicial 
foreclosure proceeding of the Trust Deed. The Complaint alleged an unpaid balance owing 
to Lender of approximately $2,200,000. 
6. Subsequently, on February 11, 1992, Lender amended its Complaint to join 
Manineau as a Defendant in order to make the Lease subject to the pending foreclosure. 
7. Manineau did not respond to the Amended Complaint, and a Default Judgment 
was later entered against Manineau finding that the Lease was subordinate to the Trust 
Deed. 
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8. In cooperation with the Lender, on June 21, 1993, Associates sold the Property 
to Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball. The purchase price was $750,000. Mr. Miller 
and Mr. Kimball made a down payment of $200,000 and executed a new Trust Deed of 
$550,000 in favor of Lender, 
9. As part of the transaction, lender assigned to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball the 
beneficial interest of the original Trust Deed and such new owners were substituted as 
Plaintiffs in this action. 
10. Also, as part of the transaction, Associates was released from any liability on the 
$2,300,000 note to Lender. Associates and its principals was dismissed as a Defendant in 
this litigation. 
11. Martineau is the only remaining Defendant 
12. Thereafter, the current Plaintiffs sought, and obtained, an Order of Sale against 
the property and Martineau's interest arising out of the Lease. 
13. A Sheriffs Sale was scheduled for November 30, 1993. 
14. Prior to the Sale, Martineau sought and obtained a Restraining Order from this 
Court which stopped the pending Sheriffs Sale. The Sale has been postponed awaiting the 
outcome of the pending hearing for a Preliminary Injunction. The hearing had been 
continued without date pursuant to agreement of the parties. 
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This Stipulation does not prohibit or prevent either party from introducing additional 
evidence to clarify or explain any of the foregoing facts, but is intended to assist the Court 
in its decision of this matter and to expedite the hearing. 
DATED this ^ 3 day of September, 1994. 
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN 
& CHRISTBNSEN 
By: J l AASrv^ 
Eunice J. Nelson, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant Martineau & 
Company 
r>ATED this day of September, 1994. 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
By: 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
Attorneys for Miller and Kimball 
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BRUCE J. NELSON 
LAW OFFICES OF 
A L L E N N E L S O N R A S M U S S E N <& CHRISTENSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SUITE 9 0 0 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8*111 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 53l-8<400 
FACSIMILE 
(601) 3 6 3 - 3 6 M 
September 30, 1994 
HAND DELIVERED 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
SUTITER AXLAND & HANSON 
175 South West Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Miller and Kimball v. Martineau 
Dear Bruce: 
The Court did not request a written order following our hearing yesterday. However, 
because no previous Temporary Restraining Order was ever executed by the Court, I would 
like some record in the file of what occurred in that regard. 
I have drafted a proposed Order which would document the Court's Order made 
yesterday at our hearing, as well as confirm what happened with respect to the Temporary 
Restraining Order. 
I enclose the original of my proposed order. If it is acceptable, please approve it as 
form and return it to me for filing with the Court. If the proposed Order is not acceptable, 
I would appreciate your calling so that we could discuss the matter. 
Sincerely, 
AJ^ fcBN NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
I 
^ruce J. Nelson 
BJN:ple 
Enclosure 
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BRUCE J. NELSON, ESQ. (#2380) 
ROBERT L. PAYNE, ESQ. (#5129) 
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 
Attorneys for Defendant Martineau & Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL A MILLER and DAVID M. ) 
KIMBALL (substituted as parties ) 
plaintiff in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL ) ORDER 
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as REPUBLIC ) 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF ) 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin Corporation), ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CIVIL NO. 920900094 
vs. ) 
) JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a Utah Limited ) 
Partnership; HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL ) 
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as personal ) 
representative of the ESTATE OF KENNETH ) 
N. GARDNER, Deceased; MARTINEAU & ) 
COMPANY, Certified Public Accountants, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Defendant Martineau & Company's Motion for Preliminary Injunction came on for 
hearing before the above-entitled Court on Thursday, September 29, 1994 at the hour of 
10:00 a.m. The current Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, Bruce T. 
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Jones, Esq. Defendant Martineau & Company, by and through its agent Leland A. 
Martineau, was present and represented by its counsel, Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
On November 30, 1993, this Court granted Defendant's Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order. Such Order stayed a pending Sheriffs Sale affecting real property 
commonly known as the Judge Building in Salt Lake City, Utah. During settlement 
negotiation between the parties, counsel for the parties verbally continued without date the 
hearing on Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction which was to follow the issuance 
of the Temporary Restraining Order. No formal written Temporary Restraining Order was 
executed on November 30, 1993, or thereafter. Nevertheless, the Sheriffs Sale was 
postponed by counsel for the current Plaintiffs, and the sale has not been rescheduled 
pending hearing on Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
The issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order was conditioned upon the posting 
of a bond by the Defendant in the amount of $1,000. Such amount was delivered by 
Defendant Martineau & Company to its counsel, Bruce J. Nelson. Pursuant to stipulation 
of the parties' counsel, such amount has been held in Mr. Nelson's trust account in lieu of 
deposit with the Clerk of the Court. 
At the hearing on September 29, 1994, the parties stipulated to a continuance of the 
hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
Pursuant to the pleadings and documents on file herein, the various stipulations of 
the parties, and for good cause shown; 
2 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The Court acknowledges its issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order on 
November 30, 1993. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, such Order remains in effect 
pending a hearing on the Preliminary Injunction Motion, or pending other subsequent Order 
of this Court. 
2. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, the $1,000 bond on the Temporary 
Restraining Order will be held in the trust account of counsel for Defendant in lieu of 
deposit with this Court. 
3. The hearing on Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is continued 
until Wednesday, November 2, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. as a second place setting. In 
the event the hearing cannot be held on such date, it will be held on Thursday, December 
22, 1994 at the hour of 8:30 a.m. 
4. On or before Friday, October 7, 1994, Defendant may file a memorandum 
outlining legal theories, authorities and facts supporting its request for preliminary 
injunction. Thereafter, Plaintiff may have through Monday, October 17, 1994 to file any 
responsive memorandum. Thereafter, Defendant may file a reply memorandum on or 
before Friday, October 21, 1994. 
5. The Court, at the request of either counsel, may consider oral argument prior 
to the scheduled evidentiary hearing in an attempt to resolve or narrow some or all of the 
issues to be determined by the Court. 
3 
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DATED this day of , 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
FRANK G. NOEL 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BRUCE T. JONES 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT C 
IN AN! 
DANIEL A. MILLER and 
DAVID KIMBALL (substi-gy 
tuted as parties 
plaintiff in the place 
Of REPUBLIC CAPITA1 
BANK, FSB, formerly 
known as REPUBLIC 
SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF 
WISCONSIN, a Wis-
cons in corporat ion.) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JUDGE BLDG ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah limited partner-
ship, HAROLD J. HILL; 
J. MICHAEL MARTIN, 
WILMA W. GARDNER, as 
personal representative 
of the ESTATE OF KENNETH 
N. GARDNER, deceased; 
MARTINEAU & CO. certi-
fied public accountants. 
Defendants. 
JTHE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
3SMBTCOUNTY 
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* 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on January 19, 1995, the above-
entitled cause of action came on regularly for hearing at the] 
hour of 10:00 a.m. of said day before the HONORABLE FRANK 
G. NOEL, one of the Judges of the above-named Court. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For Plaintiffs: MR. MARK R. GAYLORD &| 
MR. DAVID R. OLSEN 
Attornies At Law 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
For Defendants: MR. JEFFREY M JONES & 
MR. BRUCE J. NELSON 
Attornies At Law 
NELSON RASSMUSSEN AND 
CHRISTENSEN 
215 South State St. #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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1
 THE COURT: Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. 
2
 The matter before the Court this morning is Daniel Miller anc^  
^ others versus Judge Building Associates and others. This 
4
 matter is on the calendar this morning on the Defendant Mart-I 
5
 ineau's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and I believe evi-j 
6
 dence will also be taken that may pertain to the Motion to 
7
 Set Aside the Default Judgment so that then the Court may 
8
 then rule on that as well. Is that correct? 
9
 I MR. OLSEN: David Olsen for the TDuyer of the prope-| 
rty# Your Honor• That is correct. And in fact. Your Honor, 
11
 this matter has been fully briefed and there has been previovj 
12
 discussions with the Court. Wondering if we might move dir-
13
 ectly to the evidence and waive opening statements? 
14
 MR. JONES: I would like to make a couple of minute 
15
 opening statements to highlight a couple of points . we think 
16
 the Court should focus on as we proceed with our evidence. 
17
 THE COURT: Please state your .names for the record? 
18
 MR. JONES: Jeff Jones and Bruce Nelson on behalf 
19
 of the Defendant, Martineau and Company, Your Honor. 
20
 MR. OLSEN: David Olsen for the Defendant Michael 
21
 Martin. 
22
 I MR. GAYLORD: Mark Gaylord for Plaintiffs Daniel 
Miller and David Kimball. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. If I may, I hav^ 
23 
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1 l
 prepared a set of exhibits for the Court;if I may apprcj 
2
 ach the bench? That's just a courtesy copy. We'll submit 
° I exhibits. 
Your Honor, as the Court is well aware, the purpose 
5
 J of this hearing today is with respect to the defendant's 
1
 application for a preliminary injunction preventing the foreH 
closure of a deed of trust, which is the subject of this act-j 
8
 ion, originally initiated by Republic and by the substituted 
9
 I plaintiffs;that is, Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball, who are here 
in the courtroom today. I think the Court is aware that the 
deed of trust was executed in 1986 at the time the Judge 
Building was acquired by Judge Building Associates;thereafter) 
in November of 1990, Mr. Martineau, on behalf of Martineau & 
Company, entered into a lease for approximately forty-five 
hundred square feet in the Judge Building. Subsequently ther|e 
was a default by Judge Building Associates and a foreclosure 
proceeding was initiated. And initially, Mr. Martineau rec-
eived notice of that foreclosure proceeding from Mr. Hill,one 
of the principals of Judge Building Associates, and subsequenj-
tly received notice from the lender's counsel, indicating that 
no lease would be disturbed in the process of the foreclosure 
That changed, however, when Mr. Martineau was named 
as a defendant in the lawsuit and the allegations in the com-
plaint were amended to include allegations that Mr. Martineau 
lease was junior in time and subordinate to the interest of 
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the lender by way of the deed of trust. 
Mr. Martineau did not answer the complaint as the 
facts were self-evident. The lease was executed subsequent 
to the deed of trust. A default judgment was entered indica-l 
ting that in fact that was the state of affairf and the .facts 
with regard to the priority between the deed of trust and the] 
lease. 
At that point in time Mr. Martineau began to enter int<b 
negotiations with the bank, whereby he met the purchasers. He] 
talked to them on the one hand about the terms under which 
they would finance it. Ultimately he received a proposal where-
by they would sell 'em the building for $850,000. Within a 
very short number of days, after receiving that proposal, but 
before responding;he received a telephone call from Mr. Hill, 
who is present here in the courtroom today, and Mr. David Kim-f 
Kimball, one of the plaintiffs;whereby they inquired of him 
how he liked the building. In fact the testimony will show 
that Mr. Martineau immediately thought it was a great building. 
He enjoyed being there. He liked it so much that he was then 
negotiating himself with the lender to buy it. Mr. Kimball 
stated to him, in fact there was negotiations with the lenderj 
he wanted to buy the building. They then discussed the matter 
briefly, which at the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Marf 
tineau said, if you buy the building what are you going to do 
with me? Mr. Kimball's response was, we aren't going to do 
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1 anything with you. We're going to leave you where you 
2 are;in the business of attracting and keeping tenants ar*d notj 
3 foreclosing them out* 
4 Several days later an offer for $850,000 under which 
5 Mr. Martineau could have purchased the building, arrived from 
6 their lender. Mr. Martineau determined act. to exercise his 
7 right to purchase it;signed the offer. Accepted the offer 
8 for $850,000 and purchased the building, because Mr. Kimballj 
9 had told him that if he purchased the building and proceeded 
10 down the road, he then would not interfere with or attempt tol 
11 foreclose out his lease on the property;thereafter, the negon 
12 tiations with Mr. Kimball and his partner, Mr. Miller contin-j 
13 ued and they entered into an agreement which provided that 
14 they would buy both the real property and a deed of trust 
15 that was owed by the bank. So in this event, Your Honor, we 
16 have the first event which is the acquisition of the Judge 
17 Building and the deed of trust in favor of Republic savers. 
18 We have the second event which was the lease between Martin-
19 eau and the Judge Building. And then finally, we have a thirja 
20 event. And that third event is evidenced by two separate 
21 transactions(indicating) which happened simultaneously. Judge! 
22 Building Associates by way of a special warranty deed, conveypd 
23 it's interest in the property to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball. 
24 At the same time, Republic conveyed it's interest in the trusi 
25 deed to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball and assigned the fredlosure 
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action to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball. 
Now, in order to induce Republic to enter into this 
transaction, Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball proposed to pay Repu-
blic $750,000. $250,000 of that ammount was paid in cash and 
the remainder, a deed of trust for $550,000 was executed by 
Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball in favor of Republic. But, in add-f 
ition to that, there was a subordination of the deed of this 
transaction with Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball, who now owned th4 
original deed of trust;agreed to subordinate the lien of that 
deed of trust to the new lien, for $550,000. Thus added an 
additional encumbrance of $350,000 to the property which by 
the subordination, they made prior and superior to the lien 
that was then in foreclosure. The two-million-three hundred-
thousand dollars lien. So suddenly, by way of doing the tran^ 
action, they had increased the encumbrances upon the property 
by $550,000, while buying the property for a gross ammount of 
only $750,000. 
At this point in time, this transaction was undisclo-f 
sed, unknown to Mr. Martineau. No one gave him notice that 
this would occur. No one gave him notice that they were goin^ 
to proceed in a fashion which would then make his lease junior 
to not just a two-million-three-hundred-thousand dollars trust 
deed, but an additional trust deed ot $550,000. This was don4 
for one purpose only;and that was to give Mr. Miller and Mr. 
Kimball leverage to negotiate a better price and terms for MrJ 
001380 5 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1
 Martineau's lease. Mr. Martineau's lease is for a sig-
* I nificant ammount of space in the Judge Building. 
1
 THE COURT: You're saying that the obligation they 
4
 I entered into was for how much of his $550,000;that was done 
5 {
 for the sole purpose of getting them in a better position? 
6
 MR. JONES: Appreciate you givng me an opportunity) 
to clarify that. What I am saying is that the structure of 
8
 the transaction, Your Honor, whereby the rights*and the fee 
9
 J and the trust deed was acquired by Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball 
and the new trust deed for $550,000 was subordinated by this) 
transaction;was structured, was done for one purpose only. 
And that is evidenced by a letter dated March 15th, 1994 be-| 
fore the closing took place. 
The closing took place on July 1, 1994. A letter fro|n 
the lender's successor, the rEF Bank, the successor to Repub-
lic. This letter to Mr. Miller, one of the plaintiffs. Thijs 
17
 ] is not the entire letter, Your Honor. We have, in order thajl 
18
 I we can and I'll illustrate on this chart. Remember we redu-| 
19
 ' ced the language of the parties' key language , TCP Bank of 
Wisconsin course of action was to refrain from the foreclo-
sure action in regard to Mr. Martineau's lease at the Judge 
Building with the objective to try to negotiate a new lease 
in order to maximize current and future cash-flow in the Jud^e 
Building, given it's current occupancy. In other words, we 
agree our objective is we'll defer the foreclosure of this 
0&13S1 7 
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1
 until such time as you can negotiate with 'em and see if 
2 you can do tiaat to maximize the current cash-flow. Well, 
3 that means only one thing. We'll give you an economic lever{• 
4 a hammer, if you willf over Mr. Martineau's head;even though 
5 in fact# we've assigned you all of our rights. You have 
6 bought it from us and we have structured the transaction so 
7
 that you have both ownership of the property and of the deed 
8
 of trust. We have done that solely so you will have leverag^ 
9
 over one tenant in the entire building. The only remaining 
10 I defendant in this lawsuit;indeed, the only tenant who was 
ever named as a party defendant in the lawsuit. 
12
 | They did this, Your Honor, at the same time that they 
13
 I executed an assignment in favor of the lender. Signed the 
14 I new $550,000 trust deed. 
15
 I THE COURT: I doA't mean to interrupt but I am 
going to have to limit you to about two more minutes. 
17
 | MR. JONES: That will be fine. At the same time 
18 I they signed the $550,000 trust deed to the lender, they also 
19 I signed an assignment of leases, whereby they said we have 
leases at the Judge Building and we'll sign them to yotf addi-l-
tional collateral. That assignment provides as follows, Your 
Honor, assignor being Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball agree to ob| 
serve and perform all the obligations imposed upon lessor. 
They are the lessor under the leases and under paragraph D, 
not to do any act which constitutes a breach under any of th^ 
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leases or to do any other acts which would result in the 
termination of any of the leases. So, they covenanted with 
the lender that they will protect# enforce, observe and keep 
the leases at the same time. 
Now, Your Honor, all of that is in light of finally, 
paragraph 33(b) of the lease. And this is a paragraph and I 
apologize. We haven't indicated this paragraph as paragraph 
33(b) of the lease. The leases that were assume3by Mr. Mill-) 
er and Mr. Kimball. They acquired the property i.e. specifi 
cally, Mr. Martineaus's lease. Again here, so long as leaser] 
is not in default under the terms of this lease. 
The evidence will show he has never been at default; 
however, this lease shall remain in full force and effect for] 
the full term;however, that's not been terminated as a result) 
of any foreclosure or transfer in lieu thereof of such mort-
gage or other security interest to which the lessee has sub-
ordinated it's rights pursuant to this subparagraph. 
THE COURT: Now, this is which document? 
MR. JONES: In Mr. Martineau's lease. The lease 
that they now own as the owner of the building. At the same 
time that they own a trust deed en the building that they are 
attempting to foreclose and foreclose out Mr. Martineau's in| 
terest. 
Your Honor, the action taken as a whole will infairly) 
damage and prejudice Mr. Martineau under circumstances where 
mss* 9 
1 he contracted and they knew so because they bought this 
2
 lease when they bought the building and that he would be pro-] 
3 tected from foreclosure. 
4 THE COURT: Why wasn't this raised when the defaulft 
5 judgment was entered? 
6 MR. JONES: Because at the time, Your Honor, they 
7 were only seeking to establish this his lien was junior in 
8 time;that's all that the default judgment sought was determinj-
9 ation that it was junior. This clearly says that his lease 
10 is junior. It is only now that they have subsequently said 
11 not only are we going to proceed with the foreclosure, but 
12 we're going to try to foreclose your lease out. The default 
13 judgment complaint sought only and made only one allegation 
14 with regard to Mr. Martineau;that his lease was junior in 
15 time. It is# it always has been and it always will be. This) 
16 provision was the same then as it is now. 
17 THE COURT: But didn't they then ask for foreclosure? 
18 MR. JONES: Certainly, the lender did. The lender 
19 did. It asked for foreclosure# but that was a separate lend-j 
20 er and they had this deal with that lender. And now we have 
21 Miller and Kimball stepping in and taking the interest in the) 
22 lease as the landlord and owner. And as the lender and attem 
23 pting to do something different to foreclose them out at this) 
24 point in time. 
25 THE COURT: Let me ask one question, if I may, to 
further clarify the issues for me. As I understand, the lea^e 
I wa<? not rprordftd, 
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MR. JONES: That is correct. 
THE COURT: In your view, had it been recorded, 
would that subsequently even lien the five-hundred and fifty 
or whatever it was;would that have been then inferior to the 
lease? 
MR. JONES: No it would not, Your Honor, because oif 
the first sentence in paragraph 33(b). Lessee hereby subord-[ 
inates it's rights in their lease to the lien of any mort-
gage or deed of trust security interest resulting from any 
method of financing. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. JONES: Mr. Martineau did tinder his sanctions 
as lender agree thfet it wouldn't be foreclosed out. What he 
did when he signed this lease is subordinate to anything. If 
he wants to put any financing he wants on there, but can't bej 
foreclosed, especially under circumstances where he is on the 
deed of trust, which is the case in this scenario. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, you wish to make an ope 
ning statement? 
MR. OLSEN: Briefly, Judge. 
THE COURT: I thought you might. 
MR. OLSEN: Judge, simply by way cf evidence to correct 
perhaps a few inadvertant statements by counsel. I have 
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courtesy copies of the exhibits. If you'll look at 
exhibit one, you'll see that Mr, Martineau was served with a 
Complaint on February 14th, 1992;that Complaint provides for 
a foreclosure. The next document you'll see is number two 
and is the default certificate. Under the default certifica^ 
it shows that Martineau has not answered. Attached to that 
is the default judgment. If you will look at paragraphs two 
and three7paragraph two provides that Martineau has no rights) 
whatsoever in the property. No rights to bid, no rights to 
redeem. 
Paragraph three provides, that upon sale Mr. Martineaju's 
lease is extinguished. Doesn't provide an assumption. The 
default judgment provides that his lease is extinguished and 
those records, if you could look at the next page signed by 
Mr. Merrill;there is a certificate of mailing that went to 
Mr. Martineau. So, the evidence will show that Mr. Martineaij 
knew the full effect of the default judgment;that his lease 
was extinguished as of March first, or three days thereafter 
for mailing. In addition to that, Judge, there are argument^ 
that Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball assumed the leases pursuant 
to their agreement with the landlord. 
The evidence will show and the documents will show 
quite the contrary. If you look at exhibit nineteen in your 
book at paragraph or page ten rather,there is a specific 
agreement, paragraph 11.21 on page twenty. This paragraph 
0 £' 16 o o 12 
1 says, in connection with the settlement of the actioi^  
2 and the sale of the property to purchaser;TCF agrees to pre-
3 serve and assign to purchaser the right to foreclose on the 
4 leasehold interest of Martineau and Company. So the purchas^ 
5 agreement provides the foreclosure will take nlace. 
6 THE COURT: I guess what he is saying they didn't 
7 have the right to assign that because they agreed not to. 
8 MR. OLSEN: No. The agreement they say they 
9 agreed not to is assignment of rent for security purposes. 
10 That's an assignment that was executed in conjunction with 
11 this document. That's an assignment to the landlord of any 
12 leasehold interest that he nay have. They didn't ever have 
13 a lease with Mr. Martineau. The parties considered this 
14 lease would be foreclosed. In addition to that, this docu-
15 ment, number two—exhibit number twenty-two in your book;the 
16 bank specifically required and the parties agreed, that a 
17 foreclosure would be completed with Mr. Martineau within nin^ 
18 months. 
19 So, what Mr. Jones is trying to do is champion the 
20 rights of the bank. He's trying to say that the bank requir| 
21 es that the Martineau lease stay in effect, and therefore 
22 you can't foreclose it. He ^ s championed every right by Mr 
23 Martineau and in fact, the bank pursuant to the purchase 
24 agreement pursuant to the letter agreement, which recites as 
25 part of the purchase agreement, that Miller would have to 
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1
 foreclose. In addition to that, and simultaneously with) 
2
 it, you have a Stipulation and Order of this Court of June 
3
 22nd, therein your Order approving the Stipulation which was 
4
 entered on the 22nd, provides (indicating) that Miller and Kimj-
5
 ball were to foreclose on the property and this is your Order) 
6
 Daniel Miller and David Kimball are substituted as 
7
 party-plaintiffs for the sole purpose of completing the fore-j 
8
 closure of any interest Martineau and Company Certified Pub-
9
 J lie Accountants may have in the property. So this is all one) 
document. 
What they are arguing from is, they're taking an assij 
gnment that doesn't pertain to Martineaus's lease. They are 
ignoring the express provisions that require foreclosure and 
14
 then they're saying hey! The bank says you can't foreclose. 
15
 You agreed with the bank to keep them in possess ion; there fore) 
18
 you can't get us out;while they're not even privy to that 
17
 agreement, there is no agreement between Martineau— 
18
 THE COURT: Well, but what about this paragraph 
19
 here that counsel referred to;this is the agreement contained 
20
 ' in the agreement between Martineau and Company and Hill. 
21
 I MR. OLSEN: 1990 unrecorded lease. The bank isn't 
a party to it. It didn't have the bank sign-off. My clients 
aren't parties. What this paragraph says is, listen, Mr. Hil} 
we understand that oftentimes in a building, you may need to 
borrow money. We agree to let you borrow money, provided 
14 
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that we're in a f irst position. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. OLSEN: That's not what happened here. We are| 
foreclosing on something four years before this. If their ar-| 
gument was correct on this, I could enter into a lease with 
anyone;that says my property is superior to anyone's interestJ 
My interest is superior to anyone's interest and any-[ 
one who had recorded prior. Their argument is that I could 
contract their rights away. 
THE COURT: Well, but the second lien talking 
about $550,000 was after this. 
MR. OLSEN: That it did. It did. So if they 
have an argument as to the five-fifty, it's another argument 
for another day. But today we're foreclosing and proceeding 
on the two-point three million dollar trust deed. And that is| 
what is at issue, not the five-fifty that is at issue today. 
Certainly my client didn't sign it and didn't get the| 
bank's consent to that. But with that, Your Honor, we would 
submit there is just no basis, one, to set aside the default 
or to enjoin the sale. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, you may call your 
first witness, counsel. But I am going to insist we move 
through it pretty rapidly. Most of the facts are not in dis-
pute. Let's get the documents in and I think there can be 
stipulations and then stick to the evidence that really is at 
issue before the Court so we can conclude this sometime this 
afternoon. 
0 01 3 8 0 15 
MR. JONES: We would do s o , Your Honor. We would 
c a l l Harold H i l l . 
WHEREUPON THE WITNESS BEING DULY SWORN TO TELL THE 
TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH 
TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT-EXAMINATION BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Mr. H i l l , would you s t a t e your f u l l name and 
a d d r e s s for t h e record? 
A. Harold J . H i l l , 8 9 3 1 Tracey C i r c l e , Sandy, Utah 
84093 . 
THE COURT: This thought just occurs to me and I 
think that out of an abundance of caution, I'll raise this if| 
I haven't already a^e^in the past. If I am not mistaken, 
when I was practicing at Strong and Hanni, Harold Hill was a 
landlord of ours1, is that correct? 
MR. HILL: Yes. That's true. 
THE COURT: Just occurs to me just this moment and! 
I don't know whether or not I mentioned that before, but Har+ 
old Hill had an interest in the Boston Building and Strong an<p 
Hanni. 
MR. JONES: Would be no basis for us to object, Yoijir 
Honor, to your hearing the evidence., 
MR. OLSEN: Let's proceed, Judge. 
THE COURT: Ok. I did not have any personal deal-
ings with Mr. Hill. 
MR. HILL: No. None. 
16 
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1 THE COURT: Didn't negotiate any lease;don't think 
2 I even formally met Mr* Hill. I do remember the name being 
3 on some documents. That's all that I remember. 
4 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. M. Hill, what 
5 is your occupation? 
6 A. I am in the real estate business. 
7 Q. How long have you been in that business? 
8 A. About twenty years. Maybe a little longer. 
9 Q. Are you a licensed real estate broker? 
10 A- Yes. 
11 Q. Have you ever owned commercial real estate? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And would that include the Judge Building in 
14 S a l t Lake City, which i s located approximately on Main S t r e e t 
15 and Third South? 
16 A. Y e s . 
17 Q. ok. And did you own that in your individual 
18 name or capacity? 
19 A. It was owned by the Judge Building Associates, 
20 which was a limited partnership. 
21 Q. The partners;were those general partners? 
22 A- General partneis originally were Michael Martin 
23 and myself. 
24 Q. ok. And when did you acquire the Judge Building? 
25 J A. I am going to have to refer to your date 1986, 
I guess. Is that right? 
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1
 Q. And how did you acquire it? Did you pay cash 
2 or you have some financing to do? 
3 A. We originally purchased it from Granada Inc. on 
4
 a purchase contract and in approximately a year later, refin-
5
 anced it through the bank. 
6
 THE COURT: Republic? 
7
 A. Yes. 
8 MR. JONES: Mr. Hill, let me show you what has 
9 been marked for purposes of this hearing today as defendant's 
10 exhibit number one. Can you briefly identify that document? 
11 A. It's the agreement with Republic. 
12 Q. It's entitled Deed of Trust with assignment of 
13 rents and leases;is that correct? 
14 A- Yes. It is. 
15 Q. And was this the Deed of Trust that you and Mr|. 
16 Martineau executed in order to give the lender,in this case 
17 Republic Savings and Loan Association, a collateral security 
18 interest in the property which is the Judge Building? 
19 A. I t i s . 
20 Q. Subsequent t o t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e Deed o f Ttus £, 
21 d id you perform t h e o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t you had t o t h e Judge 
22 B u i l d i n g A s s o c i a t e s . Perform i t ' s o b l i g a t i o n s i n favor o f 
23 the l ender? 
24 A. Y e s , 
25 Q. Ok. Now, are you familiar with Lee Martineau? 
A. I am. 
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Q, How did you become familiar with him? 
A. Lee actually has been a tenant in a building 
that I been involved in for—I am not even sure of the amm-
cunt of time, but substantially twenty to twenty-five years 
I would think. 
Q. Would that include for example, the Boston 
Building? 
A. It would include the Boston Building. 
Q. At some point in time, did Mr. Martineau talk 
to you concerning leasing space in the Judge Building? 
A. He did. 
Q. And can you tell me approximately when that was^ 
A. 1990. 
Q. Ok. And can you describe the circumstances und-j-
er which he approached you about leasing space there? 
MR. OLSEN: Objection. Circumstances aren't rele-
vant. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 
MR. JONES: Did you attempt to negotiate the terms 
of the lease with Mr. Martineau for space in the Judge Build-)-
ing? 
A- I did. 
Q. And were you successful in concluding a lease 
negotiation? 
A. I was. 
et i>3 3 19 
1 Q. Let me hand you what has been marked as defend-
2 an't exhibit number 2, and ask if you can identify that docu-
3 ment? 
4 A. This is the lease document that I signed with 
5 Mr. Martineau. 
6 Q. The pages are not numbered;but below paragraph 
7
 thirty-eight, there is a signature for Judge Building Associa}-
8 tes. Do you recognize that signature? 
9 A. This one(indicating)? 
1 0
 Q. Yes. 
11
 A. Which one, mine? 
1 2
 Q. Yes. Is that your signature for Judge Building 
1 3
 Associates? 
14 A. It is. 
1 5
 Q. And you recognize the other signatures? 
16
 A. That's Mr. Martineau's 
1 7
 Q. Whose lease form is this? 
1 8
 A. This was a lease form that actually originated-
1 9
 MR# OLSEN: Objection as to relevence. Your Honor. 
20 A. I am sorry. 
21
 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 2
 MR. JONES: Did you prepare this lease? 
23 A. I prepared the lease. I did not originate the 
24 the actual form. 
25 MR. OLSEN: Objection as to relevence. The lease 
is in effect. Who originated it doesn't matter. 
20 
V U JL *J *} 4 
THE COURT: I think I'll sustain the objection. 
Not sure this lease is in dispute anyway. 
MR. JONES: All right, Your Honor. Was the form 
of the lease approved by the lender for your use? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. How did Mr. Martineau peform under the lease? 
A* Always performed on time. 
Q. At some point in time, did Judge Building Assod 
iates default on the note which was the obligation secured by) 
the Deed of Trust? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. Do you know about when tha t occurred? 
A. I think it was October of f91. 
Q. And in connection with that default, did you 
negotiate a deal, if you will, with the bank whereby you 
would bring potential buyers that may have had an interest 
in buying the building? 
A. I did. 
Q. And would you describe what that agreement be-
tween you and the bank was? 
A. I was personally guaranteed on the mortgage to 
the bank for the Judge Building;and it was my agreement with| 
the bank that if I could procure a buyer that they actually 
sold the property to;that I would be relieved of that oblig-
ation. 
0 01 -3 3 5 21 
1
 Q. Ok* So if you found someone to purchase the 
2
 property;that would be an event which would cause the bank 
^ then to release you from your personal guarantee? 
4
 A. Yes. 
5 Q- And did that agreement also extend to your part} 
6 ner, Mr* Martini?.*-
7 A. It ended up being that way. It* was not negotiatf 
8 ed by roe that way in the beginning, but it ended up that way. 
9 Q. At some point in time, did you attempt to find 
10 buyers for the building? 
11 A. Oh, yes. Vigorous—vigorously. 
12 Q. Did you contact Mr. David Kimball, who is here 
13 in the courtroom today about being a potential buyer of that 
14 property? 
15 A. I did. 
15 Q. Ok. Now, did you assist Mr. Kimball in formula} 
17 ting an offer to purchase the ptoperty? 
18 A. Originally. 
19 Q. Ok. In the course of assisting him, did you 
20 and he have a telephone conversation with Mr. Martineau? 
21 A. We did. 
22 Q. Do you recall approximately when that took plac^? 
23 A. Seems to me it was approximately a week or two 
24 after I had introduced Mr. Kimball to the project. Not posit} 
25 ive, but somewhere in that neighborhood. 
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Q, Where were you when the conversation took placq? 
A. Uh—I believe it was a conference call. 
Q. Where were you at the time? 
A. I was in my office. Yes. 
Q. And where was Mr. Kimball? 
MR. OLSEN: Judge, by way of foundation, could we 
get a little better clarification as to when Mr. Kimball was 
introduced? March or is it April? That may be key. 
THE COURT: Yes. If you can recall as to that 
please, counsel? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, I am sorry. I'm afraid I can't-j 
MR. JONES: I'll show you a copy of the offer thatf 
was submitted and see if that refreshes you in terms of the 
time period. I am going to hand you what has been marked as 
defendant's exhibit 13. Can you identify that defendant's ex-f 
hibit 13? 
A. This is an offer that I prepared 4r Republic 
Savings on behalf of Kimball. 
MR. OLSEN: May I voir dire? 
Hasn't been offered yet. Are you now THE COURT: 
offering it? 
MR. JONES 
THE COURT 
MR. JONES 
THE COURT 
Not yet, Your Honor. 
Ok. 
Although I will be shortly s o — 
A l l r i g h t . 
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MR. JONES: May want to keep standing. Do you knoy 
about the date that this offer was submitted to Republic Sav-
ings and Loan? 
A. March 16th. 
Q. You recognize the signature under yours on the 
bottom of page two? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And whose is that? 
A. David Kimball. 
MR. JOKES: All right. Offer defendant's exhibit 
sixteen, Your Honor. Thirteen. I apologize. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Olsen? 
VOIR-DIRE EXAMINATION BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. Mr. Hill, was that offer ever accepted? 
A. This particular offer? 
Q, Yes. 
A. I am not sure how to answer that (indicating). 
Q. You later, in fact, entered into a final pur-
chase agreement for the property, did you not? 
A. I did. 
Q. This was a preliminary offer during the scope 
of the negotiations? 
A. This was the ori^nal offer presented. 
Q, The first offer? 
A. Yes. 
0 0 1 S 9 3 24 
1 Q. But there was a final purchase agreement on the) 
2 property? 
3 A. There was. 
4 MR. OLSEN: Objection to this offer as violating 
5 the parole evidence rule. Preliminary injunction of the fin-j 
6 —al document. 
7 MR. JONES: Evidences three or four things. The 
8 fact Mr. Hill was acting with Mr. Kimball in this transactionl 
9 Number two, it gives you a time frame in which these negotia| 
10 tions were going on. And number three, it sets forth the 
11 terms which are also incorporated in the final agreement. 
12 Not attempting to contradict what the final agreement says. 
13 Not offering it for purposes of saying the transaction is 
14 something other than represented in the final agreement. But£ 
15 in this equity proceeding, we*re simply presenting the evidei}-
16 ce to show the course of negotiations,and the relationship o^ 
17 the parties,and what they were doing in that time period. 
18 That's the purpose for which it is offered. Doesn't violate 
19 the parole evidence rule because we're not attempting to arg-j 
20 ue that the final agreement means something different other 
21 than what it says. 
22 THE COURT: Well, I'll sustain the objection. I 
23 think he can testify when the negotiations were going on. 
24 MR # JONES: Ok. Do you know when, having reviewed} 
25 defendant's exhibit 13. Do you know in what time period now) 
you may have been having these discussions with Mr. Kimball 
I and then the resulting conversation with Mr. Martineau that 
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1, you've spoken about. Would i t have occurred before op 
2 after this letter? 
3 A. There were two or three discussions;to be honest 
4 with you,I am not positive whether or not the discussions with 
5 Lee and Dave on the phone were prior to or after this. I canf 
6 not remember. I am sorry. 
7 Q. ok. Would they have been in this time period? 
8 The March-April time period? 
9 A. Oh, yes. 
10
 Q. And would they have occurred before the final 
11
 agreement was entered into? 
12 A. Oh most certainly. 
13 THE COURT: We talking about 1993 or two? 
14 A. 1993. 
15 #R# JONES: Ninety-three? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Do you recall who spoke and what was said in 
13 that conversation? 
19 I A. I remember the conversation that was a conferen 
ce call between the three of us# And the call was prompted I 
believe, if I reman ber correctly;I was talking with Dave Kim-
ball and he wanted to know some opinions on the building. And 
if I remember correctly, I just conference-called into Lee's 
office and Lee in particular I wanted to talk to. He and Lee 
already had some—they knew each other from playing tennis or 
something, if I am not mistaken. 
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Q, During the course of that conversation;was therje 
any discussion whereby Mr* Kimball whereby Mr. Martineau 
described how he felt about the building? 
A. Oh yes. 
Q. And what did he say? 
A. He said he loved the building and that he most 
certainly wanted to stay there;and he liked it and etc., etc. 
Q- Did he also indicate in the conversations that 
he liked it so much that he was in the process of negotiating] 
with the lender to buy the building? 
A- I am recollecting that I heard Lee say that# 
yes. Not positive it was in that conversation. 
MR# OLSEN: Objection as to speculation. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain it. I don't believe it 
is responsive. Talked about a specific time period? 
MR. JONES: Yes. In the course of that conversat-
ion, you recall that Mr. Martineau indicated that he was try-
ing to negotiate with the lender then to purchase the build-
ing? 
A. I believe he said that, yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Martineau at some point, also ask Mr. 
Kimball what Mr. Kimball's posture would be if Mr. Kimball 
bought the building?that is vis a vis", Mr. Martineau and his 
lease? 
A- I remember that question coming up. I cannot 
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1 remember if it was in this conversation on the phone. 
2 There was also a time when Mr. Kimball and I were in Mr. Mart 
3 ineau's office. And I am not sure which one of that came up, 
4 but it did come up, yes. 
5 Q. In a conversation? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Between you, and Mr. Kimball and Mr. Martineau, 
8 that question was asked? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q# And what was Mr. Kimball's response? 
11 MR. OLSEN: Objection. Foundation as to time. 
12 THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. If you 
13 could set that out a little more clearly as to what time this 
14 was? 
15 MR. JONES: You said it was either in a telephone 
16 conversation which occurred in the March or April time period 
17 but before the final offer was submitted? 
18 A- Or it may have been in other conversations that 
19 occurred in Mr. Martineau's office. 
20 Q. Did that conversation also take place in the 
21 same time period before the offer was submitted? 
22 A- Yes, it was a very short time frame. I don't 
23 know whether or not the conversations took place prior to thi£ 
24 offer(indicating)or in between. I can't remember. I jis t 
25 remember that they did. 
0 014 02 
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1 Q. Ok* And so then what was Mr. Kimball's respons 
2
 to that question? 
3 A. That they were not in the habit of throwing out 
4 tenants. Something along that line, and that they most cer-
5 tainly wanted to retain Lee. 
6 Q. Ok. At some point in time, did Republic comm-
7 ence this foreclosure proceeding and were you served as a 
8 party-defendant? 
9 A. Yes, I was. 
10 Q. And were you also aware at some point in time, 
11
 that Martineau and Company was added as a party-defendant to| 
12 the lawsuit? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Did anyone tell you why the plaintiff was doingj 
15 that? 
16 A. My understanding 
17 MR* OLSEN: Objection, Your Honor. That's non-resj-
18 ponsive. It's a yes or no. 
19 THE COURT: Sustained. 
20 MR. JONES: Did you have d is cuss ioif where someone 
21 told you why that was being done? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. With whom did you have those discussions? 
24 A. Ray Unrath. 
25 Q. Who is Ray Unrath. 
A. Ray Unrath was acting as the agent for the bankj. 
001403 
Q. And when did this conversation take place, again) 
relative to this offer? 
A. I had this conversation with Ray Unrath many, 
many times;not only with this offer, but other offers that I 
tendered to the bank. 
Q. Ok. And what did Mr. Unrath tell you as the 
agent for the bank as to why Mr. Martineau had been added »s 
a defendant? 
A. His lease 
MR. OLSEN: Object as to relevance. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: That mean I can answer that? The 
length and ammount of Mr. Martineau's lease was a detriment 
to the project and in selling it to a future buyer, which by 
the way I didn't believe;that's why I remember so many converf 
sations. 
MRo JONES: You say you. didn't believe that? 
A. Yes, I did.not believe that. 
Q. And did you voice that to the bank? 
A. Many times. 
Q. Did you a l s o v o i c e t la- t t o Mr. Kimball? 
A- Y e s . 
Q. Now, the transaction subsequently closed in 
July—on July one of 1993? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. You, on behalf of Judge Building Associates,ex-
ecuted a special warranty deed, conveying your interest in th^ 
building to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball?is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Handing you what has been marked as defendant's 
exhibit number four. Can you identify that document, Mr. Hill? 
MR0 OLSEN: We'll stipulate that's the deed, JudgeJ 
THE COURT: That's exhibit what? 
MR. JONES: Exhibit number four, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Exhibit four? Are you offering it? 
MR. JONES: We are. 
MR. OLSEN: No objections. 
THE COURT: Received. 
MR. JONES: Thank you. At the same time you execu-j-
ted the quit-claim deed;were you aware that the bank also ass+ 
igned it's interest in the Deed of Trust that was being foref 
closed, to Mr. Kimball and Mr. Miller? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you also aware at that time, that ME Millet 
and Mr. Kimball had paid the bank $200,000 in cash and executf 
ed a new deed of trust for $550,000? 
A. I wasn't aware of the actual dollar figures, bu{: 
I was aware that the transaction did happen, yes. 
Q. Were you also aware that they subordinated that 
trust deed to an existing two-point million dollar trust deed 
which was exhibit number one? 
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A. No, I wasn't privy to that. 
Q. No one advised that you were going to do that? 
A. No. 
; Q. And do you know who structured the transaction 
in that fashion? 
A. The bank and the attorney, I am not sure of his; 
name at this point. 
Q. You didn't have any role in doing that? 
A. I had no role. 
' MR. JONES: No further questions for this witness, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Olaen? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. Thank you, Judge. Mr. Hill, I take it that 
the purchase of the Judge Building did not go well for you? 
A. It did for a time, but it did—yes,it went 
sour very quickly. 
Q. You needed to unload the debt? 
A. Oh most certainly did. 
Q. The debt itself was a big concern, I take it? 
A. Very big. 
Q. You had to have the building on the market foxn 
quite a time, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long was it on the market? 
A. You mean after the foreclosure? 
001406 32 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. No, before. When did you start listing? When 
did you start trying to sell this property? 
A. Uh-I had made some inquiries to sell it approxi-f 
mately six months before or to take on a partner. 
Q. Didn't you start 
A. And it may have been longer, but time— 
Q. Back in 1990 you tried to get Mr. Martineau to 
come in the building as an investor and partner, didn't you? 
A. I tried two or three times to get Mr. Martineau 
to invest in the building, yes. 
Q. He didn't want to do that? 
A. At the time he did not, no. 
Q. He didn't ever come forward with an offer to y<j>u 
to invest in the building, did he? 
A. No. 
Q. Didn't ever come forward with an offer to buy 
the building? 
A. He informed me on one occasion that and possible-
two, that he was working with some people to purchase the 
building over a long period of time. 
Q. How long have you been in real estate, Sir? 
A. About twenty years. 
Q. Do you have a license to sell property? 
A. I do. 
Q. Do you hold a broker's license? 
A. I also do. 
0 014 0 7 
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Q. And to hold a broker's license, there is a 
training course you have to go through;isn't there? 
A- Uh-huh. 
Q. Also have to pass a test? 
A. Oh, most certainly 
Q. You also cover certain subjects in those class-] 
es and testing, don't you, including the statute of frauds? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you understand that in an agreement in real] 
estate that is not in writing, is not binding on anyone, is 
that 
MR. JONES: Objection. It's irrelevant and beyonc^  
the scope of the direct examination. 
THE COURT: What is the relevance? 
MR. OLSEN: The relevence, Judge, is, they're talkf-
ing about Mr. Martineaus's interest;to take the testimony, 
which is being put on of making an offer on the property. Anj 
offer is not binding;an offer is not enforceable and an offer] 
is speculative until it's reduced to writing. For that pur-
pose I would like to state Mr. Hill's understanding. 
THE COURT: I know that. What is it's relevance? 
MR. OLSEN: It's also in addition, that goes to his) 
second conversation;where they are talking about Mr. Kimball1 
stating that it's not his business to put tenants out. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 
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1
 THE WITNESS: What does that mean? Mean I answer ijt? 
2
 THE COURT: Need not answer, Sir. 
3
 THE WITNESS: I am sorry. 
4
 MR. OLSEN: You talked about Mr. Ray Unrath. Mr. 
5
 Ray Unrath worked for whom? 
6
 A. Wallace Associates. 
' Q. He had what role with the lender to your under-
8
 standing? 
9 A. That he was the leasing and selling agent for 
10 the building. 
11 Q. I believe you testified that Mr. Unrath wanted 
12 Mr. Martineau out of the building? 
13 A. I testified that Mr. Unrath had informed the 
14 bank that Mr. Martineau*s lease was not a good lease to be 
15 carrying the building forward to a potential buyer. 
16 Q. You told that to Mr. Martineau, did you not? 
17 A. Yes. I did. 
18 Q. And t h i s i s before t h i s March and Apri l time 
19 period that we're deal ing with, aren' t we? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And you told Mr. Martineau there was a foreclos4 
22 ure action; in fact, his interest could be foreclosed out, dicjl 
23 you not? 
24 A- I did not tell him that his interest could be 
25 I foreclosed.out. 
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Q. You had d i scuss ion and talked with him, d idn ' t 
you? 
A. Yes, we d id . 
Q. And didn't Mr. Martineau at that point, tell yo 
that he was looking for the other space? 
A. Mr. Martineau told me that he might be forced 
into that because he understood his interest could be exting-
uished. 
MR. JONES: Objection, Your Honor. Speculation. 
He understood that Mr. Martineau believed his communication. 
THE COURT: To that extent I'll sustain the object 
ion. 
MR. OLSEN: What did Mr. Martineau tell you he be-
lieved could happen to his interest;why was he looking for 
space? 
A. Actually, two reasons: Number one, the fact tha 
the foreclosure was in place and that there was a chance that 
he could. And the other side of that, if that did happen,he 
wants to secure like space at a relatively good rate himself. 
Q. So what he told you was, that he understood that) 
he could be foreclosed out, correct? 
A. He told me that it was served to him that way. 
Not that he understood, but that's the way it come across to 
him. 
Q. That he could be foreclosed out and his lease 
could be extinguished? 
A. Yes. 
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1
 Q. Now, let's talk about the Kimball meeting for a 
2 minute. You said that was over a relatively short period of 
3
 time? 
4 A. Short,when I am saying first off was March 15ih|, 
5 closing July. That's a relatively short period of time for a 
6 transaction this large. 
7 Q. But in fact, these Kimball conversations;the on^P 
8 you referenced occurred over less than that two weeks period, 
9 did they not? 
10 A. They did. 
11 Q. So, within two weeks this conversation with Mar-f-
12 tineau was handled, and you testified as to the first conver-
13 sation,that Mr. Kimball said essentially, it's not our business 
14 to kick tenants out, correct? 
15 A. I did. 
16 Q. Now at that point in time, had Mr. Kimball,to 
17 your knowledge, seen Mr. Martineaus' lease? 
18 A. I don't believe he had. 
19 Q. You hand't given him a copy? 
20 A- I did not. 
21 Q. In that conversation, the terms of Mr. Martineaju's 
22 lease were not discussed, were they? 
23 A. I had talked with Mr. Kimball about Mr. Martine^u' 
24 lease and the fact that—do I say? 
25 Q. Go ahead. Like to hear it. 
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1 A. And the fact that I felt that it was an asset 
2 to the building. And that it had been put in a foreclosure 
3
 action. And that I felt that it should remain with the build 
4
 ing. 
5 Q. Did you tell him that you didn't give him the 
6 rental rate on the lease? 
7 A. I did not. 
8 Q. Did you tell him that you thought it was such 
9 a favorable lease that you had asked Mr. Martineau not to disj-
10 cuss it with the other tenants in the building? 
11 A. I do not remember saying that, no but 
12 Q. In fact, you did ask Mr. Martineau not to dis-l 
13 cuss his lease with other tenants in the building, did you nop? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. You had a gentleman's agreement that you would] 
16 not discuss it, correct? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Kimball that the ini-j 
19 tial term was three years? 
20 A. I am not sure I did that. 
21 Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Kimball that there 
22 were 5 three year options in the lease? 
23 A. I discussed with him that the lease was, my 
24 recollection is fifteen years. 
25 Q. Did you discuss with him that the rent could 
only increase one percent a year? 
I L T did. . 
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 Q. Did not? 
2 A. I did. 
3
 Q. When did you discuss that? 
4
 A. Conversation that we had—I mean over the lease| 
5 and why the lease was trying to be foreclosed out. 
6
 Q. Ok. I am talking about this two week period of 
7 time;you didn't discuss it during that two week period of timja? 
8
 A. No, I don't think, so. 
9 Q. Now, after this conversation did you think that 
10 there was a deal struck between Mr. Martineau and Mr. Kimball); 
11
 I that Mr. Martineau could rely on to stay in the building? 
12
 | MR. JONES: Objection as to that. Your Honor. Whatl 
he thought about whether there was a deal is irrelevant. WhaS 
14
 I was communicated by Mr. Kimball to Mr. Martineau;that is relej-
15 vant. 
16 j THE COURT: Ok. Response? 
MR. OLSEN: They're asking for an agreement. If 
one of the parties didn't feel there was an agreement 
MR. JONES: Not a party to the agreement. The 
Court makes that decision when it hears the effects of all 
21 I of the reliance by Mr. Martineau.. 
22 | THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. OLSEN: Let me make a proffer then. If allow-| 
ed to answer the question, Mr. Hill, that you did not think 
that a deal was struck at that period of time;that it was too| 
preliminary to reach a deal, especially in light of the fact 
Mr. Kimball had not seen the lease;isn't that true? 
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1 MR. JONES: Going to object to that# Your Honor. 
2 Whether he intended to make a proffer or not;the Court has 
3 already sustained the objection. He's asked the exact, same 
4 question. 
5 MR. OLSEN: That's how you protect the record. Pro) 
6 ffer if it's not in evidence, Mr. Jones. Ask leave to go for] 
7 ward with the proffer? 
8 THE COURT: Why don't you proffer to me what you 
9 think you would have rather than have him say it? 
10 MR. JONES: I believe that's appropriate. 
11 MR. OLSEN: Mr. Hill will state at that time it was) 
12 preliminary. It was too preliminary to be a deal. That Mr, 
13 Kimball had not seen the lease, and that he did not think that! 
14 it was such an arrangement had been struck between Mr. Martj-
15 ineau and Mr. Kimball. It was a discussion very early in the) 
16 proceedings. 
17 THE COURT: Ok. So it's so noted. You may proceed] 
18 MR. OLSEN: Thank you. Now, shortly after that 2 
19 week period, Mr. Kimball's attitude toward Mr. Martineau's 
20 lease changed, didn't it? 
21 A. It was kind of taken out of the loop and it was 
22 very early on in the stages after the first offer was made. 
23 Q. Well, let me ask the question a different way. 
24 A. So 
25 Q. The leases were subsequent. Mr. Martineau's 
lease was subsequently given to Mr. Kimball, was•it not? 
A. It was. 
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1 Q. And it was given to Mr. Kimball and Mr. KimballI 
2 informed you that it was not acceptable that Martineau remain| 
3
 in the building during that period a time? 
4 A. Don't recollect Mr. Kimball informing me of tha£, 
5 Q. Someone informed you of that# did they not? 
6 A. I was informed. The bank informed me of that 
7 and Ray Unrath informed me of that. 
8 Q. So, you knew shortly after that two week period 
9 that it was unacceptable that Mr. Martineau stay in on his 
10 present lease terms, correct? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And you told Mr. Martineau that, didn't you? 
13 A. I believe that I related to him that we were 
14 going to try and make the foreclosure in his lease stick, yes, 
15 Q. So, you told them that shortly after this two 
16 week period? 
17 A. Yeah. 
18 THE COURT: Would that have been in April or May?| 
19 A. Close to, in that proximity, yes. 
20 MR. OLSEN: Now, at that point in time, at one timi 
21 you had requested of Mr. Kimball, Mr. Martineau be allowe^ 
22 to stay in the building,hadn't you? 
23 A, I had, yes. 
24 Q. But it became apparent Mr. Martineau could not 
25 stay in the building under the same terms of his lease, correct? 
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A. I didn't totally understand where the whole 
was at* If you're saying was it apparent to roe;I felt at anyj 
time the bank could waive the Martineau situation in favor of] 
the buyer* 
Q- They could have waived it, but to your knowledgj* 
they didn't waive it? 
A. They refused. 
Q. They refused to waive? 
A, Yes, they did. 
Q. And you knew that before it closed? 
A. I did. I did. 
Q. Let me shew you what has been marked as plaintiffs 
exhibit 19, page 20. The signature line. Is that your signaf-
ture, Sir? 
A. My signature is not on page twenty. 
Q. I think you perhaps 
A. Sorry. You got two page twenties here. Sorry, 
it is. 
Q. Dated 6/10/'93? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And on paragraph 11.21, would you simply read 
that for the Court? 
A. In connection with the settlement action to sell 
the property to purchaser;TCF agrees to preserve and assign tcf 
purchaser the right to foreclose on the leasehold interest of 
Martineau and Company. 
$01416 42 
Q. So at that point in time, you knew unequivocally 
that the foreclosure against Mr* Martineau would proceed, did 
you not? 
A. Yes . 
Q. And you were willing to sign the agreement with 
that full understanding? 
A. I had. I signed this agreement with the under-
standing that I was relieved from responsibility? I didn't eveiji 
read it* 
Q. You understood, did you not, Sir, that that agr-j* 
eement would be binding on the parties and that represented 
the dealing between the parties? 
A. Yes . 
Q. And you understand 11.21 clearly says now and i^ 
did then that 
THE COURT: You don't need to go over that. That14 
repetitious. 
MR. OLSEN: Thank you. I offer exhibit nineteen at[ 
this point in time, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Jones? 
MR. JONES: Sorry, Your Honor? 
THE OOURT: He offered exhibit nineteen. 
MR. JONES: No. Absolutely none. 
THE COURT: Received. 
MR. OLSEN: Mr. Hill, I show you what has been mar-f 
ked as plaintiff's exhibit number 22. Would you turn to the 
second page of that exhibit? 
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A.. Yes. 
Q. Would you look—does your signature appear on 
this agreement? 
A. On page two? 
Q. Did you receive a copy of this agreement, June 
twenty-first, 1993 instructions? 
A. My attorney may have. I don't remember seeing 
this. 
Q. Who was your attorney? 
A. Bill Russell. 
Q. Was he authorized to act on your behalf in this 
proceeding? 
A. He was. 
1 Q. And if he entered into any stipulations or 
orders with the Court, you authorized hira to act in your be-
half in that regard? 
A- Yes. 
Q. Are you aware of anything that he did that was 
unauthorized by you? 
A. I am not. 
Q. I'll show you what has been marked as exhibit 
three, which is a two-part document;a stipulation and a motion 
regarding the partial settlement assignment to the cause of 
action: Substitution of plaintiff for dismissal of certain 
defendants. You'll notice that Mr. Russell's signature is on 
that;you authorized him to sign that document, did you not? 
A. I did. 
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Q. And that document authorizes Mr. Miller and Mr. 
Kimball to proceed with the foreclosure in this action, does 
it not? 
A. If that's what it says. 
Q, And that was all right with you? 
A. I have to say that I didn't have any choice. 
Q. You agreed to it? 
A. I agreed. 
Q. What is a non-disturbance certificate? 
A. Uh-usually in connection with a lease where the 
landlord protects the tenant from any disturbance at all;eith 
er on his premises or lease or anything like that. 
Q. So for example, a non-disturbance as in a situa 
tion where a lender wants to make claim on a particular 
piece of property? 
A. Could be. 
Q. Or a tenant wants a lease on a property? 
A. * Yes. 
Q. And the tenant wants to make sure the landlord 
won't forclose him out? 
A- I assume it could be, yes. 
Q. In a typical situation in commercial practice, 
the tenant would obtain a non^disturbance certificate from 
the lender? 
A. Uh-without seeing it, yes. I would have to ex-j 
plain. 
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Q. That's a practice you're familiar with? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact, some of your tenants obtained that typ£ 
of certificate from lenders, have they not? 
A. Yes. Oh yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Martineau obtain one? 
A. I am not sure. 
Q. You're not aware of one? 
A. I am not sure if he did or not. 
Q. Mr. Jones asked the question about the earlier 
exhibit which was the form of the lease to Mr. Martineau. 
A. Yes. 
Q. The bank did not approve of that executed lease 
did they, Sir? 
THE COURT: You mean—excuse me—talking about 
which, this Martineau lease? 
MR. OLSEN: Martineau lease 
THE COURT: The bank did not approve it? 
MR. OLSEN: Did not approve it. 
THE COURT: You understand the question? 
THE WITNESS: I do. Not sure how to answer it. 
The bank was aware of the lease;we had to file all leases with 
the bank. 
MR. OLSEN: The bank did not give you a non-dist-
urbance certificate? 
A. Did not. They did not give me anything in 
writing. 
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1 Q, To your knowledge, they did not agree at any 
2 time to foreclose Mr, Martineau's interest, did they? 
3 A. The bank? 
4 Q. Yes. 
5 A. Yes, But they did approve the lease. We submitf 
6 -ted the lease to them. 
7 Q. But they didn't give up their priority at any 
8 time to them? 
9 MR. JONES: Objection, Your Honor. If he wants to| 
10 ask as to his knowledge as to the bank. He is asking what 
11 the bank did rather than what he knew. No foundation for 
12 that. Mr. Hill is not a representative of the bank or speakj 
13 er for them. 
14 THE COURT: Sustained. 
15 MR. OLSEN: Now, in your trust deed. And you gavel 
16 the trust deed to the bank;the 1986 document, exhibit one toj 
17 these proceedings? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Would you read the title to that document? 
20 A. Deed of trust with assignment of rents and leases, 
21 Q. And it's your understanding of that document,isj 
22 it not, that if there is a default;that the bank has the 
23 right to collect rent on your leases? 
24 A. It is. 
25 Q. They were in fac t doing that whi le you were in 
defaul t? 
A. Yes. 
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M Q. In fact, a receiver was appointed to collect 
2
 rent, right? 
3 A. They were* 
4 Q. And if that deed of trust was assigned to some-) 
5 one else, they too would have thr right to collect rent from 
6 your tenants;isn•t that your understanding? 
7 A. It would be. 
8 MR. OLSEN: I have no further questions. 
9 RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TONES: 
10
 Q. Let me have you refer briefly to plaintiff's exj-
11 hibit number 19. P-nineteen. Is it marked? 
12 A. Uh-huh. 
13 Q. And on page twenty—I believe it's the first 
14 page twenty. 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. That Mr. 01sen pointed out to you. He directed] 
17 your attention to the 11.21 paragraph. 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Is that correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Did you have any control over TCF, the lender 
22 in this case, as to whether or not the lender would allow thej 
23 purchaser to foreclose? 
24 A. I had no control. 
25 Q. Did anyone ever discuss this matter with you? 
A. I discussed it with my attorney. 
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Q. But did 
Miller ever discuss 
A. I don't 
anyone on behalf of Mr, Kimball or Mr* 
it with you? 
remember them—anyone doing that. 
Q. Now like wise, turn if you would to plaintiff's 
exhibit P-3, which is 
THE COURT: 
MR. OLSEN: 
; the Stipulation and the Motion. I 
That has not been received, by the wayl 
Excuse me. Ask the Court to take jud-
icial knowledge and offer exhibit three. 
THE COURT: 
MR. JONES: 
THE COURT: 
MR. OLSEN: 
THE COURT: 
MR. JONES: 
or. No objections. 
THE COURT: 
MR. JONES: 
Any objection? 
None, Your Honor. 
Three is received. 
Also offer Exhibit P-22. 
Any objection, Mr. Jones? 
I think not, Your Honor. No, Your Honf 
Received. 
And while we're doing it, ve didn't 
offer defendant's exhibits one and two, which are the Deed of 
Trust and the Lease. 
THE COURT: 
MRS. JONES: 
THE COURT: 
MR. OLSEN: 
THE COURT: 
MR. JONES: 
One was offered and received, I believe 
No. 
Any objection to one? 
No objection. No objections to two. 
Any objection as to two? Be received. 
Thank you, Your Honor. Directing your 
y 0 i 'i £ 6 
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attention again to Exhibit P-3, and specifically 
paragraph three, which is found on pages four and fiveJdid 
anyone on behalf of the bank talk to you or solicit your app-f 
roval or agreement that the Deed of Trust would continue to 
be foreclosed after the transaction? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, you had no control at. all over the 
deal that was struck between Mr. Miller and Kimball on the 
one hand and the bank on the other, concerning the fashion irj 
which they would acquire the property? 
A. No. 
Q. These terms were dictated to you by the bank, 
and Mr. Kimball and Mr. Miller, if you wanted to get your 
release of liability, is that correct? 
A- They were dictated by the bank. 
Q. All right. Now, let me direct your attention, iif 
I may, to plaintiff's exhibit two, I believe, which is your 
lease;which is Mr. Martineau's lease. Mr. Olsen talked to 
you about a non-disturbance agreement. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was your understanding 
THE COURT 
MR. JONES 
THE COURT 
MR. JONES 
P-2? 
D-2, Your Honor. Sorry. 
I am sorry. 
Thank you. Mr. Olsen asked you about 
0 014 2 4 
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1
 your understanding of a non-disturbance agreement and 
2
 the legal effect of that. To make sure I understand your 
3
 testimony;did you testify, that at some point you submitted 
4
 this lease—Mr* Martineau's lease to the bank for it's rev-
5
 iew and approval? 
6
 I A. This lease was sent to the bank on more than 
one occasion. 
8
 Q. And did the bank prior to adding Mr. Martineau 
9 I as a defendant in the foreclosure proceeding,ever indicate 
to you this lease was objectionable and that any of it's 
terms would not be accepted by the bank? 
12
 | A. No. 
13
 I Q. Now, let me direct your attention to, if I may, 
14
 I paragraph 33(b). The pages are not numbered, but it's a 
little ways back in the document. Let me ask you to review 
paragraph 33(b), if you would please? Okay? 
17
 | A- Yes. 
18
 j Q. Did anyone from the bank ever indicate to you 
19
 I that the bank objected to this particular paragraph in Mr. 
20
 I Martineau's lease? 
21
 A. They did not. 
2 2
 MR. OLSEN: Object as to relevance 
23
 THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. 
2 4
 THE WITNESS: No, they didn't. 
2 5
 j MR. JONES: Ok. Did anyone at the bank ever have 
any discussions with you about the provisions of paragraph 
33(b) in Mr. Martineau's lease? 
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A. No. 
Q. And at any point in time after you submitted 
the lease to the bankrdid the bank ever do anything to indic-
ate to you that any aspect of Mr. Martineaus's lease was ob-
|jectionable? 
A. No. 
MR. JONES: Ok. Nothing else. Your Honor. 
THE CO URT: Mr. Olsen? 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. Just a small clarification. You misspoke, Mr. 
Hill, and I think you did that unintentionally. In your und-
derstanding, Mr. Unrath was a representative of the bank, was 
he not? 
A. He's an agent representing the bank. 
Q. To use that terminology, he told you on repeats 
ed occasions the Martineau lease was unacceptable, did he not? 
A. He did, in his opinion. 
Q. In his opinion? 
A. Yes. 
MR. OLSEN: Thank you. 
MR. JONES: Like to respond to that, if I may? 
Prior to the time that you were in default and the bank filed 
the foreclosure action. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did anyone on behalf of the bank, including Mr J 
UErath, ever indicate that the lease or any part of the Marti4 
neau lease was unacceptable? | 
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A. No. 
MR. JONES: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Olsen? 
MR. OLSEN: When did you go in default? 
A. Well, actual notice of default was issued right 
close to Christmas Day. I think it was 1991 or'92—'90 or'91J 
Q. And you were in default before that, were you 
not? 
A. I quit paying the mortgage payment I believe 
in about October of that year* '91. 
Q* Didn't take the bank long to tell you that? 
A. Only down about two months before they got me. 
MR. OISEN: No further questions, Judge. 
MR. JONES: One last one. What were the ammounts 
of your monthly payments to the bank? 
A. Twenty-one-thousand dollars. 
MR. JONES: Ok. Nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mere pittance. You may step down, Mr 
Hill. Thank you. 
MR. JONES: May be necessary to recall Mr. Hill, 
but he's asked if he could be excused for the interim to con-
duct some business. 
THE COURT: I have no objections to that so long 
as we know where to reach you?if you'll leave the number with 
Mr. Jones, please? 
THE WITNESS : Ok. 
00142? 
1
 MR. JONES: C a l l now Mr. David Kimball , Your Honor 
2 WHEREUPON THE WITNESS BEING DULY SWORN TO TELL THE 
TROTH, THE WHOI£ TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TROTH 
3 TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
4 DIRECT-EXAMINATION BY MR. JONES: 
5 Q. Mr. Kimball , would you s t a t e your f u l l name and| 
6
 address for the record, please? 
7 A. David M. Kimball , 1891 Ridge H i l l D r i v e , BountifuJL, 
8
 Utah. 
9 Q« And what is your occupation, Sir? 
10 A. Real estate development and hotel management. 
11 Q. How long have you been engaged in that business] 
12 A. Seventeen years. 
13 Q. Are you licensed by the State as a realtor or 
14 as a broker? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. When were you first licensed? 
17 A. 1972 as a salesman and 1975 as a broker, I believe 
18 Q. And you continue to be licensed today? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q- For the last seventeen years that you engaged 
21 in the real estate business;can you. describe the nature of 
22 your involvement in real estate? 
23 A, Primarily purchasing investment properties;foe-| 
24 using a little bit more on office buildings and hotels. 
25 Q. You have bought a number of properties and owne<jI 
and operated a number of properties in Utah;including proper-
I ties along the Wasatch Front;is that correct? 
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1
 A. Yes. 
2
 Q. Can you describe some of those properties by 
3
 name or location? 
4
 A. Uh-Peery Hotel, Salt Lake City, the Holiday Inn| 
5
 Salt lake City, Judge Building, a dental office building in 
6
 Murray, some property called Benchmark Subdivision, Salt Lake) 
7
 A few. 
8 Q. You been involved in both residential and coram-| 
9 ercial real property? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. You been involved in real property relating to 
12 lodging facilities? 
13 A- Yes. 
14 Q. The Peery Hotel that you've described? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Prior to this transaction and the closing of 
17 the transaction;had you ever had previous experience in acquij 
18 ring a deed of trust and also in the process of acquiring ti-| 
19 tie to the property? 
20 MR. OISEN: Judge, wonder-I am having a hard time 
21 seeing the witness. Perhaps Mr. Jones could move the rostrunj 
22 THE COURT: Move that to your left, Sir? 
23 MR. JCNES: Happy to do so, Your Honor as long as 
24 Mr. Martineau can see as well. 
25 THE COURT: Can you see, Mr. Martineau? 
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THE WITNESS: Could you repeat the question? 
MR. JONES: Prior to this transaction, which you 
and Mr, Miller acquired both the deed of trust and title to 
the property concurrently;had you ever entered into a transa-
ction like that previously, where you acquired both the deed 
of trust and the real property at the same time? 
MR. OISEN: Objection as to relevance. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. JONES: When did you first find out that the 
Judge Building was for sale? 
A- Uh-I would say possibly in February. 
Q. That 1993? 
A. Sorry. 1993. 
Q. Now, how did that happen? How did you find out 
about it? 
A. Through Harold Hill. 
Q. Did he contact you or what happened? 
A. He did contact me and asked if I was interested 
in purchasing the Judge Building, and I said I would be inter-} 
ested in looking at it. 
THE COURT: What was the date of that call again? 
A. I am sorry. I don't remember. I think it was 
in February. Sometime in the month of February 1993. 
MR. "JONES: How did the transaction then proceed o^ 
your involvement with the Judge Building then proceed after 
that phone call? 
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1 !
 A. Dh-I believe he later contacted me and said, 
2
 would you like to go to look at it? And I said I would. He 
3
 expressed that it was—could be bought at a very good price 
4
 And so we went up and looked at the building. That may have! 
5
 been the first of March 
® I Q. So you made a physical inspection of the build-] 
ing? 
8 I A. Yes, well, just looked in the lobby. He took 
9
 me around through some of the suites or excuse me rooms and 
10
 I some of the offices 
Q. Was anyone else with you at the time? 11 
23 
12
 j A. Mo. He had a key to the building there. 
13
 I Q. Did you see Mr. Martineau's space in the course] 
14
 I of that physical inspection? 
15
 A. Yes, I did. 
16
 Q. And did you talk to Mr. Martineau at the time 
17
 you first stopped by? 
18
 I A. Not sure if it was that particular time. It 
may have been. It could have been that first time, but I am] 
20
 | not sure if it was or maybe the second time. 
21
 I Q« After you had seen the property and Mr. Hill ha(3 
22
 I shown you through it;did he give you any information in writ) 
ing with regard to the terms, the leases, the condition of 
24
 I thh? building, the cash-flow, the obligations or anything of] 
25
 I that -nature? 
A. He didn't give me anything then 
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1
 Q. Did you subsequently receive information at tha] 
2
 time? 
3 A* Uh-I received maybe something, what I think it 
4 could have come through Wallace Associates;maybe through Har-| 
5 old Hill as far as the listing price and things like that. 
6 Q. Ok. So you received something in writing,prov-| 
7 iding information with regard to the terms of the 
8 A. That wasn't the first time. It was later in 1 
9 Q. Ok. At some point in time, did you have a dis-| 
10 cussion with the lender about the lender's interest or how 
11 the lender wanted to participate in the sale of the property?] 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Did you do that directly or through an agent? 
14 A. I did it through the agent first;through Wallacje 
15 Associates. Through them. 
16 Q- And did you do that with the assistance of Mr. 
17 Miller or do that on your own? 
18 A. I did that on my own. 
19 Q. And did you also talk to Mr. Hill about how he 
20 would participate in the sale? 
21 A. I did. 
22 Q. At some point in time# did you become aware 
23 that there was a foreclosure action pending? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And approximately when was that? 
A. And you're talking about on the property? 
Q. Yes. 
0 0 H 3 2 se 
1 A. Yes. It was probably right at the first of the) 
2 conversation with Harold Hillrwhen we first looked at the 
3
 building. Maybe the first part of March. 
4 Q. And you knew that Lee Martineau was a party-
5 defendant in that foreclosure action? 
6
 A. Yeah. I didn't really understand—didn't underj-
7
 stand that at that time, until I talked to Ray Dhrath and, 
8 well, excuse me. Harold Hill did tell me that Lee Martineau 
9 was part of some type of foreclosure. Then I talked to Ray. 
10 And he told me as well. 
11
 Q. That would have come up in your first conversa-| 
12 tion with Mr. Hill? 
13
 A. Uh-huh. 
1 4
 Q. Subsequently in conversat ions with Mr. Uhrath? 
1 5
 A. Yes. 
16
 MR. OISEN: Object to the question as being com-
17
 pound. I think he answered the latter question instead of 
18
 the first. The first question was did it come up in the firsj 
19 question then came up in later conversations. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Let's clarify that. 
21 MR. JONES: I'll ask the question again. In the 
2 2
 first conversation with Mr. Hill,he told you that the build-
23
 ing was in foreclosure and that Mr. Martineau or Martineau 
2 4
 and Company were defendants in that action? 
25 A. He didn't really specify Lee Martineau at that 
time was a part of the foreclosure. I understood only that 
the building was in foreclosure. 
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1
 I Q. Ok. When did you learn that Mr. Martineau was 
2
 I a defendant in the foreclosure? 
3
 I A. Later and I am going on this to my memory, so 
I can't specifically tell you the time. But I did talk to 
5
 I Ray Unrath on account 1 believe Harold Hill said that at a 
6
 later date than that, that Lee Martineau was trying to get 
7
 'em out of the building. And so I wanted to understand that 
8
 a little better. So I talked to Ray Unrath and he mentioned 
9
 I to me that there was a foreclosure against Lee Martineau. 
Q. And how shortly after your initial conversation) 
with Mr. Hill would that conversation with Mr. Unrath have 
taken place? 
A. Within two days maybe. Short time. 
Q. So probably in February? 
A. No, this was in March. This was probably.be th|e 
first week in March. 
17 I Q. First week in March or so? 
18 A. Uh-huh. 
19 Q- You had then gained knowledge that Mr. Martin-
20 eau was a party defendant in the action ? 
21 A. Uh-huh. I didri^ t understand it, but I under-
22 stood that there was a problem there. 
23 MR # JONES: Your Honor, this may be a good time 
24 before I launch into other things to take a break, if that 
25 J would be agreeable? 
THE COURT: This would be a good tine to do that, 
so we'll be in recess until 1:30. /Noon recess taken at this 
time.*
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JANUARY 19, 1995 - 1:30 P.M. - SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Continued) 
THE COURT: Resume the stand, please. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
(Continued) 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Mr. Kimball, if you'll recall that you're 
still under oath. 
A. Yes . 
Q. On or about March 16 of 1993, you made an 
offer, with the assistance of Mr. Hill, to purchase 
the Judge Building, didn't you? 
A. Yes . 
Q. And at the time you made that offer, you 
offered to pay $850,000; is that correct? 
MR. OLSEN: Objection; relevance, Judge. 
We haven't entered the document. Objection; parol. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, the relevance is 
as follows: I would proffer that Mr. Kimball's 
testimony will be that they offered $850,000 to 
purchase the building. They had a 30-day right to 
review all of the documents regarding the building and 
the condition, obtain the reports they wanted. As a 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. A 
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1 result of that, after the end of that review period, 
2 they reduced their purchase price to $750,000. That 
3 was their offer, to 750, which was accepted by the 
4 bank, and that's the final -- that is the final 
5 agreement that was entered into, the purchase price of 
6 750. 
7 I would also proffer that Mr. Kimball's 
8 testimony will be that in the course of that, they 
9 reviewed in detail various leases, one of which was 
10 Mr. Martineau's leases -- Mr. Martineau's lease. And 
11 as a result of the review, they determined to lower 
12 the purchase price because they didn't think that the 
13 leases were as advantageous as they thought they were 
14 when they made the $850,000 offer. 
15 THE COURT: I'll allow you to go ahead, 
16 counsel. 
17 MR. JONES: Thank you. 
18 BY MR. JONES: 
19 Q. Now, you offered to buy the building for 
20 $850,000; is that correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And that offer would have included a down 
23 payment of $170,000? 
24 A. If I remember right. I can't -- seems 
25 like that's what it was. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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Q. Or about 20 percent of the purchase price? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. And the bank, then, would finance the 
unpaid portion over a longer term; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, at the time you made that offer, you 
were aware that the foreclosure proceeding was 
commencing and that Mr. Martineau was a defendant? 
A. Well, no. I didn't know about Mr. 
Martineau then. 
Q. Well, I think you said that -- you said 
before the break that during the first week of March 
you learned that Mr. Martineau was a defendant in the 
lawsuit, and you testified, or I asked you if you 
didn't make an offer on or about March 16 of 1993, and 
you said you did. So that at the time you made the 
offer, you knew then that Mr. Martineau was a 
defendant in the lawsuit that had been brought by 
Republic to foreclose the trust deed. 
A. Well, I didn't know if he was actually in 
the foreclosure. I knew that there was some problem 
they had had with Lee Martineau, but I didn't know it 
was a foreclosure from him. I knew that the property 
was in foreclosure. 
Q. So you don't recall your testimony prior 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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to the noon hour? 
MR. OLSEN: Objection. Argumentative. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. When you made the offer on March 16th, you 
expressly reserved the right to instruct the bank 
which leases would or would not be foreclosed in the 
foreclosure proceeding, didn't you? 
MR. OLSEN: Judge, may I have a continuing 
objection? I suppose your ruling carries throughout 
this. We're talking about preliminary offers. We 
have a final agreement in evidence. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. OLSEN: Can I have a continuing 
objection? 
THE COURT: You may. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Let me direct your attention, if I may, to 
Exhibit D-13. Can you identify Exhibit D-13? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that your signature at the bottom of 
the second page dated March 16, 1993? 
A. Yes, it is . 
Q. And is this the document you utilized 
prepared by Mr. Hill in order to make your proposal to 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 purchase the property at $850,000 to Republic Savings 
2 and Loan? 
3 A. Yes, with the intent to really continue 
4 further negotiations with the bank. 
5 Q. Did you include in paragraph 8 a provision 
6 that would allow you to specify which tenants were 
7 included in the foreclosure proceedings? 
8 A. Well, I think the idea there, and this is 
9 why --
10 MR. JONES: Well, your Honor, I'll move 
11 again for the admission of Defendant's Exhibit 13 in 
12 order that we can refer specifically to the language 
13 and not have him speculate or discuss it without the 
14 Court having the opportunity to review it. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Olsen? 
16 MR. OLSEN: I object on the issue of 
17 parol, your Honor, if there's an integrated document, 
18 and on relevance. 
19 THE COURT: He makes a good point. I've 
20 allowed you to go quite a ways, counsel, but 
21 preliminary negotiations, we have an agreement that we 
22 entered into on what can be relevant. 
23 MR. OLSEN: I understand, your Honor. The 
24 relevance relates to the estoppel argument that we've 
25 already presented to the Court. That is, at this 
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point in time he'd spoken to Mr. Martineau. He'd 
already told Mr. Martineau, according to Mr. Hill's 
testimony, that he intended to foreclose him out, and 
he included language in here that would prevent --
that would give him that option, that would allow him 
to control that as it went forward. It is written 
evidence signed by him confirming that he did not 
intend, or at least he was retaining for himself the 
right to determine who got foreclosed and who didn't. 
So it's clearly relevant as to our estoppel argument. 
I recognize, and again we're not saying 
that this -- we're not arguing that this document 
varies the final terms. They are as they are with 
regard to Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 19. But this 
sets forth, this verifies or ratifies the testimony 
that Mr. Hill gave us with regard to Mr. Kimball's 
statement that he didn't intend to foreclose out Mr. 
Martineau. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. 
MR. JONES: Is this exhibit, then, 
received, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JONES: Thank you. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Let me direct your attention specifically 
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to paragraph 8 of Defendant's Exhibit D-13 and have 
you read that. 
A, "No lease shall be foreclosed unless 
otherwise specified by the buyer." 
Q. And you read that before you signed this 
offer; did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Kimball, you were aware of that 
provision? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you included that provision in this 
offer to Republic specifically so you could follow 
through on your promise to Mr. Martineau that he would 
not be foreclosed out if you acquired the property; is 
that correct? 
A. No. 
MR. OLSEN: Objection; leading. Objection 
to the use of the word "promise." Misstates the 
testimony. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: No, that's not correct. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. So you included that, then, so you would 
have the option to foreclose him out and utilize that 
to improve your position with regard to Mr. 
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Martineau's lease? 
A. Well, first I never saw this lease at the 
time. I never saw Mr. Martineau's lease. I never --
it was never my intention, as Mr. Hill and Mr. 
Martineau put it, that they're trying to kick everyone 
out of the building. That wasn't our intention. Our 
intention was to lease out the building, to put money 
in to improve the building. My partner, Danny Miller, 
was going to do the due diligence in reviewing the 
leases. My job was to do the due diligence on the 
building, on the function of the building. But this 
is probably, this language right here, was really, or 
this agreement right here was really in the form of a 
negotiation for the bank with us to try to tie down 
the building to see where we go from there. 
Q. Did you think this language had no effect, 
didn't mean anything, Mr. Kimball? 
A. Didn't really mean anything to me. 
Q. I see. So you didn't know what the 
language --
A. It was subject to me approving the leases. 
Q. You didn't mean anything by this language 
at all? 
A. Huh-uh (negative). What should I mean by 
it? 
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1 Q. It's in your document that you signed. 
2 That's what I'd like to know. What did you mean by 
3 it? 
4 A. Well, Harold Hill wrote this up, and I 
5 felt like this was an agreement that was as a form of 
6 negotiation to start with for whomever had the 
7 building, the lender or Harold Hill, to see where we 
8 went from here. 
9 Q. When you read this language, and you 
10 testified -- correct me if I'm wrong -- you did 
11 testify that you read it before you signed it, 
12 correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. You understood, then, when you read it 
15 that you would have control, if the bank accepted your 
16 offer, over which leases were foreclosed and which 
17 leases weren't? 
18 A. I didn't know what I'd have control over. 
19 Q. You didn't understand that that language 
20 gave you that authority or gave you that power? 
21 A. Well, I thought it was mainly between me 
22 and Harold Hill, as far as what was specified. I 
23 didn't know who had control over the building at that 
24 point. 
25 Q. Isn't your letter addressed to Mr. Dennis 
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1 Bush at Republic Savings? 
2 A. Yes, it is. 
3 Q. And isn't this as set forth in paragraph 
4 1, the purchase price of $850,000, offered to Republic 
5 Savings? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And so you knew when you signed this 
8 letter that you were dealing with Mr. Bush on behalf 
9 of Republic Savings, correct? 
10 A. I knew I had to go through Mr. Bush, yes. 
11 Q. And it was your intent in submitting this 
12 letter to him to make an offer to buy the building 
13 from Republic Savings for $850,000, correct? 
14 A. I didn't know if it was going to be 
15 actually bought from Republic or bought from Mr. 
16 Harold Hill. I didn't understand the legality of 
17 where it went. 
18 Q. But your intent was to buy the building? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And your intent was to submit an offer for 
21 $850,000? 
22 A. That's correct. 
23 Q. And your intent was also to control the 
24 foreclosure process as it related to tenants in the 
25 building? 
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1 A. Well, again, I didn't really -- I wasn't 
2 really too concerned about it personally, because that 
3 was going be part of the due diligence, and I wasn't 
4 really privy, or not privy, but I wasn't too concerned 
5 about getting involved in all of the leases. That was 
6 going to be --
7 Q. I'm not asking you what your division of 
8 labor was between and you Mr. Miller. 
9 A. Okay. 
10 Q. I'm asking you: When you signed this, and 
11 by the language in paragraph 8, you intended to 
12 control who would be included in the foreclosure 
13 process as the potential buyer of the building; isn't 
14 that correct, Mr. Kimball? 
15 A. You know, you asked the question that I 
16 have control or my intent was to have control of all 
17 the leases in this building. I guess I could say yes, 
18 and if, in fact, I saw the leases, I could have 
19 control over that, yes. 
20 Q. You expected when you acquired the 
21 building to acquire the leases, didn't you, Mr. 
22 Kimball? 
23 A. Yes, I did. 
24 Q. So you expected, once you acquired them, 
25 to exercise control over the leases? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And so certainly when you were making the 
3 offer, you didn't intend for the bank to foreclose 
4 someone out that you wanted to keep in the building, 
5 did you? 
6 A. No, I didn't. 
7 Q. So by this language, then, you intended to 
8 have control over who would be included in the 
9 foreclosure process among the tenants? 
10 A. Okay. Yes. 
11 Q. And thus you have the ability, then, to 
12 honor your promise to Mr. Martineau that his lease 
13 would not be foreclosed out? 
14 MR. OLSEN: Objection on the question. It 
15 misstates the testimony, Judge. It characterizes a 
16 promise of which there is none and there's no evidence 
17 of a promise. 
18 THE COURT: Sustained. 
19 BY MR. JONES: 
20 Q. You never requested that Republic add any 
21 other tenant in the building as a defendant in the 
22 foreclosure, did you? 
23 A. I never intended Republic to add? 
24 Q. You never requested Republic to add any of 
25 the other tenants as defendants in the foreclosure 
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action? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Prior to the time that you acquired the 
rights in this action? 
A. No. 
Q. And since the time you acquired the rights 
in this action, you've not seen to amend the complaint 
to add any other tenants as party defendants, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, you said there was an inspection 
period and you had some time to inspect the property; 
is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. What was the purpose of that? 
A. To do the standard due diligence that the 
property was, in fact, what they represented, and the 
leases. That's why you had an estoppel. 
Q. And you, then, or your partner received 
that information and you reviewed it, correct? 
A. Yes, he reviewed the leases. 
Q. And as a result of that review, you went 
back to Republic and you said we're going to reduce 
our offer to $750,000? 
A. That's not correct. 
Q. Is that not correct? 
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A. That's not correct. That wasn't based on 
the leases. 
Q. What was it based on? 
A. Basically it was based on representations. 
They came in, another bank acquired the Republic Bank, 
which was TCF Bank. They came in. They wanted more 
money down. They wanted to sell the building as is, 
whereas before they were representing that they would 
do certain things with the building, the roof, bring 
it up to the ADA, American Disabilities Act, fire and 
safety. We assumed that risk to take it as is so that 
they didn't have any liability, and in effect that's 
how we came to that price. 
Q. Where does it say in Exhibit 13 that they 
would bring it up to ADA? Where does it say that you 
wouldn't take the building as is? 
A. I'm sorry? Where? 
Q. Exhibit 13 is the offer that you've just 
been looking at. 
A. Oh, this had nothing to do with it. This 
has nothing to do with the negotiations then. This 
was later. 
Q. Let me understand your testimony 
correctly. At the time you made this offer, it's your 
testimony that you didn't have the leases? 
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A. Didn't have the leases. Didn't know 
anything about the building. 
Q. And you offered $850,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Not knowing anything about the building? 
A. That's correct. Basically a quick 
look-see to see that the value looked like it was 
there. And it was worth it to get into it, to draw up 
an earnest money with a 30-day money back, basically. 
It wasn't that -- it was a good faith on the buyer and 
seller to see if the building would fit our needs and 
if we fit their needs. 
Q. After you entered into negotiations, you 
did get the leases and you did review the leases? 
A. That's correct. Mr. Miller did. I 
didn't. 
Q. And after you'd reviewed the leases, you 
signed an agreement with Judge Building Associates, 
and TCF Bank of Wisconsin, which is Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 19, on May 28, 1993, in which the purchase 
price was going to be $750,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me ask you about the structure of the 
transaction as it ultimately closed. You and Mr. 
Miller agreed to acquire a title to the property and 
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agreed to acquire the note and the Deed of Trust in 
consideration for payment of $750,000; is that 
correct? 
A. Well, yes. 
Q. Did any portion of your purchase price go 
to Judge Building Associates? 
A. None of mine. They paid a commission. Is 
that what you're referring to? 
Q. No, I'm not referring to commissions. Did 
any portion of the purchase price go to Judge Building 
Associates in consideration of receiving a deed? 
MR. OLSEN: I'm going to object. That 
calls for a legal conclusion. Judge Building 
Associates is getting out of its indebtedness, and to 
ask him where it went, he had an agreement, he paid 
$750,000. The agreement speaks for itself. 
MR. JONES: Well, he may know whether they 
received money or not. 
THE COURT: If he knows, he can answer. 
THE WITNESS: Not to my knowledge. I 
don't know. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. You also agreed that Hill and Martineau 
would be released from liability under the Deed of 
Trust and the note, correct? 
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A. That's correct. That's why Harold called 
them. 
Q. And you agreed that they'd be dismissed as 
defendants in this action, correct? 
A. I assumed they would, yes. 
Q. You also agreed to sign a new Deed of 
Trust in favor of the bank to finance the $550,000 
portion of the purchase price, which was unpaid at 
closing; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you also agreed to subordinate that 
Deed of Trust -- excuse me -- subordinate the Deed 
of Trust which is the subject of this action, to that 
new $550,000 Deed of Trust; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And in order to do that, in order to do 
those things, you executed various documents in favor 
of the bank, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me have you first look at what has 
been marked as Defendant's Exhibit Number 5. Can you 
identify that? 
A. It states it's a Deed of Trust Assignment 
of Rents and Security Agreement. 
Q. Is it dated June 21, 1993? 
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A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And is it executed on page 22 by you and 
Mr. Miller? 
A. Yes. 
MR. OLSEN: Judge, we'll stipulate to the 
admission of 5, 7 and 8. 
THE COURT: Very well. Are you going to 
offer them, counsel? 
MR. JONES: I am, your Honor. 
THE COURT: They will be received. 
MR. JONES: Exhibit Number 7, your Honor, 
is an assignment dated June 18, 1993, and Exhibit 
Number 8 is a subordinated agreement also dated June 
18th. Excuse me, I misspoke. That's the 18th as 
well. Exhibit 8, D-8 is a subordination agreement 
dated June 18, 1993. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. You executed each of those documents; is 
that correct, Mr. Kimball? Except I believe you did 
not execute the assignment, which is 8; is that 
correct? 
A. Not the assignment. 
THE COURT: Which is which? It's not 8, 
is it? 
MR. OLSEN: 7. 
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MR, JONES: 7, your Honor, is the 
assignment from the bank of the Deed of Trust, which 
is the subject of this foreclosure action. 
THE COURT: You said 8. I think you meant 
7 . 
MR. JONES: 7, yes, I'm sorry. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Now, as additional collateral to the bank 
in order to secure the $550,000 loan, you also 
executed an assignment of all of your interest in the 
tenant leases in the Judge Building, didn't you? 
A. Yes. I can't remember, but yeah, 
probably. 
THE COURT: This would be Exhibit Number? 
MR. JONES: Exhibit Number 6, your Honor, 
D-6, which is an assignment of leases. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Olsen? 
MR. OLSEN: No objection. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. With regard to Exhibit D-6, let me ask you 
one preliminary question. In the course of doing 
this, executing all of these documents whereby you 
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would acquire the Deed of Trust, which is the subject 
of this action, you would give the new trust deed and 
you would subordinate it to the old trust deed, and 
you would also assign the leases as collateral 
security for the debt. You attempted to preserve your 
right to foreclose Mr. Martineau's lease, didn't you? 
MR. OLSEN: Objection. The question is 
compound and misstates the documents in evidence. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure how that 
misstates the documents. You intended to just refer 
to these that are in evidence; did you not? 
MR. JONES: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Restate the question, please. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. In connection with the closing where you 
were giving the trust deeds, subordinating them to 
older trust deeds, subordinating it to an older trust 
deed and assigning your leases, during the course of 
all that, you also intended to do what was necessary 
to preserve your right to foreclose or protect Mr. 
Martineau with regard to his lease, correct? 
MR. OLSEN: Objection; it's a compound 
question. The one question was foreclose, the other 
is protect. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
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1 BY MR. JONES: 
2 Q. You executed documents preserving to you 
3 the right to proceed with the foreclosure of Mr. 
4 Martineau's lease; is that correct? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 MR. JONES: And I believe, your Honor, 
7 that they have already been offered. 
8 THE WITNESS: That was a requirement from 
9 the bank. 
10 MR. JONES: Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 22. 
11 Do you have 22 there? P-22? 
12 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
13 BY MR. JONES: 
14 Q. Now, I'm going to direct your attention to 
15 paragraph 2 in Exhibit P-22, found at the top of the 
16 second page. Would you read that? You don't have to 
17 read it out loud, but just review that. 
18 A. Number 2? 
19 Q. Yes. 
20 A. Okay. Okay. 
21 Q. You've read that? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Did you initial that paragraph? 
24 A. Yes, I did. 
25 Q. The changes that say -- the change from 
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1 six months to nine months? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And added the phrase, "use its best 
4 efforts to"? 
5 A- Yes. 
6 Q. Now, you recorded or caused to be recorded 
7 the assignment, the trust deed and the subordination 
8 agreements, which are Defendant's Exhibits 5, 7 and 8; 
9 is that correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Did you ever record this letter or cause 
12 to be recorded this letter, which is Plaintiff's 
13 Exhibit 22? 
14 A. I don't think -- I'm not sure if the 
15 letter was recorded. I think that language, I 
16 remember, was in the purchase agreement. 
17 Q. This was never recorded, was it? 
18 A. I don't believe it was. I don't know. 
19 Q. Now, the offer that was accepted by 
20 Republic required Republic to produce tenant estoppel 
21 certificates for your review, didn't it? 
22 A. I believe so. 
23 Q. And you received that, those certificates, 
24 before closing, didn't you? 
25 A. Yes. 
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Q. And did you personally review those 
tenants' estoppel certificates, Mr. Kimball? 
A. You know, I really didn't. I didn't 
personally review them. 
Q. Do you know if Mr. Miller reviewed them? 
A. I believe he did. 
Q. Now, as a result of the execution and 
delivery of these documents, the trust deed, the 
subordination agreement, the assignment of leases, and 
your receipt of the assignment of this, of the Deed of 
Trust, which is the foreclosure in this action, both 
you and Mr. Miller owned both title to the property as 
well as the trust deed, which is the subject of the 
foreclosure, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as a result, don't you and Mr. Miller 
consider yourselves to be the landlords with regard to 
tenants in the Judge Building? 
MR. OLSEN: Objection. Calls for a legal 
conclusion. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Don't you and Mr. Miller consider 
yourselves to be the landlords of the tenants in the 
Judge Building? 
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1 A. Yes, we do. 
2 Q. And since June of '93, have you and Mr. 
3 Miller assumed the responsibilities of the landlord to 
4 the tenants in the Judge Building? 
5 A. We have. 
6 Q. Do you consider yourself bound by the 
7 terms of the written leases which existed in June of 
8 1993, at the time you acquired the building? 
9 A. I think we do, all except for the 
10 Martineau lease. 
11 Q. You don't consider yourself bound by the 
12 Martineau lease? 
13 A. We don't. I don't. 
14 Q. Have you refused to perform services as 
15 requested by Mr. Martineau or anyone in his staff 
16 since June of '93? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Have you refused to allow them access to 
19 their space since June of '93? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. In fact, since June of '93, you've 
22 performed all of the services that they have required 
23 since they occupied that space? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And since June of '93, they've made all of 
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the payments that were due and owing under the lease, 
haven't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you've accepted all of those payments? 
A, Yes. 
Q. And you've never returned any of those 
payments or refused to accept them, have you? 
A. No, although he didn't pay his increase. 
So he is technically in default on that, I guess. But 
it's pretty minor, so we never . . . 
Q. Since June of '93 and with regard to the 
Martineau lease, have you ever indicated to Mr. 
Martineau or anyone that you didn't consider yourself 
to be his landlord with regard to that lease? 
A. Well, I think he's very much aware that we 
continually tried to continue some negotiations to 
execute a new lease. And we didn't want to be deemed 
as a landlord, if you want to use that expression. 
But during this negotiation we were continuing this 
legal aspect as well. The bank requested it. 
Q. But in these negotiations, you were 
negotiating as landlord of the building, weren't you? 
A. I was. 
Q. And you were negotiating as owner of the 
building, weren't you? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And you were negotiating with the person 
who was a tenant who was occupying space? 
A. That's correct, 
Q. And who was paying you rent? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you provided all of the services under 
the lease that his lease called for expressly? 
A. Yes. 
Q, And he was paying you? 
A. Well, I'm not sure what his lease really 
called for expressly. 
Q. Have you never reviewed --
MR. OLSEN: Objection. This has been 
asked and answered. We've been through it three 
times. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Have you ever reviewed Mr. Martineau's 
lease? 
A. Very briefly. 
Q. With regard to Mr. Martineau's lease, are 
you familiar with the provisions of paragraph 33-B? 
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A. I'm not familiar with that. 
Q. So you've never reviewed that? 
A. I looked at the amount and the terms and 
the length of the lease. 
Q. Since June of '93, if Mr. Martineau had 
not paid his rent, was it your understanding that you 
had the right to evict him from the premises and then 
pursue him for whatever the unpaid rent was under the 
lease? 
MR. OLSEN: Objection; relevance. 
THE COURT: Sustained 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Since June of '93, if you had refused to 
provide services to Mr. Martineau, was it your 
understanding that you would have been in default with 
regard to your obligations? 
MR. OLSEN: Objection; relevance. 
Objection; speculation. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, it's clearly 
relevant as to his understanding of what his 
relationship is and how he's treated them. We have, 
again, our argument to the Court is it is unfair and 
inequitable for them on the one hand to treat them as 
tenants, to accept the rent, and in every fashion act 
as if they are tenants in the building, and including 
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providing all the tenants' services, and on the other 
hand tell them that they are going to foreclose them 
out and they're going to extinguish their rights 
because they're junior and inferior. 
THE COURT: You can certainly argue that 
on the basis of the record now. You don't have to go 
into what his understanding about the obligation under 
the lease was. 
MR. JONES: I'll do so. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Since January of '93, well, let me 
rephrase the question. You've testified that you 
signed at the time of the closing -- or excuse me --
that you accepted -- I apologize. At the time of 
closing, you signed in favor of the bank an assignment 
of leases, which is Defendant's Exhibit Number 6, D-6, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you signed that Exhibit, D-6, did you 
review it? 
A. Well, I looked at this as between us and 
the bank and it didn't have anything to do with 
Martineau. So my partner, Danny Miller, went through 
this quite extensively, so I wasn't really too 
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concerned to review it. So the answer is I really 
didn't review it. 
Q. So you didn't read it? 
A. I didn't really read it. 
Q. You didn't read paragraph 2, found on the 
very first page, specifically 2-A or 2-D found at the 
top of page 2? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you never read those provisions? 
A. I didn't, since it was between us 
and 
Q. This was, however, a document that was 
required by the bank in order that you could get the 
financing from them, correct? 
A. Well, I assume it was, because everything, 
every document we have in here was required by the 
bank. 
Q. Now, inasmuch as you and Mr. Miller are in 
a position of being both the landlord and trust deed 
holder on the property, you find yourself in a 
favorable position to allow Mr. Martineau to stay in 
the building under the lease rates of the lease, under 
the terms of the lease and at the rates that he's now 
at, don't you? 
A. No. I mean, I guess I'm thinking of two 
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things here. Can you restate that question again, 
please? 
Q. Because you and Mr. Miller own both the 
property, have title to the property, and because 
you own the Deed of Trust, which is the subject of 
this action, you and Mr. Miller are in a favorable 
position --
THE COURT: Objection; relevance. 
THE COURT: Finish your question. Had you 
finished? 
MR. JONES: I had not. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. -- you and Mr. Miller are in a favorable 
position to determine that Mr. Martineau can stay in 
the building and occupy his space under the existing 
lease, aren't you? 
A. Well, we could. Yeah, we're in the 
position now. However --
Q. And you — 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. JONES: I'm sorry. 
THE WITNESS: Initially, and this is where 
we're going back to this purchase agreement where it 
states that -- where you pointed, and I can't remember 
what exhibit it is, but where we initialed six months 
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and nine months, we wanted -- the bank requested the 
six-month period to foreclose out Mr. Martineau. We 
wanted to extend it longer so we could try to 
renegotiate something with Mr. Martineau and not take 
such a drastic action. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. So it is your testimony that you are 
compelled to foreclose? 
A. We were, initially. I believe that the 
bank's position still is that we continue this. 
Q. And why? Why is that? 
A. Because the lease is really detrimental to 
the value of the security of the building. 
Q. And do you believe that? 
A. I do believe that. 
Q. I see. You don't want Mr. Martineau as a 
tenant in the building? 
A. No, I didn't say that. I'd like to have 
Mr. Martineau as a tenant. 
Q. But you want him as a tenant in the 
building in order that you can get a higher lease rate 
from him? 
A. Market value, yes. 
Q. And that's the only reason, isn't it? 
A. Pardon? 
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1 Q. That's the only reason that Mr. 
2 Martineau's lease is expressly described in these 
3 documents, and you have the right to proceed with this 
4 foreclosure action, is so you can try to get a higher 
5 lease rate out of Mr. Martineau? 
6 MR. OLSEN: I'm going to object; one, on 
7 relevance; two, the question is vague; three, it calls 
8 for speculation because there's a bank that's a party 
9 to this. The documents say what they say. Whatever 
10 the reasons are, that was the reason. I'm going to 
11 object to all this on the basis of parol. 
12 THE COURT: I'm not sure what you're 
13 getting at, counsel. I don't see the relevance is in 
14 question. 
15 MR. JONES: I'll withdraw the question, 
16 your Honor. No further questions. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Olsen? 
18 MR. OLSEN: I'll be brief, Judge. I need 
19 to mark Exhibit P-26. 
20 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. OLSEN: 
22 Q. Mr. Kimball, I show you what has been 
23 marked as Exhibit P-26. Mr. Jones was asking you 
24 questions about a document, this March 16th offer. He 
25 stopped with an offer. Was that offer accepted? 
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A. No, it wasn't. 
Q. Would you turn to the back two pages of 
Exhibit P-16. Do you recollect P-16? P-26, excuse 
me • 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that? 
A. Well, this is P-26. I'm sorry, did you 
say the back two pages? 
Q. What are the back two pages? 
A. It's the initial proposal that Harold Hill 
gave to me to give to, I guess, Republic. 
Q. Whose handwriting is all over that 
document? 
A. 
Q. 
accepted? 
A. 
Q. 
P-26? 
A. 
Q. 
bank? 
A. 
It's Ray Unrath from Wallace & Associates. 
Was that document, was your offer ever 
No, it wasn't. 
And was this the reply that you got back, 
Yes. Yes, it was. 
And Ray Unrath was a representative of the 
That's correct. 
MR. OLSEN: I'd move for the admission of 
P-26 . 
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MR. JONES: I'll object, your Honor. Lack 
of foundation. The document is not signed by Mr. 
Unrath. He's not here to testify that he even 
prepared it. It's not addressed to Mr. Kimball. It's 
addressed to Mr. Hill. It's not been signed and it 
doesn't bear Mr. Kimball's signature at any point. 
And he's testified it's not his handwriting. I don't 
think there's foundation. 
THE COURT: Mr. Olsen? 
MR. OLSEN: It's the goose and gander 
argument, Judge. They introduced the offer, which was 
parol, and what comes back to Mr. Kimball is what is 
being introduced now, and it specifically treats 
paragraph 8. We have an unaccepted offer now in 
evidence and he's objecting to the response that was 
delivered back to Mr. Kimball. 
THE COURT: I guess it's an authentication 
argument, counsel. 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. Do you recognize the handwriting on that 
document? 
A. Yes. Well, just that it was Ray Unrath 
that made the notes on it. 
Q. Where? The first two? 
A. Looks like he's wrote Ray Unrath where it 
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says Harold Hill. 
MR. JONES: May I voir dire, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Are you familiar with Mr. Unrath's 
handwriting? 
A. Yes, just not this. 
Q. Did you see him make any of these 
notations on this page? 
A. No, I didn't. No, I didn't. 
Q. Did you receive a copy of this directly 
from Mr. Unrath? 
A. I don't remember receiving a copy of this 
I received other notes from Ray Unrath, though. 
Q. Did he ever tell you that he made these 
notations ? 
A. I don't remember. 
MR. JONES: I would continue to object, 
your Honor, on the basis that he cannot authenticate 
this document. He's neither sufficiently familiar 
with his handwriting -- Mr. Unrath never told him 
that this was his handwriting -- nor was he present 
when this was made. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 
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MR. OLSEN: Judge, for time purposes, we 
can call Mr. Hill. I'm wondering if Mr. Jones will 
stipulate to the document. If you look at the top, 
you can see the fax is from Wallace & Associates. If 
you look at the cover page, you can see that it is 
Wallace & Associates letterhead, and you can see 
that's it's in my client's -- my client will testify 
it's in their files in the normal course of business, 
and this was sent back to them. 
Now, we can recall Mr. Hill to testify as 
to that or we can get Wallace & Associates in and put 
their business records into evidence. But if you look 
at the cover, if you look at the fax, that's clearly 
where it came from, and we'd ask for accommodation in 
order to move it along. 
MR. JONES: I don't want to make it 
difficult, your Honor, but I have never seen the 
document before, the second page with handwriting. 
Mr. Hill isn't here to talk to. I'd be happy to talk 
to him at such time as we can. But I, under these 
circumstances, couldn't agree to that because I don't 
have sufficient background knowledge or information 
with regard to this document. I've not seen this 
handwriting before. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 1 - 0 2 5 6 0 0 1 4 7 4 
MR. OLSEN: Judge, considering that, 
considering that we have an unsigned offer with the 
plaintiff's exhibit on March 16th, I think this points 
out the problem with putting an unsigned offer in. And 
I'd move to, again, renew my objection to the 
admission and ask the Court to reconsider that ruling 
on the March 16th document. 
THE COURT: You may be heard, Mr. Jones. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, we have Mr. 
Kimball here. He's told us he signed it. He's 
testified as to it. There's no reason, given the 
purpose for which we have offered it, that it should 
be withdrawn. 
THE COURT: This is strictly an 
authentication problem. I believe I'll sustain the 
objection. 
MR. JONES: I understand, judge. 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. Mr. Kimball, was your March 16th offer 
ever accepted? 
A. No, it wasn't. 
Q. Have you ever signed a lease with Mr. 
Martineau? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Do you have any signed agreement with Mr. 
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Martineau whatsoever? 
A. No. 
Q. Is there any signed agreement with Mr. 
Hill whereby the Martineau lease has been delivered to 
you or specifically assigned to you? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever signed an agreement in 
writing assuming the obligations under the Martineau 
lease? 
A. No. 
Q. You were also assigned the 1986 trustf 
deed; were you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that has a provision which allows for 
the collection of rents if there's a default on the 
trust deed obligation; does it not? 
A. Yes, I guess. 
Q. Now, they talked about the fact that 
you've been accepting rent from Mr. Martineau. How 
long have you been trying to get Mr. Martineau out of 
that building? 
A. Since before we closed, I guess, really. 
Q. And, in fact, a sale was scheduled in 
November of 1983; was it not? 
A. '93. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
Salt Lake City, Utah (801)531-0256 
1 Q. 1993. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. So the reason that you've been accepting 
4 rent is because there's an order pending this hearing 
5 which precludes you from proceeding with the 
6 foreclosure; is that correct? 
7 A. That's correct. 
8 MR. JONES: Objection; leading, your 
9 Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Sustained as to leading. 
11 MR. OLSEN: I don't have any further 
12 questions. Oh, one more question, Mr. Kimball. 
13 BY MR. OLSEN: 
14 Q. Earlier Mr. Jones had asked you about a 
15 conversation with Mr. Martineau where you had 
16 indicated that you did not want him out of the 
17 building. At any time prior to the time you purchased 
18 the building, did Mr. Martineau tell you that he was 
19 interested in purchasing the building? 
20 A. No, he didn't. He did mention or did say 
21 that at one time he wanted to buy the building. 
22 Q. When did he tell you that? 
23 A. He told that to -- I don't know exactly 
24 when he said it to me, but it was in one of the first 
25 meetings I had with him. Maybe Mr. Miller was there, 
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1 I can't remember. 
2 MR. OLSEN: I don't have any further 
3 questions, Judge. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Jones? 
5 MR. JONES: May I have just one moment, 
6 your Honor? 
7 I have no further questions. 
8 THE COURT: All right. You may step down, 
9 Mr. Kimball. Thank you. 
10 Call your next witness. 
11 MR. JONES: Mr. Miller, please, your 
12 Honor. 
13 (The witness was sworn.) 
14 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. JONES: 
16 Q. Mr. Miller, would you state your name and 
17 address for the record, please. 
18 A. Daniel A. Miller. My residence address? 
19 Q. Yes. 
20 A. 3604 Glen Ridge Drive, Sherman Oaks, 
21 California. 
22 Q. What is your occupation, Mr. Miller? 
23 A. I'm in real estate management, leasing and 
24 ownership. 
25 Q. Tell me first what your education is. Do 
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1 you have a college degree? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And from what university? 
4 A. UCLA, 
5 Q. And in what year did you obtain that 
6 degree? 
7 A. I graduated in 1965. 
8 Q. And in what area did you receive your 
9 degree? 
10 A. Business administration. 
11 Q. And you have a postgraduate degree? 
12 A. Yes. Law degree. 
13 Q. A law degree? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. When did you obtain that? 
16 A. 1968 . 
17 Q. From what institution? 
18 A. UCLA. 
19 Q. Subsequent to obtaining your law degree, 
20 did you have occasion to practice as a lawyer? 
21 A. I practiced for approximately ten years. 
22 Q. And in your practice as a lawyer, did you 
23 have a particular area of emphasis or specialty? 
24 A. I would say more business and real estate. 
25 Q. Since approximately 1978; is that 
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1 correct? When you ceased that practice? 
2 A. I did continue to practice in 1980. 
3 Q. Since 1980, then, you've been involved in 
4 the real estate business; is that correct? 
5 A. Yes, I have. 
6 Q. And would you describe generally since 
7 1980 the nature of the real estate business that 
8 you've engaged in. What kind of property or what kind 
9 of involvement? 
10 A. In the early '80s there were a couple of 
11 retail projects, but since the early '80s through the 
12 present, it's been exclusively office buildings in 
13 Utah. 
14 Q. Are most of the properties you own or 
15 manage located in Utah? 
16 A. They all are. 
17 Q. Do you own other properties with Mr. 
18 Kimball? 
19 A. One other. 
20 Q. And what property is that? 
21 A. It's a professional office building in 
22 Murray. 
23 Q. How did you become familiar with the 
24 opportunity to acquire the Judge Building? 
25 A. Mr. Kimball brought it to my attention. 
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Q. And approximately when did that occur? 
A. This would have been approximately 
sometime, I would say, mid-March of 1993. 
Q. And once the building had come to your 
attention, did you and Mr. Kimball strike some sort of 
agreement to proceed jointly to attempt to acquire the 
building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in that regard, did you assume some 
responsibilities as part of the due diligence process? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you describe to us what your 
responsibilities were? 
A. I primarily reviewed the operational 
records of the property and the leases of the 
property, as opposed to building conditions and 
inspections. That was more Mr. Kimball's function. 
Q. In that respect, then, did you have 
occasion to review the lease between Judge Building 
Associates and Martineau & Company? A copy of which 
has been marked as Defendant's Exhibit D-2, I 
believe. 
A* Excuse me. I just realized I left my 
glasses on the bench. If I may have those brought to 
me I would appreciate it. 
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(Mr. Miller's glasses were retrieved and given to 
him. ) 
Thank you. 
Q. Certainly. 
A. The question was whether I had the 
opportunity to review that lease? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you know when you reviewed the 
lease? 
A. I know approximately when. It would have 
been in April of 1963. 
Q. '93? 
Excuse me, 1993. It would have been after 
And how do you identify the date as April 
A. 
April 7. 
Q. 
7? 
A. After we opened escrow, we had the right 
to inspect documents, and I submitted a document 
request list for detailed documents on the Judge 
Building. That was dated April 7. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And sometime thereafter, I would say 
within approximately ten days, the documents were 
delivered to me to look at. 
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Q. And after you received them, how quickly 
did you proceed to review them? 
A. I would say within that day or the next 
day. There were time constraints on this purchase. 
We had a limited time in which to evaluate documents. 
It was a large purchase, so I gave it my attention. 
Q. And do you recall specifically reviewing 
the Martineau's lease at that time? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Did you review the provisions relating to 
the term of the lease, how long it went? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what the renewal options would be? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what the rate per square foot was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you also review the body of the lease; 
that is the specific provision relating to some of the 
other tenants' rights and obligations? 
A. Less so. In other words, when I found out 
that the lease went for 18 years at substantially 
below-market rent, did not pass on operating expenses 
as other leases had, my immediate response was that 
this lease was not a good lease for the building. And 
I communicated that to the parties we were dealing 
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with. 
Q. Who was that? 
A. That would have been Ray Unrath and Bob 
Merrill, the attorney for the lender. 
Q, Did you have occasion to review paragraph 
25 of the lease? 
A. 25? Sale by lessor? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Did you have occasion to review paragraph 
33, including specifically subparagraph B of paragraph 
33? 
A. I believe I did review that, yes. 
Q. And you reviewed it before you signed the 
real estate purchase agreement, a copy of which is 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-19? By the time you signed 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-19 in May of 1993, you had 
clearly reviewed by then the Martineau lease and 
provision 33-B of the lease, correct? 
A. That's correct, because the Martineau 
lease became a significant portion or part of the 
negotiations and the transaction, and I had 
substantial dealings with the attorneys for the bank 
as to how we were going to deal with the Martineau 
lease and the foreclosure of that lease. 
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Q. And your interest in dealing with the 
foreclosure was so that you and Mr. Kimball would be 
in a position to negotiate a higher or better lease 
rate with Mr. Martineau and not accept the lease as it 
was then written; correct, Mr. Miller? 
A. Not totally correct. Not the way you've 
expressed it. 
Q. How isn't it correct? 
A. Our position was that this lease, because 
it went 18 years, at the rate that went it was almost 
half the going rate, market rate at that time. And if 
you carried it out with the 1 percent annual increases 
for 18 years, you'll have a situation that the rental 
rate on that lease after 18 years is not even the same 
as what the market rate is today. So it was the 
longevity of the lease that was of major concern to 
me. The rental rate we felt we could in effect live 
with for a shorter period of time. And that's why as 
the negotiations ensued, I felt we were very 
reasonable in what we proposed to Mr. Martineau. 
Q. My question, Mr. Miller, was: You were 
concerned about an opportunity to be in a position to 
continue the foreclosure in order that you would have 
the ability to get higher or better lease terms that 
were more favorable to you out of Mr. Martineau, or to 
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1 foreclose him out of the property; is that correct? 
2 A. That's correct. We wanted a fairer lease. 
3 Q. And that's fairer by the way you have 
4 viewed that, correct? Something you view as a fairer 
5 lease? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. You don't have any reason to believe that 
8 Mr. Martineau didn't believe this was a fair lease, do 
9 you? 
10 A. I have no -- I'm sure he probably thought 
11 it was a fair lease. I don't know. If I may 
12 continue, I'm looking at it as a purchaser of a 
13 property in which the rates are probably half of the 
14 market rates and the lease is going to go out another 
15 15 years. 
16 Q. I've handed you what has been marked as 
17 Defendant's Exhibit 10. Can you identify that 
18 document, please? 
19 A. I'm sorry? Which? 
20 Q. Defendant's Exhibit 10. 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Can you identify that document? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. What is it? 
25 A* When we purchased the property --
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Q. If you'll just identify it. 
A. It's a letter from Mr. Richard Thurman of 
TCF Bank. 
Q. And it's dated March 15, 1994; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Does that bear your signature -- excuse 
me — at the bottom? 
A. That is my signature. 
Q. Daniel A. Miller? 
A. Yes. 
MR. JONES: We'd move for the admission of 
Defendant's Exhibit 10, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. OLSEN: Objection; relevance. 
Objection; parol. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, it's relevant as 
to what their intent was in terms of excluding Mr. 
Martineau's lease, isolating Mr. Martineau's lease and 
proceeding with the foreclosure. 
THE COURT: I'll receive it. 
MR. JONES: Thank you. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Now, as part of the purchase of this 
property, it was one of your requirements that the 
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lender deliver estoppel certificates to you; isn't 
that correct? 
A. On leases of a certain minimum size, we 
wanted estoppel statements to confirm the terms of the 
leases, that is correct. 
Q. in fact the agreement you signed said you 
would get estoppel certificates from all of the 
tenants? 
A. I don't believe so. I don't know. I 
think you had to be a certain square footage and size, 
and I think I then narrowed this to certain of what I 
would consider the major tenants of the building. You 
have to realize that almost every tenant was on a 
month-to-month tenancy, or their lease was due to 
expire within maybe a year or two or three, other than 
Mr. Martineau. 
Q. And were those estoppel certificates 
delivered to you at some time for your review? 
A. Yes, they were. 
Q. And you got them before the closing on 
this property in or about June or July, 1993, right? 
A. I received them before the closing, that 
is correct. 
Q. What was the purpose of the estoppel 
certificates ? 
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A. The purpose of the estoppel certificate is 
to basically confirm, at least to us, the rent 
payments that were being made by the tenants. And 
that if any of the tenants had any objections, such as 
the owner of the building wasn't meeting his 
obligations, the then-owners, we would know what we 
would be stepping into, so it would give us a better 
situation or understanding of the tenancy of the 
property, 
Q. And you received an estoppel certificate 
from Mr. Martineau, didn't you? 
A. Yes, we did. I did. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, we'd move for the 
admission of Defendant's Exhibit Number 11, which is 
the estoppel certificate. 
MR. OLSEN: No objection. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
MR. JONES: Thank you. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Do you recognize that document, Mr. 
Miller? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You wanted to know by way of that estoppel 
certificate that Mr. Martineau was paying his rent? 
A. No, that's not correct. I mean, that 
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would be one thing, but I was much more concerned with 
the handwritten notes on this document that said that 
he had an option on adjoining suites. That would 
concern me. And then when I saw that document, it 
concerned me more. 
Q. You certainly wanted to know that he was 
paying rent as provided in the estoppel certificate, 
correct? 
A. Yeah. I would want to know what his rent 
was. It confirms the terms of the lease. That, too. 
Q. And you also wanted to know if he thought 
there were any defaults by Judge Building Associates, 
wouldn't you? 
A. Yes, I would want to know that. 
Q. And your estoppel certificate addresses 
that, doesn't it? 
A. I'm not sure it does. This was not our 
form of estoppel, so I can't really address that. 
Q. Well, specifically paragraph 9 addresses 
the fact that the lessee will pay its obligations to 
the new landlord under the lease? 
A. Maybe I could stop you for a moment. We 
rejected this estoppel. This estoppel certificate was 
not satisfactory to us. 
Q. Did you receive a new estoppel 
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certificate? 
A. No. No, we did not. 
Q. Did you give anyone notice that you 
rejected it? 
A. Yes, the bank and Ray Unrath. First of 
all, it purported to give Mr. Martineau an option on 
adjoining space at the same low rate that he was 
already having, so we objected to that for that 
purpose. We objected to it on the purpose that there 
was a foreclosure already going on, and it was fully 
our intention to preserve those foreclosure rights, to 
either have the lender foreclose or give us an 
opportunity to foreclose. So in that sense, this 
estoppel was something that raised questions that we 
needed to deal with, and which we subsequently did 
deal with with the lender. 
Q. So your testimony is you didn't like some 
of the things that Mr. Martineau wrote in here; is 
that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you didn't have any objection, though, 
to his signing without any modification to paragraph 
number 9, though, did you? 
A. May I read it? Paragraph number 9 in a 
way was insignificant because of what was going on 
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with the foreclosure of Martineau. In other words, 
this is signed by Martineau. It's not signed by me. 
Q. So you didn't care about the promise that 
Mr. Martineau made in paragraph 9? 
A. Which promise is that? 
Q. The promise that he would pay all of his 
lease obligations? 
A. That was fine. I would assume that he 
would pay his rent as other tenants were paying their 
rent. 
Q. Because you considered him to be a tenant 
in the building at that time? 
A. At that time, until there was a 
foreclosure, his lease was in effect. 
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Martineau that you 
rejected this estoppel certificate? 
A, I don't think I ever discussed the 
estoppel certificate with Mr. Martineau. 
MR. JONES: No further questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Olsen? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. Mr. Miller, did you ever have discussions 
with Mr. Martineau on whether his lease was acceptable 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
Salt Lake City, Utah (801)531-0256 0 0 1 4 9 2 
to you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. When did those occur? 
A. Those would have occurred in April of 
1993. 
Q. Where did they occur? 
A. In his office. 
Q. Who was present? 
A. He and I. 
Q. What did you tell him? 
A. I told him that I considered his lease to 
be unacceptable in the present form. 
Q. Let me get right the issue. You're a 
lawyer, you did the documents. Did you intend that 
the trust deed be merged into the conveyance of title 
to you? 
MR. JONES: Objection, your Honor, the 
documents speak for themselves. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: There was no intention -- in 
fact, the intention was just the opposite. Everything 
was structured to specifically preserve the rights to 
foreclose on that lease. That was our intention, and 
I believe, at least I hope, that is what has actually 
happened. That was our intention. The parties to the 
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1 transaction all signed those documents, including us, 
2 including the bank. 
3 BY MR. OLSEN: 
4 Q. And since you acquired title to the 
5 property, have you made efforts to foreclose? 
6 A. Yes, we did. 
7 Q. And you had discussions with the bank 
8 about that foreclosure? 
9 A. Yes, we have, because under our agreement 
10 with the bank, there was a nine-month period in which 
11 to proceed -- excuse me -- to use our best efforts 
12 to foreclose that lease. 
13 Q. And have they consented to the foreclosure 
14 and proceeded? 
15 MR. JONES: Objection, your Honor; 
16 hearsay. 
17 THE COURT: Sustained. 
18 BY MR. OLSEN: 
19 Q. Have you ever been informed by them that 
20 you should not proceed with the foreclose? 
21 A. No. In fact, just the opposite. This 
22 exhibit that was shown to me, from the bank to me, was 
23 giving us an extension of time. In other words, there 
24 was this June 21st letter that was part of the loan 
25 documents. It was that letter that informed us of the 
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obligation of nine months to either foreclose or enter 
into a satisfactory lease. 
The nine months had expired, so we felt we 
wanted the approval of the bank to continue, and we 
requested it, and this was the response back from the 
bank saying that okay, you know, go ahead and still 
try to make a deal. 
Q. Have you ever signed an agreement with Mr. 
Martineau whereby you would honor the lease that he 
has on the property? 
A. No. 
Q. Has it always been your intention to 
foreclose? 
A. Yes. 
MR. OLSEN: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Jones? 
MR. JONES: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. Miller, 
thank you. 
Let's take a short recess at this time. 
Mr. Jones, time-wise, how are we doing? You have one 
more witness? 
MR. JONES: Mr. Martineau, and then we'll 
be done. 
THE COURT: We'll take a ten-minute 
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recess . 
(Recess) 
THE COURT: Call your next witness. 
MR. JONES: We call Mr. Lee Martineau, 
your Honor 
THE COURT: Mr. Martineau? 
(The witness was sworn.) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Mr. Martineau, would you state your name 
and address for the record, please. 
A. Yes. Leland, L-e-1-a-n-d, Arah, A-r-a-h, 
Martineau, M-a-r-t-i-n-e-a-u. 
Q. And your residence address? 
A. 3167 East Deer Creek Circle, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
Q. What's your occupation, Mr. Martineau? 
A. Certified Public Accountant. 
Q. And how long have you been engaged in that 
profession or practice? 
A. I've been engaged in that since 1965. 
I've been certified since 1968. 
Q. You're familiar with the lease which is at 
issue in this lawsuit? 
A. Yes . 
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1 Q. Have you made, to your knowledge, all of 
2 the payments that have been due and owing under the 
3 lease? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Now, prior to the time that the 
6 foreclosure commenced, who did you make those payments 
7 to? 
8 1 A. To Judge Building Associates. 
9 Q. Were you aware that at some time a 
10 receiver was appointed? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And after the receiver was appointed, who 
13 did you make the payments to? 
14 A. To Mr. David Jewkes. I believe it was --
15 there was an account set up for Wallace & Associates 
16 in favor of the bank. 
17 Q. And did you understand Mr. Jewkes to be 
18 the receiver of the property? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Now, at some point in time were you aware 
21 that the property was sold? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And after that sale, who did you make your 
24 payments to? 
25 A. To D.M. Properties, I believe it's called, 
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or Judge Building, to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball. 
Q. Since that time, have Mr. Miller and Mr. 
Kimball ever refused your payments? 
A. No. 
Q. Have they ever told you they should be 
made in any other fashion other than to them directly? 
A. No. 
Q. And where did you deliver the payments to? 
A. To their offices. 
Q. Where are there offices located? 
A. They're now in the Judge Building. 
Q. Has there ever been a time when they 
refused to provide you with services? 
A. No. 
Q. And, in fact, have they provided you all 
of the services you have requested under the terms of 
the lease? 
A. Yes . 
Q. Have they ever given you any notice 
indicating that you did not have any rights under the 
lease; that you didn't have rights under the lease? 
A. No. 
Q. And have they ever given you any notice 
that you should not ask them to perform services as 
the landlord under the lease? 
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A. No. Quite the contrary. They've sent us 
correspondence indicating we should request anything 
we needed from them. 
Q. And that correspondence was on their 
letterhead with regard to this building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you learn that there was a 
default by Judge Building Associates to Republic 
Savings and Loan? 
A. In December of 1991/ Mr. Hill advised me 
that he was behind on the lease payments -- or excuse 
me — mortgage payments to the bank and having 
trouble making those payments. 
Q. And at some point in time did you learn 
that there had been a foreclosure proceeding 
commenced? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes 
How did you learn of that? 
We received notice through the mail. 
I'm going to hand you what has been marked 
as Defendant's Exhibit Number D-14. Can you identify 
that document? 
A. Yes, I can. 
Q. What is it? 
A. This is a letter dated January 9th, 1992 
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addressed to the Judge Building tenants signed by Mr. 
Robert E. Merrill from Van Cott-Bagley, who 
represented Republic Capital Bank. 
MR. JONES: We move for the admission of 
Exhibit D-14, your Honor. 
MR. OLSEN: No objection. 
THE COURT: It is received. 
MR. JONES: Thank you. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. As a result of receiving this letter, did 
you have any concern that your lease on the building 
was in jeopardy? 
A. No. 
Q. And why is that? 
A. Because Mr. Merrill also sent a letter out 
to all the tenants that said none of the leases would 
be affected. 
Q. And is that, in fact, found in this letter 
about five lines down, or six lines down? 
A . Yes, it is. 
Q. And is that the sentence that reads: "It 
is not intended to disrupt your occupancy of space in 
the Judge Building"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Subsequent to the receipt of this --
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excuse me -- subsequent to the receipt of this 
letter, did you develop an interest in buying the 
Judge Building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when did that occur? 
A, Shortly after we learned of the 
foreclosure, Mr. Hill came to us and indicated that he 
was looking for potential buyers, and asked if we were 
interested. 
Q. Did you obtain information with regard to 
the building? 
A. Yes . 
Q. And what kind of information was that? 
A. I received information that Mr. Hill had 
put together in regard to the actual leases, the rent 
rolls, if you will, provisions contained in the leases 
and a brief package in regard to what the operating 
cash flows would and should be in the future. 
Q. And at some point in time did you yourself 
commence discussions with Republic Savings Bank about 
buying the building? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Approximately when did those discussions 
begin? 
A. The beginning of 1993, specifically in 
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1 February or March. 
2 Q. And who were you dealing with expressly? 
3 A. I was not dealing expressly with one 
4 person. I was dealing with Ray Unrath only because he 
5 sort of kept inserting himself between me and Mr. 
6 Dennis Bush, who was the bank officer in charge of 
7 this particular sale and this building. I was dealing 
8 directly with Mr. Bush, Dennis Bush, and also Mr. 
9 Unrath. 
10 Q. Do you recall receiving a telephone call 
11 from Mr. Miller and Mr. Hill in this time period? 
12 A. Not from Mr. Miller. 
13 Q. Excuse me, Mr. Kimball and Mr. Hill. I'm 
14 sorry, I misspoke. 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And do you recall about when that took 
17 place? 
18 A. Approximately the first week of March, if 
19 my recollection is to coincide with what David Kimball 
20 said. 
21 Q. And can you tell us where you were? 
22 A. In my office. 
23 Q. And were they there with you, or was it a 
24 telephone call? 
25 A. No, it was a telephone call. I understood 
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it to be a conference call. Mr. Hill indicated that 
he had David Kimball on the phone with us. 
Q. And can you tell me who spoke and what was 
said? 
A. Yes. I've known David Kimball for a long 
time, and we had a personal relationship, friendship 
from before. I don't recall that we had any 
substantial business dealings, but we may have done a 
little bit of work for Mr. Kimball. But we talked a 
little bit about tenants and then specifically I was 
asked of my impressions regarding the Judge Building. 
Mr. Hill and Mr. Kimball indicated that Mr. Kimball 
was interested in buying it, and he wanted to know 
what my impressions were of it, both as a tenant and 
otherwise. 
Q. What did you say? 
A. I told him I loved the building. I loved 
the space, I was very happy there. I liked it so much 
that I was even trying to buy it. 
Q. Was there anything else said in the 
telephone conversations? 
A. Yes. I indicated to Mr. Kimball that I 
was certainly happy to indicate to him my feelings 
about the building, but if he was going to become the 
buyer, was he going to foreclose my lease. 
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Q. And did he respond to that? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said, "No, I'm not in the habit of 
kicking tenants out. I'm in the habit of bringing 
tenants in." 
Q. Did Republic subsequently offer to sell 
the building to you for $850,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when did Republic make that offer? 
A. Approximately two or three days after my 
phone call with Mr. Kimball. 
Q. I'm going to hand you now what's been 
marked as Defendant's Exhibit 12, D-12. Can you 
identify that document? 
A. Yes, I can. 
Q. What is it? 
A. There is a fax copy of a letter of intent 
that was drafted by Mr. Unrath and faxed to Mr. Dennis 
Bush of Republic Capital Bank at my request for him to 
evidence in writing his offer to sell me the building 
for $850,000. 
MR. JONES: We move for the admission of 
Defendant's Exhibit 12, your Honor. 
MR. OLSEN: May I voir dire, your Honor? 
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THE COURT: You may. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q, There's some handwriting, Mr. Martineau, 
just above Republic Capital Bank. It says: "This 
agreement is not binding." 
A. Yes. 
Q. Whose writing is that? 
A. I assumed it to be Mr. Bush's. It was not 
mine. 
Q. Was it in this form that it came to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever sign this agreement? 
A. No. 
MR. OLSEN: I'll object on the basis of 
relevance. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, the relevance is 
very clear. 
MR. OLSEN: Do you want an argument, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JONES: The relevance, we believe, is 
very clear. Mr. Martineau is negotiating to purchase. 
He has the conversation with Mr. Kimball. Within 
several days thereafter, he receives a proposal from 
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the bank agreeing to sell or offering to sell the 
building to him for $850,000. He doesn't sign this or 
accept it because of the conversation with Mr. 
Kimball. This is evidence of how he changed his 
position in reliance upon Mr. Kimball's statement, so 
it's clearly relevant. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. How did this come to your attention? 
A. This was delivered to me by Mr. Ray 
Unrath. 
Q. And did you read the document when it 
came? 
A• Yes. 
Q. Did it set forth a price and terms that 
you had been negotiating to achieve with Republic? 
A. It was approximately $100,000 less in 
total purchase price. We had been talking in the 
realm of $950,000 prior to that. And as I was 
discussing certain aspects of the building and the 
status of the building with Mr. Bush, he indicated, 
look, I'm going to give you a great deal. It's 
$100,000 cheaper than anybody else is going to get, 
and I'll let you have it for 850, basically. And I'm 
paraphrasing. It certainly was more of a conversation 
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1 than that. And I then asked him to put that in 
2 writing for me. 
3 Q. And subsequent to that conversation, this 
4 arrived? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Did you ever sign it? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Why didn't you sign it? 
9 A. Because I'm a CPA, and what I do, I do 
10 very well, and I did not want to become a realtor or a 
11 landlord. And I was comfortable with becoming or 
12 staying just a tenant in this building. And if Mr. 
13 Kimball was going to buy it, and he had assured me 
14 that he would not be foreclosing my lease, I was very 
15 happy with that. 
16 Q. And did you subsequently, after making the 
17 decision not to accept this offer, did you 
18 subsequently learn that Mr. Kimball had made an offer 
19 that had been accepted by Republic? 
20 A. Yes. And I was told by Mr. Hill that, in 
21 fact, Mr. Kimball had reserved, in his understanding, 
22 reserved the right to not foreclose me out as he had 
23 promised. 
24 Q. I'm going to ask you if you recognize 
25 Defendant's Exhibit D-ll. 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, I do. 
And what is that? 
It's an estoppel certificate that we 
received in April of '93. 
Q. Does it bear your signature? 
A. It does. 
Q. And who asked you to sign this? 
A. It was delivered to us by Wallace & 
Associates, I believe, the trustee, and his office, 
acting for and in behalf of the lender. 
Q. The receiver, would that be Mr. Jewkes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you signed it; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you read it before you signed it? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And in reviewing specifically paragraph 9, 
did you have an understanding that if you signed it 
and the building was purchased by Mr. Kimball, that 
you would then have an obligation to make your lease 
payments to him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did anyone, including Mr. Miller or Mr. 
Kimball, ever get back to you and say that in any 
fashion this estoppel certificate was unacceptable? 
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A. No. 
MR. JONES: No further questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Olsen? Mr. Olsen, if you 
can move this so that counsel can see you. 
MR. OLSEN: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. Mr. Martineau, when you were asked by 
counsel, let me just get the time frames right and get 
some dates right. You said that you learned the 
building was in default in December of 1991, correct? 
A. Yes, I believe that's correct. 
Q. And then you said that January of 1992 you 
received a letter from Mr. Robert Merrill? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that letter was introduced into 
evidence, and in that letter you pointed out to the 
Court that Mr. Merrill had stated that the leases 
would not be disturbed; is that fair? 
A. It says: "It is not intended to disrupt 
your occupancy of space in the Judge Building." 
That's what the letter says. 
Q. And is that what you believed this whole 
time from the date of that letter through April of 
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1994 -- 1993? 
A. No. 
Q. It changed, didn't it? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. In fact, later, in February of 1992, you 
were joined as a defendant in the foreclosure action, 
weren't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were served on February 14th, 
1992, weren't you? 
A. I guess that's the date. It was 
approximately that same time, yes. 
Q. I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 
1. 
MR. OLSEN: Your Honor, I'd ask the Court 
to take judicial knowledge of the return of service, 
certificate of service. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, we'll certainly 
stipulate to its admission. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. So at that point in time, you realized 
that the bank was trying to foreclose your interest, 
didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And did you have counsel available to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you present this problem to them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That you were being foreclosed? 
A. Yes, I did. I reviewed that with my 
counsel. 
Q. Did anyone ever grant you an extension 
within which to file an answer in this case? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Did anyone grant you an extension saying 
you need not file a counterclaim in that case? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't do anything? 
A. No, I did something. I discussed it with 
my attorney, who informed me that the purpose of this 
foreclosure action was to determine if I was inferior 
to the first trust deed, and he indicated we were. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I want to 
interpose an objection. He's now testifying with 
regard to advice of counsel, and I don't think that's 
appropriate in this proceeding. It's attorney-client 
privilege. 
THE COURT: Well, that's certainly true, 
and I wouldn't want him to do that until he's had a 
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1 chance to discuss that with counsel. With that, I 
2 don't know if I can -- if that's an objection or just 
3 a note of caution for your client. 
4 MR. JONES: It's probably both, your 
5 Honor. 
6 BY MR. OLSEN: 
7 Q. Mr. Martineau, you had a very clear 
8 understanding shortly after you were served in this 
9 action that your lease was inferior to the Deed of 
10 Trust; did you not? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And you were aware of the language in the 
13 complaint that asked that your lease be extinguished, 
14 correct? 
15 A. I don't recall the exact language in the 
16 complaint. 
17 Q. But you read it? 
18 A. I did read it. 
19 Q. And you gave it to your attorney? 
20 A. Yeah, I did. 
21 Q. And after giving it to your attorney, you 
22 made a conscious decision not to answer or respond in 
23 this case, correct? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Now, your default in this action was taken 
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March 5th, 1993? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were aware that that default had been 
entered; were you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were aware that default judgment 
purported by its express terms to extinguish your 
interest in the property, correct? 
A, No. 
Q. Did you read the default judgment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You read all the words in the judgment? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What are the words: "On any execution, 
sale of the property pursuant to order of this Court 
in the above-entitled action, any interest or lien 
claimed by the defendant, Martineau & Company, shall 
be forthwith extinguished and terminated." What does 
that mean to you? 
A. Is that from the document? 
Q. From the default judgment itself. 
A. It means what it says. 
Q. But you admit having received a copy of 
that judgment? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And you admit having received it in the 
first part of March? 
A• Yes, sir. 
Q. Of '93. Now, after that time, you then 
had your conversation with David Kimball that you 
referred to, didn't you? 
A. Well, I'm not sure. The date of this is 
'93. 
Q. March 5th, 1993? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after this default was entered, you 
then had a conversation with Mr. Kimball? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after that conversation with Mr. 
Kimball, you had decided that you did not want to 
purchase the property. That's what you've testified 
to, correct? 
A. That I preferred to remain a tenant, yes 
Q. Now, when you talked to Mr. Kimball you 
didn't talk about the terms of your lease, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't talk about the length of the 
term? 
A. 
Q. 
No 
He didn't ask you not to try and buy the 
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1 property, did he? 
2 1 A. No. 
3 Q. In fact, you didn't even tell him in that 
4 conversation you were attempting to buy the property, 
5 did you? 
6 A. Yes, I did. 
7 Q. But he did not ask you not to proceed? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. And you didn't tell him that you would 
10 dissuade from buying it if you could have a lease, did 
11 you? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. It wasn't even discussed? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Now, there came a time -- at the time you 
16 had the conversation with Mr. Kimball, you knew that 
17 the bank wanted you out of the property, didn't you? 
18 A. I knew Ray Unrath wanted me out of the 
19 property. 
20 Q. And he was a representative of the bank? 
21 A. He was a real estate agent. I'm not sure 
22 just how good of an agent he was for the bank, but he 
23 did represent them. 
24 Q. But he told you pretty clearly the bank 
25 wanted you out? 
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1 A. Not that it wanted me out, sir. He did 
2 not say that. He said that he wanted to renegotiate 
3 the lease. 
4 Q. He said the lease in its present form was 
5 unacceptable to the bank, correct? 
6 A. I guess. I guess that's fairly 
7 characteristic of what he said. 
8 Q. And you also discussed with him that your 
9 lease was inferior to the security position of the 
10 bank, correct? 
11 A. I didn't discuss that with Ray Unrath, no. 
12 Q. But you knew that? 
13 A. Yes, I did. 
14 Q. And understood it? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Now, within two weeks after your 
17 conversation with Mr. Kimball, Mr. Hill testified that 
18 you were told that your lease was unacceptable to Mr. 
19 Kimball and Mr. Miller. You heard that testimony? 
20 A. I heard that testimony. The time frame 
21 was incorrect. 
22 Q. How is it incorrect? 
23 A. Well, I did not hear that my lease was 
24 unacceptable to Mr. Kimball until I was told that 
25 either by Mr. Kimball or Mr. Miller when they came to 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
Salt Lake City, Utah (801)531-0256 0 0 1 5 1 6 
my office. But that was sometime in the mid or latter 
part of April. 
Q. So now we're talking about four weeks? 
A. Or six. 
Q. Four to six weeks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So at this point in time you have a 
default judgment entered March 5th, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And within four to six weeks, by your 
testimony, and two weeks by Mr. Hill's testimony, you 
learned that your lease was unacceptable, correct? 
A. To Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball, yes. 
Q. And at that point in time you knew one of 
two things, didn't you? You knew that they would 
either foreclose your interest or you'd have to enter 
into a lease that was satisfactory, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your lease as it was just wasn't going to 
work with them? 
A. That's what they told me. 
Q. So we take that time period. That now 
takes us at the very latest through the middle of 
April. 
A. Or the third week of April, yes. 
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Q. Third week of April. At that point in 
time you had had conversations with Mr. Kimball. You 
knew what he said about foreclosing, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then you knew that they intended to 
foreclose, right? 
A. Yes . 
Q. Now, why did you wait until October of 
1994, which is 15 months, to move to set aside that 
default judgment? 
A. You'll have to ask my attorney that, sir. 
MR. JONES: Objection, your Honor. 
MR. OLSEN: But you admit --
THE COURT: There's been an objection, Mr. 
Olsen. State your objection. 
MR. JONES: Relevance, your Honor. It has 
nothing to do with -- when he moved to have the 
default judgment set aside has nothing to do with our 
motion for issuance of the preliminary injunction. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. Mr. Martineau, isn't it true that you took 
no efforts to set aside this default judgment until 
October of 1994? 
A. I assume that's when the motion was made, 
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yes . 
Q. Now, when the default judgment was entered 
in this case, you realized that you had no right to a 
possessory interest in the property, correct? 
A. I -- I 
MR. JONES: Objection, your Honor. I 
think that calls for a legal conclusion. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q. Mr. Martineau, in any proceeding or any 
paper that you were aware of prior to today's 
testimony, are you aware of ever raising before this 
Court that Mr. Kimball made a misrepresentation to you 
and you relied on it? 
A. A misrepresentation? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't know. 
Q. At any time. What I'm hearing today is 
the first time we've heard it. At any time in any 
proceeding in this Court or elsewhere, are you aware 
that you have raised the argument you're attempting to 
make now? 
A. I don't know when it was raised, but it's 
true. That conversation did take place, and what I 
have related to this Court today is the absolute 
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truth. That's what was said. 
MR. OLSEN: I don't have any further 
questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones? 
MR. JONES: No further questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. 
Martineau. Thank you. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I think we're 
prepared to rest. I just want to make sure quickly 
that we have all of the exhibits received that I 
believe have been offered. And if I'm not mistaken, I 
know Defendant's Exhibits 1 through 14 have all been 
admitted or received. And I believe those are the 
only ones we have offered. 
THE CLERK: I don't have either of 3 or 9. 
I don't have a ruling on 12. 
MR. JONES: Excuse me. 3 was not offered. 
I'm sorry, Pat. 3 was not offered. 9 was not 
offered. I think those were the only two that I have 
that were not offered because the plaintiff offered to 
stipulate. 
THE COURT: So you're not going to offer 
19? 
MR. JONES: No. Those exhibits, your 
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Honor, that we have marked are represented by 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 19. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE CLERK: Was 12 received? 
THE COURT: What is the issue? 
MR. OLSEN: I don' think there's an issue. 
He was just checking to see if they were received. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE CLERK: I don't have 12 received. 
MR. JONES: 12 was. That's the letter of 
intent. 
THE COURT: Did you have an objection to 
MR. OLSEN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Received. 
MR. OLSEN: It was received over my 
objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLSEN: We would move for the 
admission of P-2, which is the default judgment. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Jones? 
MR. JONES: None, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
Do you rest? 
MR. JONES: We do. 
12? 
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1 MR. OLSEN: Your Honor, at this point in 
2 time we'd like to make a motion pursuant Rule 41-B to 
3 dismiss the claims brought by the defendant, 
4 Martineau. He's moved to set aside the default 
5 judgment. At this point he's shown no basis that it 
6 can be set aside, he's shown no meritorious defense. 
7 He's shown no reason for the delay in bringing it, and 
8 the rule provides that it must be brought within 90 
9 days. He testified that at the latest he clearly knew 
10 all the facts by mid-April. It was brought 16 months 
11 after that point. 
12 In addition, equitable grounds that are 
13 raised are as insufficient as they are untimely. And 
14 those grounds themselves are not inequitable. The 
15 basis they are raising is that there was a 
16 foreclosure. There was an attempted foreclosure. 
17 That is what happens. The evidence is very clear that 
18 the Martineau lease was unrecorded; and the second 
19 position is that they had no certificate of 
20 non-disturbance from the landlord, which means that 
21 there was a right to foreclose. 
22 They raised the issue that rent was 
23 accepted. That was a right that was given under the 
24 trust deed. By their own evidence they established 
25 there was a default in the trust deed from December of 
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1991 through the present date. Mr. Hill testified to 
that. So long as it is in default, the holder of that 
trust deed is entitled to receive the rents. Those 
rents were received. First they were paid to the 
lender, and when the lender sold for consideration the 
trust deed, they were paid to him. 
So under those circumstances we submit 
that there is no evidence of any kind authorizing the 
setting aside of the default, and as such they lack 
standing to challenge the sale. There was testimony 
as to merger. The documents are very clear that on 
the face there was no intent to merge. Mr. Kimball 
testified to it. The purchase agreement provides it. 
Exhibit 22 provides it. The only document they 
attempt to rebut it with is a document that is not 
signed by Mr. Martineau, that was an assignment of 
lease. Those assignments of leases made assignments. 
But as to Mr. Martineau's lease, there is 
no document of any kind in evidence where Mr. 
Martineau's lease was transferred to Mr. Kimball or to 
Mr. Miller. In fact, they testified that it was not 
transferred. As the Court's aware, the Statute of 
Frauds requires that all agreements on real estate be 
in writing, and there cannot be assumption of a debt 
of another unless it's signed by the party to be 
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bound. And the estoppel certificate signed by Mr, 
Martineau alone does not bind those who received it. 
If they wanted to be bound, they needed an assumption 
of lease signed by the parties to be bound. 
The assignment that they introduced simply 
does not assign the lease. It assigns leases in the 
property, but those are leases that Miller and Kimball 
will acquire. The Martineau lease was specifically 
treated -- the specific provisions in the lease 
control over the general. The parties treated it in 
every single document through the decrees of the 
Court, through the orders of the Court that have been 
submitted, that the right to foreclose would be 
preserved. Merger is an issue of intent. The intent 
of the parties is to foreclose the issue, and that 
intent is untraversed. 
Mr. Martineau makes the argument that 
there is an exception based upon innocent third 
parties. Well, there may be an exception, but the 
case isn't treated as some third parties treat buyers 
and sellers so that there's not a merger to defeat a 
valid security interest. You can never have an 
innocent third party when you have a recorded lease 
and they are in an inferior position. That is what 
the recording statutes are designed to protect. Once 
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1 you take something in a second position, that's the 
2 position you have, and you cannot complain when the 
3 first forecloses, because that is the contract. 
4 What Mr. Martineau attempts to do in this 
5 is to get a lease, which is a very good lease, and it 
6 is subject to, despite what he says, that they had a 
7 gentleman's agreement that it would be not be 
8 discussed with anyone else. They attempt to elevate 
9 and keep their lease ahead of the lender without the 
10 lender's consent, and there's no law to do that. The 
11 law permits everything to be done as it was done in 
12 this case. 
13 We submit we should be allowed to proceed. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Jones? 
15 MR. JONES: Thank you, your Honor. 
16 Let me address the argument with regard to 
17 the setting aside of the default first, your Honor. 
18 I'm not sure procedurally whether that's appropriate, 
19 but in that it's been raised, the facts don't indicate 
20 that Mr. Martineau knew within 90 days after his 
21 conversation with Mr. Miller -- excuse me -- after 
22 his conversation with Mr. Kimball, that in fact Mr. 
23 Kimball was not going to protect him and honor his 
24 lease. He may have come to some of that knowledge 
25 within that time period, but that isn't the event that 
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gives rise principally to the cause of action. 
He didn't know at that point in time, Mr. 
Martineau didn't know, that they were going to do the 
macerations that they did to subordinated the lease to 
the existing 2.3 million dollar trust deed to the new 
$550,000 trust deed. They could have changed their 
mind, and he would have had a claim against them for 
promissory estoppel. 
But if they hadn't acquired title to the 
trust deed and didn't have control over it, and the 
lender had proceeded to foreclose, Mr. Martineau 
wouldn't have an argument and he wouldn't be here 
today. 
None of those facts were known to Mr. 
Martineau until well after June when they commenced 
the foreclosure proceeding again, i.e., Mr. Kimball 
and Mr. Miller did, having taken title to the Deed of 
Trust, having then subordinated that Deed of Trust to 
the new $550,000. That was not known until well after 
the closing, when these proceedings got started again 
for purposes of foreclosure. He had no reason to know 
that he should have any concern with regard to this 
lease until that happened. He was in the same 
position he was before, vis-a-vis the lender. He was 
always in that position with the lender. And again, 
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had there not been a conveyance to Mr. Kimball and to 
Mr. Miller of the trust deed, he wouldn't have those 
rights. 
But because they acquired the trust deed 
and subordinated it, that gives rights to his claim, 
because they now control the ability to let him 
proceed, if you will, under his lease or to attempt to 
foreclose him out. 
Now, all of that said, it's irrelevant 
whether it was a year or three months or 18 months 
afterward, because Rule 60b, subsection 6 and 7, are 
not limited in scope as to when they can be brought. 
Both of them indicate that if for reasons 
post-judgment, 6 in particular, and I would read that 
for the Court just quickly. 
Subsection 6 provides: "Or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application." That's precisely what we've argued to 
the Court, Their actions post-judgment make the 
prospective application of that default certificate 
and judgement inequitable, unfair, and injurious. For 
all of those reasons, the default judgment should 
indeed be set aside. 
Now, addressing the motion in particular. 
We have made the showing we need to today, your Honor. 
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And I'll go through I believe the six points very 
quickly that established that. Number one, the 
purpose of the foreclosure is to collect a debt. In 
this case, they're attempting to foreclose a 2.3 
million dollar trust deed under circumstances where 
they own that and title to the property. They're not 
attempting to collect any debt. The evidence is 
unequivocal today that the whole purpose of the 
foreclosure is to allow Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball the 
opportunity to improve their position vis-a-vis Mr. 
Martineau's lease, get a better lease, or to collect 
-- or to remove him from the property. They do not 
intend to collect one thing from that foreclosure. 
They're not going to get one dollar. They're not 
going to get one right that they don't already have. 
They have title to the property. They own 
it. They've released or consented to the release of 
the obligors. No money is going to come as a result 
of the foreclosure. The only purpose of the 
foreclosure it to foreclose out Mr. Martineau if they 
can't get him to agree to pay to a higher and better 
amount, an amount that is more attractive and 
satisfactory to them. You couple that with the fact 
they have subordinated that Deed of Trust to the new 
$550,000 loan, and what we have is a vigorous effort 
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1 on their part to change the playing field, to make it 
2 certain that they have as much leverage over Mr. 
3 Martineau as possible. Now he can't go to a sheriff's 
4 sale and bid the amount of that trust deed, 2.3 
5 million dollars. 
6 THE COURT: Let me ask you this question: 
7 There's no evidence that's before me that they ever 
8 intended to do that. 
9 MR. JONES: Well, your Honor, whether he 
10 intended to or not I don't believe is the issue. The 
11 issue here is whether they've made it impossible for 
12 him to bid, and the fact of the matter is --
13 THE COURT: But there's no evidence on 
14 that at all, is there? 
15 MR. JONES: Certainly, because the fact of 
16 the matter is that the trust deed is for 2.3 million 
17 dollars, the existing one that is the subject of this 
18 action. The new one is for 5.5 million -- I'm 
19 sorry — $555,000. And what they've done is instead 
20 of leaving him in the position which he was in when 
21 they started this action and took the default, where 
22 if there was a sale he could walk to the courthouse 
23 steps and he knew what the amount of the debt was, he 
24 allowed the default to be taken under circumstances 
25 where he knew there was 2.3 million dollars in debt. 
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1 Now, by subordinating that, he is subject to not 2.3, 
2 but 2.3 plus $550,000. 
3 THE COURT: I guess what I'm saying is 
4 it's all sort of academic, isn't it, unless there's 
5 some evidence that he'd been harmed; that he would 
6 have gone and made the bid and gotten the property? 
7 MR. JONES: I don't think so, your Honor. 
8 The whole purpose of a sheriff's sale is to provide 
9 number one, the ability to collect the debt. And that 
10 doesn't exist here. And number two, what they have 
11 done is to make it -- even if he intended to go and 
12 stand there -- impossible for him to get what he 
13 bargained for at the time the default judgment was 
14 taken. He can't do that, then, because now they have 
15 interposed an additional lien ahead of him for 
16 $550,000. That's our argument on the trust deed. And 
17 with regard to --
18 THE COURT: What you're telling me is 
19 therefore I'm to conclude that he wouldn't have wanted 
20 it with the $550,000 lien? 
21 MR. JONES: He may have wanted it with the 
22 $550,000. I don't know that, your Honor. I mean, I 
23 agree that that's speculative. But what I'm saying to 
24 you is what they did was to act in a fashion which 
25 improved their position to his detriment. They had 
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added the $550,000, making it that much more difficult 
for him to acquire the building, and they did it in 
light of the fact that they don't have a debt to 
collect out there. That's our whole point. There's 
no debt to collect. It's a foreclosure for one 
purpose and one purpose only. It's admitted; it's in 
the documents; it's testified to by both Mr. Miller 
and Mr. Kimball, and that is as stated by TCF Bank in 
their letter: We'll let you foreclose this in order to 
maximize current and future cash flow. One thing and 
one thing only. We'll give you a hammer to beat him 
over the head with to try to get more money out of 
him. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this: Is there 
anything about the structure of this transaction 
that's illegal? 
MR. JONES: Illegal? I don't believe so. 
I mean, your Honor our argument is an equitable 
argument. 
THE COURT: Okay, they did what they were 
entitled to do under the law. 
MR. JONES: Well, they violated his rights 
by doing it, because they worsened his position. 
Again, they did this all post-judgment, your Honor. 
They took a judgment under circumstances where they 
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1 said we're going to foreclose you behind this 2.3 
2 million-dollar loan. 
3 THE COURT: I guess my question is: He 
4 hasn't even recorded his lease? 
5 MR. JONES: That's correct. 
6 THE COURT: Does he have some vested right 
7 to prevent them from going out and imposing new liens 
8 on it, borrowing money? 
9 MR. JONES: They have -- well, your 
10 Honor, they want their cake and they want to eat it, 
11 too. They either want to foreclose him out, and if 
12 they do they want to ignore this provision in his 
13 lease that says they won't foreclose him out. Or they 
14 want him to pay more money. I mean, they really do 
15 want their cake and to eat it, too, your Honor. 
16 They're saying we'll make it so difficult 
17 for you that you've got to negotiate with us or leave 
18 the building. And all the while they're ignoring their 
19 contractual obligation in the lease that says: "So 
20 long as he isn't in default, the lease shall remain in 
21 full force and effect for the full term hereof, and 
22 shall not be terminated as a result of any 
23 foreclosure." 
24 Now, they own the Deed of Trust. They 
25 control entirely whether or not he is foreclosed, 
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1 because this provision, number one, they control it, 
2 number one. But number two, he's performed his lease 
3 obligation and says to them, I'm entitled to say in 
4 under this provision of the lease. But they say, no, 
5 no, no. We never signed that lease. We never signed 
6 it. 
7 They say that in light of the fact that 
8 they took a special warranty deed from the Judge 
9 Building Associates and acquired title. The law in 
10 this state is real clear that when you acquire title 
11 by a deed, you also acquire all of the incidents of 
12 title of that property, including the leases. They 
13 acquired the leases and they so testified. They have 
14 accepted the rents, they've accepted all the benefits 
15 under the Martineau lease since the date they acquired 
16 the property. 
17 Now, your Honor, I've switched horses. 
18 I'm talking to you from a contractual perspective, and 
19 by law they are the tenant -- excuse me — the 
20 landlord. And all of their attempts to say we're 
21 really not, we really tried to exclude Martineau, we 
22 really didn't want to be bound by the lease, are 
23 disingenuous in light of the fact that they knew when 
24 they acquired the property and became the owner of the 
25 property, that they would have a lease under which 
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they accepted money and provided services, which gave 
Martineau certain rights and required them to protect 
Martineau; to keep Martineau in his position as long 
as he was not in default under the lease. And the 
testimony is clear that he's not in default. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. You shifted gears 
here on me. We were talking about events that 
occurred after the default judgment was entered to 
warrant this Court setting aside that default 
judgment. Now you're talking about a contractual 
provision that presumably was known to your client at 
the time the default judgment was entered. 
MR. JONES: Well, it existed at the time 
the default judgment was entered, that's right. But 
remember, at the time the default judgment was 
entered, Harold Hill, Judge Building Associates, they 
didn't own the trust deed. They didn't have any 
rights under the trust deed. 
THE COURT: Why wasn't this raised? 
MR. JONES: For that very reason. 
THE COURT: But what I guess I'm saying is 
he received a copy of the default judgment. 
MR. JONES: He's testified that he has, 
correct. 
THE COURT: So that extinguished his 
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1 rights under the lease, didn't it? 
2 MR. JONES: Well, the default just says 
3 that he's junior. That's all it says, your Honor. 
4 The default judgment doesn't say that his rights are 
5 extinguished. It says upon the sale, and there hasn't 
6 been a sale. 
7 THE COURT: Well, okay. 
8 MR. JONES: And that's why we're here. 
9 Again, what happened are all of their intervening 
10 actions and the fashion in which they structured the 
11 transaction places on them the contractual obligation 
12 to abide by the second sentence in paragraph 33-B. 
13 THE COURT: But the default judgment, 
14 counselor, I think you'll have to concede that's 
15 fairly clear that he's not going to have an interest. 
16 This Court has granted the plaintiffs a default 
17 judgment in this foreclosure action to foreclose him 
18 out. "Upon any execution of sale of the property 
19 pursuant to order of this Court in the above-entitled 
20 action, any interest or lien claimed by the defendant 
21 Martineau shall be forthwith extinguished and 
22 terminated." 
23 MR. JONES: And again, your Honor, that's 
24 why we're standing in front of the Court, because we 
25 want to prevent that because of the subsequent events. 
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1 All of these events --
2 THE COURT: No, I'm talking about this 
3 contract. I guess I'm asking for an explanation of 
4 why if he, in the face of this, why he didn't raise 
5 this issue sooner. 
6 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I think the simple 
7 explanation is that this imposes an obligation on the 
8 lessee -- excuse me -- the lessor, to protect him, 
9 all right? The lessor is in default and the lessor is 
10 being foreclosed out. Obviously, it would be a futile 
11 effort to go to the lessee -- I'm sorry, I keep 
12 saying lessee -- obviously it would have been a 
13 futile effort for the lessee, Mr. Martineau, to go to 
14 the lessor, Mr. Hill, and say protect me, because he's 
15 in default, and he obviously is being foreclosed out 
16 by the lender at that point in time. 
17 Now, that all changes when Mr. Miller and 
18 Mr. Kimball buy both estates, when they buy both the 
19 property and when they acquire title to the very trust 
20 deed that they're trying to foreclose here. They 
21 control this foreclosure, and they have now the 
22 obligation and can perform under that particular term 
23 of the contract. Mr. Hill had no leverage. Mr. Hill 
24 was not in a position to exercise any control or right 
25 with Republic. He was in default with them. 
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But the fact of the matter is by doing the 
transaction in this fashion, and again this was not 
unknown or undisclosed to Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller 
testified that he read this provision of the lease 
before he bought it. Presumably a man of his 
experience and training, especially his legal 
training, would know that if he becomes the landlord 
of the property, then he's got these affirmative 
obligations to protect the tenants. And that's the 
position he put himself in. 
Now, whether it was intentional or 
unintentional is really of no moment, because that's 
where they now. And despite the fact that they 
continue to argue there is no merger, if the Court 
buys that argument, accepts that argument -- excuse 
me, I didn't mean that in a derogatory sense -- that 
the Court accepts that argument, that there is no 
merger, then clearly they have rights separate -- they 
have rights in the Deed of Trust, and they control 
that, and they can exercise that, and they have a duty 
not to under any circumstances injure, harm or 
diminish Mr. Martineau's rights in a foreclosure when 
he is not in default under the terms of the lease, 
which he is not. 
THE COURT: Now, well, let's get back to 
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the argument* Is there any evidence before me, and I 
don't think there is, that Mr. Martineau did not move 
to have this judgment set aside in reliance on the 
fact that he had only the one lien ahead of him, and 
that had he known there was going to be another lien, 
that he would have moved to have the judgment set 
aside? 
MR. JONES: That's precisely what he did. 
When he found out that there was a lien ahead of him, 
he did that. I think that's the best evidence, that 
he viewed the playing field as sufficiently altered, 
and that he was injured thereby. 
THE COURT: He still waited over a year, 
didn't he? 
MR. JONES: After the closing, that's 
correct. But the fact, again, your Honor, under Rule 
60-b, there's not a time period in 60-b(6). We're not 
limited in time to the three-month period. 60-b(6) 
doesn't have that three-month limitation. And the 
fact of the matter is, he'd come to the Court well 
before that, in November of '93, and filed a motion to 
dismiss and said wait a minute. You guys have changed 
things, such that I think the remaining claims here 
should be dismissed. The motion to dismiss was filed 
by Mr. Martineau on November 24, 1993. That's five 
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months after the closing, your Honor, but certainly 
indicates that he was proceeding to do what he needed 
to do to protect his position with regard to his 
interest in this particular action, and his rights to 
assert that he was being harmed thereby. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JONES: Now, while we're talking about 
33-B, Mr. Olsen says gee, we're not subject to it. We 
never signed it. If you're arguing it, the Statute of 
Frauds prevents that. Apparently Mr. Miller and Mr. 
Kimball forget that the rule is when there is a part 
performance, the Statute of Frauds won't defeat a 
person's interest, and there is clearly part 
performance, if not entire performance by Mr. 
Martineau. He's paid his rent checks every single 
month to them. They have provided services to him. 
They've never denied him any services. He's — they 
communicated to him as the landlord, or he's 
communicated to them as the landlord. In every 
respect there is part performance. The Statute of 
Frauds would not in any way limit the application. 
Your Honor, we've made arguments. I also 
want to talk for just a minute about the idea of a 
non-disturbance clause. Mr. Olsen raised that and 
said gee, if he really wanted protection, he should 
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have gone to the bank and got a non-disturbance 
clause. Well, that's exactly what that is once Mr. 
Kimball and Mr. Miller acquired title to the Deed of 
Trust. That's a non-disturbance clause. And when 
they own the Deed of Trust, it's subject to this 
agreement to protect them. 
THE COURT: Didn't you say the bank who 
loaned this money was subject to that? 
MR. JONES: Well, I think the bank was. 
They're not here to testify. But the bank, it was Mr. 
Hill's testimony, was not challenged that he submitted 
the leases, Martineau's leases to the bank and the 
bank never objected until he was in default. I think 
the fact he submitted them --
THE COURT: The loan was entered into 
before the lease. 
MR. JONES: Oh, sure. But he testified --
THE COURT: How can you impose that on the 
bank? 
MR. JONES: Because he submitted it to the 
bank as he said he was required to do under his trust 
deed, and the trust deed requires that he submit all 
new leases to the bank for their review. They never 
rejected it. They never said it was unacceptable 
until after the foreclosure commenced. Now, by then 
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1 Clearly they went back to the bank and 
2 said we don't think the cash flow is there out of 
3 these leases. We find these objectionable. We're 
4 only going to pay $750,000. They've already got the 
5 benefit of Mr. Martineau's low lease, if there is 
6 such, if his rates are low, and at this point in time 
7 there is no testimony other than from Mr. Kimball and 
8 Mr. Miller that the rate is too low. They've already 
9 got the benefit of it in the reduced purchase price, 
10 the different between the 850 and the 750. 
11 Lastly, your Honor, again, I want to 
12 reiterate that the cases are very clear that as to the 
13 merger issue, that merger will exist or not exist; 
14 that is depending upon the intent of the parties. 
15 That's the modern rule. The parties' intent governs 
16 merger, except when an innocent third party is 
17 injured. 
18 I cite to the Court the case, the 
•19 principal case that's argued by the plaintiffs, Paris 
20 Bank of Texas versus Custer. The plaintiffs quote 
21 this language from page 76: "It was a well-established 
22 inflexible rule under the common law that a merger 
23 always took place when a greater and a lesser estate 
24 coincided and met in the same person, one and the same 
25 right, without any intermediate estate." They argued, 
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well, they're saying there is an intermediate estate. 
That argument seems to fly in the face of 
the lease not being recorded, but they say for 
purposes of argument that there's the 1986 trust deed, 
the Martineau lease, and then the later trust deed. 
So there is an intermediate estate. There can't be a 
merger. Well, what was not quoted is where the Court 
goes on and says, let's see: "The interests of the 
parties, when several estates where interests have 
united and will prevent a merger, where the rights of 
innocent third parties who are strangers to the 
transaction" -- Mr. Martineau is clearly a stranger to 
the transaction between the bank, Mr. Miller and Mr. 
Kimball and Judge Building Associates -- "will be 
prejudiced by merger." 
And, in fact, in the case they cited the 
Court found there was a merger. Now there's abundant 
cases, and I can cite them to the Court: Baxter versus 
Revco, a 1977 case from Oklahoma; Walkup versus 
Cushing, also an Oregon case from 1992, all of which 
acknowledge that where there are rights of a third 
party that are affected, then a party's intent as to 
merger is not controlling. And the Court should make 
a decision, then, based upon how that third party will 
be injured. 
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1 Merger is a question of intent. If the buyer and the 
2 seller or the trust deed# owner of the trust deed and 
3 purchaser of the trust deed, don't intend it to be 
4 merged, it isn't. 
5 The issue that Mr. Martineau is hurt, as I 
6 think the Court has pointed out, that question is 
7 disingenuous. He is hurt because he is in the second 
8 position. He was hurt when the default was entered 
9 before any of this happened, because the lease was 
10 extinguished. He was hurt simply because the bank 
11 contracted with Mr. Hill that the bank would have the 
12 right to foreclose. That's the way it works. That's 
13 the way it was set up. That is the only hurt to Mr. 
14 Martineau. 
15 He's not complaining because he's hurt, 
16 he's complaining because he wants to be in a first 
17 position with what he contracted for. What he 
18 contracted for was he was in a second position that 
19 could be foreclosed. It was recorded, documented in 
20 front of him and they gave him notice. The hurt being 
21 a junior inferior interest is the hurt that the law 
22 has to handle or you can't get a clear title. To 
23 argue that there's no debt to be collected is totally 
24 fallacious. They turned the note, and as the document 
25 provided, into a non-recourse note. That's how 
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1 California and other states mandate that you do it in 
2 residential property. It doesn't mean that you don't 
3 get to foreclose and clear title to the property. 
4 That's how the lender gets its value. 
5 Why is a lender interested in seeing that 
6 this foreclosure goes through? Because the value of 
7 his property is tied to what's in there, and they 
8 didn't want Mr. Martineau in there. That's their 
9 right, when they contracted with Mr. Hill. And when 
10 they contracted that contract prior to Mr. Martineau, 
11 that's what they contracted for, clear title, free and 
12 clear of encumbrances. If they have to get it, they 
13 can sell it and deal with it, and that's what they 
14 did. 
15 The O'Reilly case very clearly says intent 
16 governs. The intent is in each and every document, 
17 including the non-recourse in the leases. It is in 
18 every -- it's in the documents that you signed and in 
19 the order that you signed, and it's in the foreclosure 
20 documents. 
21 Mr. Martineau, there's no evidence that he 
22 would have purchased that at a sale. There's no 
23 evidence that he would purchase it ever. The evidence 
24 was that he didn't ever tell Mr. Kimball that he would 
25 not buy because of this conversation. I mean, that 
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1 wasn't a topic of discussion. And you heard Mr. 
2 Martineau testify, I'm a good accountant, but I don't 
3 want to be a landlord. That's the evidence. If he 
4 wants more, he has to improve. 
5 The evidence of intent is everyone who is 
6 involved in the transaction said the intent was not to 
7 merge these documents. Mr. Hill says I reluctantly 
8 agreed to it, but I agreed and I signed the document. 
9 Mr. Miller says there was no intent. Mr. Kimball says 
10 there was no intent. The documents supported from the 
11 bank that have been introduced into evidence show that 
12 there was no intent, and they failed to call a bank's 
13 witness to say there was an intent. They have not 
14 called a single witness that says there was an intent 
15 to merge, and without that they're simply out of luck. 
16 This contractual provision is a 
17 contractual provision between Hill, and is a 
18 contractual provision between Martineau, and it's 
19 clearly inferior. And that's what your order did and 
20 the default judgment did, is it extinguished that. 
21 THE COURT: Are you ready to assume that 
22 obligation under this contract? 
23 MR. OLSEN: No, sir. 
24 THE COURT: Why not? 
25 MR. OLSEN: The agreement doesn't provide 
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for it. It would require an express assumption. It 
would require an assignment and delivery of that lease 
specifically. And they didn't do it. 
The assignment that they purport to rely 
on is an assignment of any leases in the building to 
the secured party. Well, those are leases that they 
have. You can't assign what you don't have. They 
argue, well, you collected rents. That's what the 
trust deed allows them to do. You collect rents until 
you foreclose. They argued that they collected rents 
for a year-and-a-half, almost two years. Well, yes, 
they have, because they tried to foreclose and Mr. 
Martineau came down and got a TRO that stopped it. I 
mean, that's where it is. The reason they're 
collecting rent is because they're entitled to under 
the trust deed. 
But upon sale, and that's what we're 
asking you to do, this lease is gone, because it's 
inferior. Only if that lease were superior would any 
of those provisions survive. And then he's argued, 
the other point they're making, if you look at the 
signature lines on the assignment they're relying 
upon, that's an agreement between the bank and my 
clients. I mean, he's -- Martineau's a stranger to 
that agreement championing rights of the bank where 
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1 the bank has clearly said foreclose. 
2 With that, your Honor, part performance, 
3 there's no part performance in this. The performance 
4 under the security agreement, they get the rents until 
5 they foreclose. It's not part performance of a 
6 lease. 
7 Thank you. We'd submit it, Judge. 
8 One final thought. The windfall in this 
9 case would go to Mr. Martineau. He'd get something he 
10 never contracted for, which is a lease in a second 
11 position elevated to a first, and under his argument, 
12 the type of argument he makes, no one could foreclose, 
13 ever. Because once a lease is in the property, and 
14 once you've taken assignment of rents for security, 
15 there argument is that you have then accepted the 
16 lease and it elevates above the trust deed. It can't 
17 happen. 
18 We'd submit it. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Well, I think that 
20 the crux of this matter before me seems to me to be 
21 whether or not the Court is to set aside this default 
22 judgment. If the Court decides for the reasons that 
23 you have made that this default judgment should be set 
24 aside, then we get further into other equitable 
25 issues. If the Court rules that this default judgment 
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1 should not be set aside, then I think counsel is 
2 correct that you at that point have no standing to 
3 raise these issues if there's a default judgment 
4 that's already been entered which essentially allows 
5 them to go ahead with the sale and to extinguish the 
6 rights of Mr. Martineau. 
7 So I think the decision this Court has to 
8 make is whether or not to set aside the default 
9 judgment. And in allowing this matter to go forward 
10 on an evidentiary hearing, I believe that I indicated 
11 this morning I felt that I needed some evidence with 
12 regard to that issue, whether or not to set aside the 
13 default judgment, and that since we were hearing 
14 evidence, I would hear evidence as well on the motion 
15 for preliminary injunction. So both of those issues, 
16 I believe, have been before the Court this morning, 
17 and the Court will rely on the evidence presented to 
18 make its ruling on both issues. 
19 The Court is not going to set aside the 
20 default judgment. The Court is of the opinion that 
21 there was an unreasonable delay in bringing the motion 
22 to set aside the default judgment. These judgments 
23 have to have some finality, and under certain 
24 circumstances they can be set aside, but there must be 
25 a reasonable response to a motion for a default 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 1 - 0 2 5 6 0 0 1 5 5 0 
1 judgment by a defendant to set aside that default 
2 judgment, and the Court finds there was not in this 
3 case; that there was an unreasonable delay. 
4 Mr. Martineau knew in March of 1993 of 
5 this default judgment, and the Court so finds. And I 
6 believe that I will have you, Mr. Olsen, have you 
7 prepare some findings with respect to this ruling. 
8 The Court finds that Mr. Martineau did have knowledge 
9 of the default judgment; that the default judgment is 
10 clear in its terms. Had this in some manner or had he 
11 had some rights that arose out of this contractual 
12 provision that you've shown me today that could be 
13 relied upon to set aside the default judgment, then it 
14 could have been done at that time. He knew of the 
15 contract; he knew of the contractual rights at the 
16 very time that the default judgment was made known to 
17 him, and still there was a delay of approximately 17 
18 months. 
19 Now, you've relied quite heavily, Mr. 
20 Jones, on this subsequent transaction that occurred in 
21 June of 1993 to say that this default judgment should 
22 be set aside, and that that somehow violated Mr. 
23 Martineau's rights. And I disagree with you. I am 
24 not convinced and I haven't been shown that there's 
25 any right of his that has been violated by that 
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subsequent transaction. 
I think you can see that the plaintiffs 
had a legal right to do what they did. They could 
have gone out and borrowed money on the property. I 
believe they have acted legally in everything that 
they've done and that they had a right to fashion this 
transaction in the way that they did, and I don't know 
of any vested right that the defendant would have in 
his position to prevent them in any way from doing 
that, or even to argue that they shouldn't. So I just 
am not convinced. 
And in addition that, there's been 
absolutely no evidence, and as heavily as you have 
relied on that subsequent transaction, there's been no 
evidence as to the significance of that subsequent 
transaction, actually, to your client, as to what his 
intent was, what he relied upon, whether he intended 
to bid on this property or whether in any way he 
actually has been harmed. I think that you've asked 
me to rule on that academically, that there may be 
some harm. But there has been no evidence from your 
client with regards to those subsequent transactions. 
I think that you failed in your evidence 
to show that there would be irreparable harm if the 
sale had gone forward, but that may be a superfluous 
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ruling inasmuch as the Court feels there has been an 
unreasonable delay in moving to set aside the default 
judgment. Therefore, I will allow the default 
judgment to stand. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Olsen, would you prepare 
findings of fact? 
MR. OLSEN: I will, your Honor. One brief 
bit of testimony if the Court would like it now or if 
you would like it later. The injunction is issued 
without — he's pursued an issue without right. Utah 
case law provides the difference between fair rental 
value and what's actually paid by Mr. Martineau as an 
element of damages. Otherwise, he could stay in the 
property forever at the $5.90 rate, and the going rate 
is roughly $11 a foot. We are prepared to introduce 
testimony from Mr. Miller and Mr. Greg Dunn, who is 
the leasing agent, and that would probably only take 
us five minutes, if we can introduce it now or set up 
a subsequent time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, are you prepared to 
meet that? 
MR. JONES: Certainly not, your Honor. 
It's an inappropriate time and place to raise that, 
let alone that we have legal objections to it. 
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They're not entitled to it under the case law, I don't 
believe. Number two, that's not the purpose of the 
hearing today. We're certainly going to be entitled 
to have notice of what their claims are and what they 
are going to assert the fair rental value was in order 
to be prepared to respond. It's not the subject of 
the hearing today. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll give you some 
time to respond to that. If you think it can be 
decided on a legal basis, then submit a memorandum. 
And I'd like to have that memorandum if you can do 
that in 15 days. 
MR. JONES: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think the way we'll proceed 
is to have you, Mr. Olsen, prepare a memorandum 
indicating why you feel you're entitled to that and 
what you think you're entitled to and why there needs 
to be an evidentiary hearing. I'll give you 15 days 
to do that. 
Mr. Jones, I'll allow you 10 days to 
respond to that with your argument as to why they're 
not entitled to any damages. And I'll allow you five 
days to respond to that, Mr. Olsen, and then the Court 
will rule. And if I determine at that time that I 
need evidence, that they are entitled to something 
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and I think I need some evidence, then I'll tell you 
and set up an evidentiary hearing. 
MR. OLSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, with regard to our 
claim to set aside the default judgment and the 
Court's ruling, I understand that the Court is basing 
its ruling principally upon the fact that there was an 
unreasonable delay after the time it was entered. 
Does the Court feel it necessary to make a ruling with 
regard to our evidence as to the equitable issues, the 
estoppel issues as they relate to the default? 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know that I need 
to. I'll be prepared to do that, but I'm not certain. 
As it relates to the default? 
MR. JONES: Yes, the setting aside of the 
default. 
THE COURT: Well, as it relates to the 
default, yes, I think that would have been something 
for the finder of fact and the conclusions as it 
relates to that. And the Court's just of the opinion 
that inasmuch as there was an unreasonable delay, that 
the Court has to balance the harm in this case. And 
to come in just a few days before the sale, 17 months 
after the default was entered, the Court feels is 
unreasonable. 
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MR. OLSEN: We'll prepare those* 
THE COURT: Now, I'm not sure which 
specific equitable issues you're referring to. If you 
want me to clarify that, I will. 
MR. JONES: Recognizing the Court has made 
its ruling, I think it wasn't 17 months later, your 
Honor, since this notice. The sale was noticed, I 
believe, in September and that's when Mr. Martineau 
came in and obtained a TRO. He responded within a 
matter of two or three months after the — actually a 
matter of three months after the closing. 
THE COURT: I don't want to go back and 
argue that, but the specific dates I may be in error 
on. The default judgment was entered in March of 
1993, March 5th. 
MR. NELSON: The sale was scheduled — if 
I could just jump in because I was there for the date 
-- the sale was scheduled for the end of November. 
Just before the sale, a motion was filed to dismiss 
all the causes of action. You issued a TRO. We went 
through the next eight or nine months of arguments. 
MR. JONES: That's right. 
MR. NELSON: Counsel, at the last hearing 
we were at scheduled in October, suggested we hadn't 
filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. I 
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indicated I didn't think it was necessary because we 
had already filed a motion to dismiss heretofore, but 
based upon his statement we then filed the motion to 
set aside the default judgment. 
THE COURT: And that was about 17 months 
after the default was entered. What specific 
equitable issues are you referring to? 
MR. JONES: Well, the estoppel issue that 
we've already mentioned, I think, goes well to the 
basis for setting aside the default. 
THE COURT: All right, then. I think that 
you're referring to the testimony of your client that 
there was a promise made that he would not be 
foreclosed on. 
MR. JONES: Both that and the payment of 
rent. 
THE COURT: The Court finds with regard to 
the estoppel argument that in light of what happened 
after that promise, and the Court finds it does not 
rise to the level of a promise. But in any event, the 
Court finds that there was an unreasonable reliance 
upon that promise; that if there was reliance, it was 
an unreasonable reliance in light of what occurred 
shortly after that so-called promise was made, and 
that Mr. Martineau would not have been entitled to 
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1 I rely upon that promise that he would not be foreclosed 
2 upon, in light of the default judgment and in light of 
3 everything else that occurred after that period of 
4 time. 
5 MR. JONES: Thank you, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Court will be in recess. 
7 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 4:03 
8 I p.m.) 
9 I *** 
10 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
) ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
This is to certify that the 
preceding motion hearing before Judge Frank G. Noel 
was taken before me, Kathy H. Morgan, a Certified 
Court Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State 
of Utah; 
That the above-named proceedings were 
reported by me in stenotype, and thereafter caused by 
me to be transcribed into typewriting, and that a 
full, true, and correct transcription of said 
testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the 
foregoing pages numbered from 4 to 123 inclusive. 
I further certify that after the said 
proceedings were transcribed, the original of same was 
filed with the aforementioned court. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action, and that I am not interested in the 
event thereof. 
Witness my hand and official seal at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, this 10th day of August, 1996. 
My commission expires: 
May 24, 1999 
N O T A R Y P U B L I C 
STATE OF UTAH 
MyGommsaonExpm 
May 24,1999 
KATHY K MORGAN 
7296 South 525 East 
Midvate, Utah 84047 
Kathy R, RPR 
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 14 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), 
or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon 
the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 65A- Injunctions. 
(a) Preliminary injunctions. 
(1) Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party. 
(2) Consolidation of hearing. Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an 
application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits 
to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even when this 
consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon an application for a preliminary 
injunction which would be admissible at the trial on the merits becomes part of the trial record 
and need not be repeated at the trial. This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied 
as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury. 
(b) Temporary restraining orders. 
(1) Notice. No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the adverse party 
or that party's attorney unless (A) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or 
by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to 
the applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in opposition, and 
(B) the applicant or the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing as to the efforts, if 
any, that have been made to give notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should 
not be required. 
(2) Form of order. Every temporary restraining order shall be endorsed with the date and hour 
of issuance and shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record. The order 
shall define the injury and state why it is irreparable. The order shall expire by its terms within 
such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed 
the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against whom 
the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the 
extension shall be entered of record. 
(3) Priority of hearing. If a temporary restraining order is granted, the motion for a 
preliminary injunction shall be scheduled for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes 
precedence over all other civil matters except older matters of the same character. When the 
motion comes on for hearing, the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall have 
the burden to show entitlement to a preliminary injunction; if the party does not do so, the court 
shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. 
(4) Dissolution or modification. On two days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary 
restraining order without notice, or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may 
prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification. In that event 
the court shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice 
require. 
(c) Security. 
(1) Requirement. The court shall condition issuance of the order or injunction on the giving 
of security by the applicant, in such sum and form as the court deems proper, unless it appears 
that none of the parties will incur or suffer costs, attorney fees or damage as the result of any 
wrongful order or injunction, or unless there exists some other substantial reason for dispensing 
with the requirement of security. No such security shall be required of the United States, the 
State of Utah, or of an officer, agency, or subdivision of either; nor shall it be required when 
it is prohibited by law. 
(2) Amount not a limitation. The amount of security shall not establish or limit the amount of 
costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the restraining order or 
preliminary injunction, or damages that may be awarded to a party who is found to have been 
wrongfully restrained or enjoined. 
(3) Jurisdiction over surety. A surety upon a bond or undertaking under this rule submits to 
the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as agent upon whom 
any papers affecting the surety's liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. The 
surety's liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action. 
The motion and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk 
of the court who shall forthwith mail copies to the persons giving the security if their addresses 
are known. 
(d) Form and scope. 
Every restraining order and order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its 
issuance. It shall be specific in terms and shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by 
reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. It shall 
be binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and 
attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive 
notice, in person or through counsel, or otherwise, of the order. If a restraining order is 
granted without notice to the party restrained, it shall state the reasons justifying the court's 
decision to proceed without notice. 
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing 
by the applicant that: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or 
injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the 
underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject 
of further litigation. 
(f) Domestic relations cases. 
Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the equitable powers of the courts in domestic 
relations cases. 
